QEOMACIA AUTEXOUSIASTIKH

OR,

A DISPLAY OF ARMINIANISM:

BEING

A DISCOVERY OF THE OLD PELAGIAN IDOL FREE-WILL, WITH THE
NEW GODDESS CONTINGENCY,

ADVANCING THEMSELVES INTO THE THRONE OF THE GOD OF HEAVEN, TO THE
PREJUDICE OF HIS GRACE, PROVIDENCE, AND SUPREME
DOMINION OVER THE CHILDREN OF MEN;

Wherein

THE MAIN ERRORS BY WHICH THEY ARE FALLEN OFF FROM THE RECEIVED DOCTRINE OF ALL
THE REFORMED CHURCHES, WITH THEIR OPPOSITION IN DIVERS PARTICULARS
TO THE DOCTRINE ESTABLISHED IN THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND,
ARE DISCOVERED AND LAID OPEN OUT OF THEIR OWN
WRITINGS AND CONFESSIONS, AND CONFUTED
BY THE WORD OF GOD.

Produce your cause, saith the LORD: bring forth your strong reasons, saith
the King of Jacob.—
Isaiah 41:21.

Woe unto him that striveth with his Maker! Let the potsherd strive with the
potsherds of the earth.—
Isaiah 45:9.

Qe>v w+ Ake>si>lai kli>maka kai< mo>nov ajna>bhqi eijv to<n oujrano>n.—
Constant., apud Socrat., lib. 1. cap. 10.

PREFATORY NOTE.

THE relation of man to his Creator has engaged the attention of earnest and thoughtful minds, from the days of the patriarch of Uz to the most recent controversies of modern times. The entrance of sin into the world has vastly complicated this relationship; so that, considered in its various bearings, it involves some of the most difficult problems with which the human intellect has ever attempted to grapple. The extent to which the intellect itself has been weakened and beclouded by the corruption of our nature, renders us the less able to penetrate into the deep mysteries of human duty and destiny. Whether man sins now as essentially affected with the taint of the first sin, and involved in the responsibilities of the first sinner, or sins wholly on his own account and by his own free act, under the bias of no connection with Adam, except what connection obtains between example on the one hand and imitation on the other? whether, on the supposition of a scheme of saving grace, grace is simply divine and external aid to the will of man, already operating freely in the direction of what is good, and so establishing a meritorious claim upon God for the bestowal of such aid, or a supernatural influence creating in man the very liberty itself to will and to do what is good? and whether, in the latter view of divine grace, as bestowed in divine sovereignty, and therefore according to a divine purpose, it can be reconciled with human responsibility?—are the questions which produced the sharp encounter of keen and conflicting wits between Pelagius and Augustine of old.

Towards the middle of the ninth century, these questions again assumed distinctive prominence in the history of theological speculation. Gottschalc, a monk of Orbais, distinguished himself by his advocacy of the doctrines of Augustine. It was the doctrine of predestination chiefly on which he insisted; and the controversy in his hands assumed this peculiar modification, that not merely the application of gracious influence, but the reference of the atonement, was exhibited as under the limit and regulation of the divine sovereignty and purpose. Not that in this respect he was at variance with Augustine, but the point seems to have been specially and formally mooted in the discussions of this age. His view of predestination embraced an element which may be reckoned an advance on the Augustinian doctrine; for according to him, predestination was twofold, comprehending the punishment of the reprobate as well as the salvation of the elect; but while he held the predestination of men to the punishment of their sin, he was far from holding, as his opponents alleged, that they were predestinated to the commission of sin. Council warred with council in the case of Gottschalc. Gottschalc himself expiated by a death in prison his audacious anticipation of the rights of private judgment and free inquiry in a dark age.

