The State of Man Before the Fall and the
Covenant of Nature
The Scholastic Reformer explains
how "covenant works" in the Covenant of Works.
The The State of Man Before the Fall
and the Covenant of Nature
by Dr.
Francis Turretin
IV. This double covenant is proposed to us in
Scripture:
Twofold of nature and of grace; of works and of
faith; legal and covenant: of evangelical. The foundation of this
distinction rests both on the different relation of God contracting (who
can be considered now as Creator and Lord, then as Redeemer and Father)
and on the diverse condition of man (who may be viewed either as a
perfect or as a fallen creature); also on the diverse mode of obtaining
life and happiness (either by proper obedience or by another's imputed);
finally on the diverse duties prescribed to man (to wit, works or
faith). For in the former, God as Creator demands perfect obedience from
innocent man with the promise of life and eternal happiness; but in the
latter, God as Father promises salvation in Christ to the fallen man
under the condition of faith. The former rests upon the work of man; the
latter upon the grace of God alone. The former upon a just Creator; the
latter upon a merciful Redeemer. The former was made with innocent man
without a mediator; the latter was made with fallen man by the
intervention of a mediator.
V. The covenant of nature is that which God the
Creator made with innocent man as his creature, concerning the giving of
eternal happiness and life under nature." The condition of perfect and
personal obedience. It is called "natural,* not from natural obligation
(which God does not have towards man), but because it is founded on the
nature of man (as it was at first created by God) and on his integrity
of powers. It is also called "legal" because the condition on man's part
was the observation of the law of nature engraved within him; and of
"works" because it depended upon works or his proper obedience.
VI. Episcopius, and with him the Remonstrants, deny
the existence of that a covenant of nature was made with Adam ("Institutiones
theologica," 2.1 in Opera Theologica [16781, p. 23); but it can be
proved. (1) There are granted the essential parties of a covenant, God
and man. God, who as the Creator of man, must also be his governor and
from this, his legislator, and because good in his own nature, the
rewarder also of those who seek him (Heb. 11:6), so that he would not
only give him a law for his direction, but also hold forth a reward to
him for keeping it (although bound by no right to that). Man who,
because a creature, must also wholly depend upon God and, because
upright, could keep the inscribed law, and because rational, ought not
otherwise than in a rational manner (i.e., by the intellect and will) be
governed, both by the prescription of a law, the promise of rewards and
the threatening of punishment. Also since he was created after the
image of divine holiness, he ought to have been led to a communion of
that happiness also which is the inseparable attendant of holiness.
VII. Second, a law was imposed upon Adam, which
necessarily implies a federal agreement and contract. For he who
receives it, binds himself officially to obedience under the punishment
denounced through the same; he who gives it (for the very reason that he
exacts obedience) is bound to furnish indemnity and security to the one
obeying. Although Moses sets forth only one part of that federal
sanction (referring to punishment. Gen. 2:17). still he proves that the
former concerning the promise should not be excluded, both from the
sacrament of the tree of life (by which it was sealed) and from the
threatening of death (which by reason of contraries had the implied
promise of life and from the various passages of Scripture which express
more clearly the nature and sanction of the law, as Lev. 18:5-"lf a man
do these, he shall live in them,' cf. Dt. 27:26; Ezk. 20:11; Mt. 19:17;
Gal. 3:12).
VIII. Third, the passage in Hos. 6:7 seems not
obscurely to intimate this: the Israelites are said to have
"transgressed the covenant like Adam". For although these words may also
be explained of the inconstancy of men (that they may be said to have
transgressed the covenant as men are wont to do, who are naturally false
and fickle, and often deceive expectation), still nothing prevents their
being referred also to Adam (that they may be said to have violated the
covenant like Adam, their first parent, who miserably broke the covenant
contracted with him by God). A similar locution occurs in Job 31:33: "If
I covered,' says he, "my transgressions as Adam.' Here is a manifest
reference to the fact of Adam's endeavoring to excuse and hide his sin
(Gen. 3:12).
IX. Fourth, such a covenant was demanded not only
by the goodness and philanthropy (philanthrapia) of God (which
could not exert itself more fitly than by receiving nearer to himself
and making happy with his communion the man seeking him), but also by
the state of man and the desire of happiness impressed upon his heart by
God. Since it cannot be doubted that it was right and lawful, it could
not be empty and frustrated, but ought to be fulfilled on the ground of
man's obedience (unless we hold that God wished to feed man with a vain
desire and thus deceive him—which even to think is blasphemous).
X. In this covenant we consider: (1) the subject or
contracting parties; (2) the pact itself. The contracting parties are
God and man. God contracts as Creator and Lord. Under this relation (schesei),
two things ate included: legislator power and goodness in remunerating.
The former because as Creator he cannot but govern the creature, nor can
he govern except suitably to his nature (i.e., rationally [logikos]
by the imposition of fit laws). The latter because he could not help
loving and rewarding the creature doing his duty.