The next revival of the same controversy in substance, though under certain modifications, took place after the Reformation. It is remarkable that at this period discussion on these weighty questions sprang up almost simultaneously in three different parts of Europe, and in three schools of theology, among which a wide diversity existed. The shackles of mediaeval ignorance were burst asunder by the awakening intelligence of Europe; and if we except the controversy between Protestantism and Popery, on which the Reformation hinged, no point could more naturally engage the mind, in the infancy of its freedom, than the compatibility of the divine purpose with human responsibility; on the solution of which problem the nature of redemption seemed to depend, and around which, by the spell of the very mystery attaching to it, human speculation in all ages had revolved. When an interdict still lay on theological inquiry, Thomists and Scotists had discussed it in its metaphysical form, and under a cloud of scholastic subtleties, lest the jealousies of a dominant church should be awakened. But now, when a measure of intellectual freedom had been acquired, and the dispute between free-will on the one hand and efficacious grace on the other involved a practical issue between Rome and Geneva, the question received a treatment almost exclusively theological.

First, perhaps, in the order of time, this discussion was revived in Poland, and in connection with the heresies of Socinus. The divinity of Christ, the nature of the atonement, and the corruption of human nature, are all doctrines essentially connected. It is because Christ is divine that an adequate satisfaction has been rendered, in his sufferings, to the claims of divine justice; and such an atonement is indispensable for our salvation, if man, because dead in sin, has no power to achieve salvation by any merit of his own. A denial of the total corruption of our nature seems essential to the Unitarian system; so far there is common ground between the systems of Pelaglius and Socinus. It is not wonderful that this measure of identity should develop consequences affecting the doctrine of the divine purposes and of predestination, though it is beyond our limits to trace either the necessary or the historical evolution of these consequences. Spanheim, in his “Elenchus Controversiarum,” p. 237, ascribes the origin of the Arminian controversy in Holland to certain emissaries, Ostorodius and Voidovius, dispatched by the Polish Socinians into the Low Countries, for the purpose of propagating the tenets of their sect. Their tenets respecting the Trinity and the atonement took no root in these countries; but Spanheim affirms that it was otherwise in regard to certain opinions of Socinus, “quae ille recoxit ex Pelagii disciplinâ,” on predestination, free-will, and the ground of justification before God.

About the same time, the Church of Rome was shaken to its center by the same controversy. The Jesuits had always Pelagian leanings, and in the Council of Trent their influence was triumphant, and, so far as its decrees stereotype the Romish creed, sealed the doom of the waning authority of Augustine. Louis Molina, in 1588, made an attempt, in his lectures on “The Concord of Grace and Free-will,” to unite the conflicting theories. The Jesuits regarded his attempt with no favor. A lengthened controversy arose, in which Molinism, as partly a deviation from, and partly a compromise of, the fundamental principles of the Augustinian system, was effectually assailed by the piety of Jansen, the learning of Arnauld, and the genius of Pascal, till the bull Unigenitus secured a lasting triumph for Jesuitism, by the authoritative condemnation of the doctrines of Augustine, as declared in the collection of extracts from his writings which Jansen had published under the title “Augustinus.”

But it was in Holland that the controversy on this point arose which had the chief influence on British theology, and reduced the questions at issue to the shape under which they are discussed by Owen in his “Display of Arminianism.” On the death of an eminent theologian of the name of Junius, Arminius was called to the vacant chair in the University of Leyden. Gomar, a professor in the same university, and the Presbytery of Amsterdam, opposed his appointment, on the ground of his erroneous principles. On giving a pledge that he would teach nothing at variance with the Belgic Confession and Catechism, he was allowed to enter on his office as professor in 1603. Gomar and he again fell into a dispute on the subject of predestination,—the origin of prolonged troubles and controversies in the Church of Holland. Gomar and his party were supported by the majority of the clergy in the church. Arminius depended upon the political support of the state. The former sought a national synod to adjudicate on the prevailing controversy. The latter, having the ear of the state, contrived to prevent it. Stormy scenes ensued, amid which Arminius died, and Episcopius became the leader of the Remonstrants, as his followers were called, from a remonstrance which they submitted in 1610 to the States of Holland and West Friesland. The Remonstrants levied soldiers to sustain their cause, and the provinces resounded with military preparations. At last, profiting by the confusion, Maurice, the head of the house of Orange, by a series of daring and reckless movements, seized upon the government of the States. In deference to Gomar and his party, he convened a general synod on the 13th November 1618. The doctrines of Arminius were condemned, and five articles were drawn up and published as the judgment of the synod on the points in dispute. The first asserts election by grace, in opposition to election on the ground of foreseen excellence; in the second God is declared to have willed that Christ should efficaciously redeem all those, and those only, who from eternity were chosen to salvation; the third and fourth relate to the moral impotence of man, and the work of the Spirit in conversion; and the fifth affirms the doctrine of the perseverance of the saints. The Church of France embodied these articles among her own standards. The Church of Geneva as cordially acquiesced in them.