XI. Man must be viewed under a double relation -
Man as just and as the first. He had the power to perform the prescribed
duty. Thus there arose the obligation of fulfilling it (which otherwise
could not have had place since no one is bound to an absolute
impossibility). In the latter, Adam in a certain manner included the
whole human race, which was to spring from him, both as the root and the
seminal principle from whom the whole human race was to descend (Acts
17:26); and as a public person and representative head, because he
represented all men who were to spring naturally from him. Hence that
covenant pertained not only to Adam, but to all his posterity in him.
The illustrious Amyrald acknowledges "as he was the first man, he, as it
were, represented the whole human race, which was to be born from him"
("Theses Theologicae de Tribus Foederibus Divinis," 8 in Syntagma
Thesium Theologicarum [1664], p. 213). Now the foundation of this union
arises from the twofold bond connecting men with Adam: the one natural,
according to which he was the common father of all and they his sons;
the other forensic, by which from the most wise providence of God he was
constituted the chief and head of the human race, who should contract
for himself and his, and hold or lose the goods bestowed upon him, as
goods common to the whole of nature.
XII. The pact consists of two parts: on the one
side, the exaction of duty on the part of God and a restipulation
consisting: (a) in on the part of man; on the other side, the promise of
the exaction of blessing on the part of God and the acceptation on the
duty or of the part of man. The duty was partly general, partly special
obedience due to (according to the twofold law given to him: the moral
or the law. The general was the knowledge and worship of God, justice
towards his neighbor and every kind of holiness; the special was
abstinence from the forbidden fruit (in which obedience to the whole law
was contained as in a compendium and specimen). The former was founded
on the law of nature not written in a book, but engraven and stamped
upon the heart (of which Paul says, "All do by nature the things
contained in the law, and show the work of the law written in their
hearts," Rom. 2:14, 15). Thus they who are without the written law are
not without the engraven law since they (through the dictates of
conscience) are a law unto themselves. The latter was founded upon the
symbolic and positive law. The former was principal and primary; the
latter, however, only secondary. For although he was bound to obey each
special precept or that symbolic law given to him, still most especially
was obedience to the natural law required of him (for exploring of
which this symbolic precept only served, as will be shown hereafter).
XIII. The obedience which the law demanded ought to
have these marks;(l) with regard to principle-sincerity, to be true and
sincere from the whole heart, not hypocritical and external of the body
only; (2) with regard to the object—universality, to extend not to
certain things only, but to all the precepts of the law without
exception; (3) with regard to degrees—intension, to be perfect and
absolute; (4) with regard to duration-perseverance, to be constant and
perpetual even unto the end without interruption.
XIV. Although man was already bound to this
obedience by a natural obligation as a rational creature, necessarily
subject to the dominion of God and his law, yet he was mote strongly
bound by a federal obligation which God so stipulated that man—by the
powers received in creation—could perform it, although in order that he
might actually perform it, he still needed the help of God both to
actuate these faculties and powers and to preserve them from change.
This help did not tend to the infusion of any new power, but only to
exercising the efficacy of that power which he had received. Now this
did not belong properly to the covenant of nature, but always depended
on the most free good pleasure of God; otherwise the covenant of nature
had been immutable, and man had never sinned.
XV. The sanction of the covenant attended the
exaction
(b) The sanction of duty. It consisted both in the
promise of reward and in the threatening of punishment. The promise was
of the highest happiness (of eternal life) to be passed not on earth but
in heaven. The threatening was of death and whatever in Scripture comes
under the name of death to express punishment of all kinds (into which
man by his own sin deservedly fell).
XVI. However, from this pact arises the mutual
obligation of the parties, differing according to their condition. With
respect to man, not only was it from die pact, but absolute and simple
from the nature of the thing (and on the account of God, to whom man as
a creature to the Creator, the beneficiary to the Benefactor, owed
himself wholly and whatever he had to God and was bound to love him with
his whole heart). But with respect to God, it was gratuitous, as
depending upon a pact or gratuitous promise (by which God was bound not
to man, but to himself and to his own goodness, fidelity and truth, Rom.
3:3; 2 Tim. 2:13). Therefore there was no debt (properly so called) from
which man could derive a right, but only a debt of fidelity, arising out
of the promise by which God demonstrated his infallible and immutable
constancy and truth. If the apostle seems to acknowledge this right or
debt (Rom. 4:4), it must be understood in no other than a respective
sense; not as to the proportion and condignity of the duty rendered to
God by man (Rom. 8:18; Lk. 17:10), but to the pact of God and justice
(i.e., the fidelity of him making it).
XVII. If therefore upright man in that state had
obtained this merit, it must not be understood properly and rigorously.
Since man has all things from and owes all to God, he can seek from him
nothing as his own by right, nor can God be a debtor to him-not by
condignity of work and from its intrinsic value (because whatever that
may be, it can bear no proportion to the infinite reward of life), but
from the pact and the liberal promise of God (according to which man had
the right of demanding the reward to which God had of his own accord
bound himself) and in comparison with the covenant of grace (which rests
upon the sole merit of Christ, by which he acquired for us the right to
life). However, this demanded antecedently a proper and personal
obedience by which he obtained both his own justification before God
and life, as the stipulated reward of his labors.
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