Four English deputies, Drs. Carleton, Hall, Davenant, and Ward, together with Dr. Balcanquhal from Scotland, by the command of James VI., repaired to Holland, and took their place in the Synod of Dort, in accordance with a request of the Dutch Church to be favored with the aid and countenance of some delegates from the British Churches. The proceedings of the Synod of Dort had the sanction of these British divines. No doubt can be entertained that the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England were not Arminian; but on the elevation of Laud to the see of Canterbury, Arminianism grew strong within its pale. A royal prohibition was issued against all discussion of the controverted points in the pulpit. All ecclesiastical preferments at the disposal of the Crown were bestowed on those who leaned to Arminian views. “The fates of our church,” says Owen, in the note to the reader prefixed to the following treatise, “having of late devolved the government thereof into the hands of men tainted with this poison, Arminianism became backed with the powerful arguments of praise and preferment, and quickly prevailed to beat poor naked truth into a corner.” It would, however, be neither fair nor correct if the statement of these facts left an impression that Arminianism made progress solely through the help of royal and prelatic favor. It was embraced and supported by some authors to whom no sinister motives can be imputed; and the cause has never found an abler advocate than John Goodwin, whose name, for his publications against the royal interest, was associated with that of Milton, in the legal proceedings instituted against them both at the Restoration.

At this juncture, Owen felt it his duty to oppose the innovations on the received doctrine of the church, by the publication of a work in which the views of the Arminians are exhibited on all the leading topics of the controversy, with the exception of three points, relating to universal grace, justification, and the perseverance of the saints. He substantiates his statements regarding the Arminian tenets by copious quotations from the works of the Dutch Remonstrants; and contrasts them, at the close of each chapter, with passages from Scripture. Exception may be taken to this course, as the sentence of any author, detached from the context, may convey a meaning which is essentially modified by it. Some of these quotations are so far accommodated by Owen as to present a full statement of a particular opinion, instead of appearing in the parenthetic and incidental form which they present in the original works, as merely parts of a sentence. We did not feel it needful to interfere with them in this shape; for, so far as we can judge, our author evinces perfect integrity in all the quotations to which he has recourse, and the slight alterations occasionally made on them never superinduce a dishonest or mistaken gloss on the views of the authors from whom the passages are selected. It may be questioned if Owen sufficiently discriminates the doctrine of Arminius from the full development which his system, after his death, received in the hands of his followers. Sometimes, moreover, opinions possessing the distinctive features of Pelagianism are confounded with Arminianism, strictly so called. Our author, perhaps, may be vindicated on the ground that it was his object to exhibit Arminianism as current and common in his day; and his quotations seem to prove that his Display of it was not far from the truth, though, from the refinement of modern discrimination on some of the points, many an Arminian would hardly subscribe to some of the statements as a correct representation of his creed, and a Calvinistic author is under obvious temptation to run up Arminian views into what he may esteem their legitimate consequences in the extravagance of the Pelagian theory. The style is simple; some polish appears in the composition; and occasionally a degree of ornament and pleasantry is employed (as when he enters on the question of Free-will, chap. 12.), which is rare with Owen, who perhaps prided himself on the studious rejection of literary elegance. It could be wished that he had risen superior to the vice of the age in such discussions, by manifesting less acerbity of temper and diction in the refutation of the views which he combats in this work. It was Owen’s first publication (1642), and immediately brought him into notice. The living of Fordham in Essex was conferred upon him by the Committee of Religion, to whom the work is dedicated.—ED.

2 Martii, anno Domini 1642.

IT is this day ordered, by the Committee of the House of Commons in Parliament for the Regulating of Printing and Publishing of Books, That this book, entitled “A Display of Arminianism,” be printed.

JOHN WHITE.

TO THE RIGHT HONORABLE
THE LORDS AND GENTLEMEN OF THE
COMMITTEE FOR RELIGION,[1][1]

THE many ample testimonies of zealous reverence to the providence of God, as well as affectionate care for the privileges of men, which have been given by this honorable assembly of parliament, encourage the adorers of the one, no less than the lovers of the other, to vindicate that also from the encroachments of men. And as it was not, doubtless, without divine disposition that those should be the chiefest agents in robbing men of their privileges who had nefariously attempted to spoil God of his providence; so we hope the same all-ruling hand hath disposed of them to be glorious instruments of re-advancing his right and supreme dominion over the hearts of men whose hearts he hath prepared with courage and constancy to establish men in their inviolated rights, by reducing a sweet harmony between awful sovereignty and a well-moderated liberty. Now, the first of these being demandated to your particular care, I come unto you with a bill of complaint against no small number in this kingdom, who have wickedly violated our interest in the providence of God, and have attempted to bring in the foreign power of an old idol, to the great prejudice of all the true subjects and servants of the Most High. My accusation I make good by the evidence of the fact, joined with their own confessions. And because, to waive the imputation of violent intrusion into the dominion of another, they lay some claim and pretend some title unto it, I shall briefly show how it is contrary to the express terms of the great charter of Heaven to have any such power introduced amongst men. Your known love to truth and the gospel of Christ makes it altogether needless for me to stir you up by any motives to hearken to this just complaint, and provide a timely remedy for this growing evil; especially since experience hath so clearly taught us here, in England, that not only eternal but temporal happiness also dependeth on the flourishing of the truth of Christ’s gospel.

Justice and religion were always conceived as the main columns and upholders of any state or commonwealth; like two pillars in a building, whereof the one cannot stand without the other, nor the whole fabric without them both. As the philosopher spake of logic and rhetoric, they are artes anti>strofai, mutually aiding each other, and both aiming at the same end, though in different manners; so they, without repugnancy, concur and sweetly fall in one with another, for the reiglement and direction of every person in a commonwealth, to make the whole happy and blessed: and where they are both thus united, there, and only there, is the blessing in assurance whereof Hezekiah rejoiced,—truth and peace. An agreement without truth is no peace, but a covenant with death, a league with hell, a conspiracy against the kingdom of Christ, a stout rebellion against the God of heaven; and without justice, great commonwealths are but great troops of robbers. Now, the result of the one of these is civil peace; of the other, ecclesiastical: betwixt which two there is a great sympathy, a strict connection, having on each other a mutual dependence. Is there any disturbance of the state? it is usually attended with schisms and factions in the church; and the divisions of the church are too often even the subversions of the commonwealth. Thus it hath been ever since that unhappy difference between Cain and Abel; which was not concerning the bounds and limits of their inheritance, nor which of them should be heir to the whole world, but about the dictates of religion, the offering of their sacrifices. This fire, also, of dissension hath been more stirred up since the Prince of Peace hath, by his gospel, sent the sword amongst us; for the preaching thereof, meeting with the strongholds of Satan and the depraved corruption of human nature, must needs occasion a great shaking of the earth. But most especially, distracted Christendom hath found fearful issues of this discord, since the proud Romish prelates have sought to establish their hell-broached errors, by inventing and maintaining uncharitable, destructive censures against all that oppose them: which, first causing schisms and distractions in the church, and then being helped forward by the blindness and cruelty of ambitious potentates, have raised war of nation against nation,—witness the Spanish invasion of ‘88;[ii][2] [and war] of a people within themselves, as in the late civil wars of France, where, after divers horrible massacres, many chose rather to die soldiers than martyrs.

And, oh, that this truth might not, at this day, be written with the blood of almost expiring Ireland! Yea, it hath lastly descended to dissension betwixt private parties,—witness the horrible murder of Diazius, whose brains were chopped out with an axe by his own brother Alphonsus,[iii][3] for forsaking the Romish religion; what rents in[the] State, what grudgings, hatreds, and exasperations of mind among private men, have happened by reason of some inferior differences, we all at this day grieve to behold. “Tantum religio potuit suadere malorum!” Most concerning, then, is it for us to endeavor obedience to our Savior’s precept, of seeking first the kingdom of God, that we may be partakers of the good things comprised in the promise annexed. Were there but this one argument for to seek the peace of the church, because thereon depends the peace of the commonwealth, it were sufficient to quicken our utmost industry for the attaining of it. Now, what peace in the church without truth? All conformity to anything else is but the agreement of Herod and Pilate to destroy Christ and his kingdom. Neither is it this or that particular truth, but the whole counsel of God revealed unto us, without adding or detracting, whose embracement is required to make our peace firm and stable. No halting betwixt Jehovah and Baal, Christ and Antichrist; as good be all Philistine, and worshippers of Dagon, as to speak part the language of Ashdod and part the language of the Jews: hence, hence hath been the rise of all our miseries, of all our dissensions, whilst factious men labored everyday to commend themselves to them who sat aloft in the temple of God, by introducing new popish-arminian errors, whose patronage they had wickedly undertaken. Who would have thought that our church would ever have given entertainment to these Belgic semi-Pelagians, who have cast dirt upon the faces and raked up the ashes of all those great and pious souls whom God magnified, in using as his instruments to reform his church; to the least of which the whole troop of Arminians shall never make themselves equal, though they swell till they break? What benefit did ever come to this church by attempting to prove that the chief part in the several degrees of our salvation is to be ascribed unto ourselves, rather than God?—which is the head and sum of all the controversies between them and us. And must not the introducing and fomenting of a doctrine so opposite to that truth our church hath quietly enjoyed ever since the first Reformation necessarily bring along with it schisms and dissensions, so long as any remain who love the truth, or esteem the gospel above preferment? Neither let any deceive your wisdoms, by affirming that they are differences of an inferior nature that are at this day agitated between the Arminians and the orthodox divines of the reformed church. Be pleased but to cast an eye on the following instances, and you will find them hewing at the very root of Christianity. Consider seriously their denying of that fundamental article of original sin. Is this but a small escape in theology?—why, what need of the gospel, what need of Christ himself, if our nature be not guilty, depraved, corrupted? Neither are many of the rest of less importance. Surely these are not things “in quibus possimus dissentire salvâ pace ac charitate,” as Austin speaks,—“about which we may differ without loss of peace or charity.” One church cannot wrap in her communion Austin and Pelagius, Calvin and Arminius. I have here only given you a taste, whereby you may judge of the rest of their fruit,—“mors in olla, mors in olla;” their doctrine of the final apostasy of the elect, of true believers, of a wavering hesitancy concerning our present grace and future glory, with divers others, I have wholly omitted: those I have produced are enough to make their abettors incapable of our church-communion. The sacred bond of peace compasseth only the unity of that Spirit; which leadeth into all truth. We must not offer the right hand of fellowship, but rather proclaim iJero<n po>lemon,[iv][4] “a holy war,” to such enemies of God’s providence, Christ’s merit, and the powerful operation of the Holy Spirit. Neither let any object, that all the Arminians do not openly profess all these errors I have recounted. Let ours, then, show wherein they differ from their masters.[v][5] We see their own confessions; we know their arts, ba>qh kai< meqodei>av tou~ Santana~,—“the depths and crafts of Satan;” we know the several ways they have to introduce and insinuate their heterodoxies into the minds of men. With some they appear only to dislike our doctrine of reprobation; with others, to claim an allowable liberty of the will: but yet, for the most part,—like the serpent, wherever she gets in her head, she will wriggle in her whole body, sting and all,—give but the least admission, and the whole poison must be swallowed. What was the intention of the maintainers of these strange assertions amongst us I know not,—whether the efficacy of error prevailed really with them or no, or whether it were the better to comply with Popery, and thereby to draw us back again unto Egypt;—but this I have heard, that it was affirmed on knowledge, in a former parliament, that the introduction of Arminianism amongst us was the issue of a Spanish consultation. It is a strange story that learned Zanchius[vi][6] tells us, how, upon the death of the Cardinal of Lorraine there was found in his study a note of the names of divers German doctors and ministers, being Lutherans, to whom was paid an annual pension, by the assignment of the cardinal, that they might take pains to oppose the Calvinists; and so, by cherishing dissension, reduce the people again to Popery. If there be any such amongst us, who, upon such poor inconsiderable motives, would be won to betray the gospel of Christ, God grant them repentance before it be too late! However, upon what grounds, with what intentions, for what ends soever, these tares have been sowed amongst us by envious men, the hope of all the piously learned in the kingdom is, that, by your effectual care and diligence, some means may be found to root them out. Now, God Almighty increase and fill your whole honorable society with wisdom, zeal, knowledge, and all other Christian graces, necessary for your great calling and employments; which is the daily prayer, of your most humble and devoted servant,

JOHN OWEN.

TO THE CHRISTIAN READER.

READER,—Thou canst not be such a stranger in our Israel as that it should be necessary for me to acquaint thee with the first sowing and spreading of these tares in the field of the church, much less to declare what divisions and thoughts of heart, what open bitter contentions, to the loss of ecclesiastical peace, have been stirred up amongst us about them. Only some few things, relating to this my particular endeavor, I would willingly premonish thee of:—

First, Never were so many prodigious errors introduced into a church, with so high a hand and so little opposition, as these into ours, since the nation of Christians was known in the world. The chief cause I take to be that which AEneas Sylvius gave why more maintained the pope to be above the council than the council above the pope,—because popes gave archbishoprics, bishoprics, etc., but the councils sued “in forma pauperis,” and, therefore, could scarce get an advocate to plead their cause. The fates of our church having of late devolved the government thereof into the hands of men tainted with this poison, Arminianism became backed with the powerful arguments of praise and preferment, and quickly prevailed to beat poor naked Truth into a corner. It is high time, then, for all the lovers of the old way to oppose this innovation, prevailing by such unworthy means, before our breach grow great like the sea, and there be none to heal it.

My intention in this weak endeavor (which is but the undigested issue of a few broken hours, too many causes, in these furious malignant days, continually interrupting the course of my studies), is but to stir up such who, having more leisure and greater abilities, will not as yet move a finger to help[to] vindicate oppressed truth.

In the meantime, I hope this discovery may not be unuseful, especially to such who, wanting either will or abilities to peruse larger discourses, may yet be allured by their words, which are smoother than oil, to taste the poison of asps that is under their lips. Satan hath ba>qh kai< meqodei>av, depths where to hide, and methods how to broach his lies; and never did any of his emissaries employ his received talents with more skill and diligence than our Arminians, laboring earnestly, in the first place, to instill some errors that are most plausible, intending chiefly an introduction of them that are more palpable, knowing that if those be for a time suppressed until these be well digested, they will follow of their own accord. Wherefore, I have  endeavored to lay open to the view of all some of their foundation-errors, not usually discussed, on which the whole inconsistent superstructure is erected, whereby it will appear how, under a most vain pretense of farthering piety, they have prevaricated against the very grounds of Christianity; wherein,—

First, I have not observed the same method in handling each particular controversy, but followed such several ways as seemed most convenient to clear the truth and discover their heresies.

Secondly, Some of their errors I have not touched at all,—as those concerning universal grace, justification, the final apostasy of true believers,—because they came not within the compass of my proposed method, as you may see chap. 1., where you have the sum of the whole discourse.

Thirdly, I have given some instances of their opposing the received doctrine of the church of England, contained in divers of the Thirty-nine Articles; which would it did not yield us just cause of farther complaint against the iniquity of those times whereinto we were lately fallen! Had a poor Puritan offended against half so many canons as they opposed articles, he had forfeited his livelihood, if not endangered his life. I would I could hear any other probable reason why divers prelates were so zealous for the discipline and so negligent of the doctrine of the church, but because the one was reformed by the word of God, the other remaining as we found it in the times of Popery.

Fourthly, I have not purposely undertaken to answer any of their arguments, referring that labor to a farther design, even a clearing of our doctrine of reprobation, and of the administration of God’s providence towards the reprobates, and over all their actions, from those calumnious aspersions they cast upon it; but concerning this, I fear the discouragements of these woeful days will leave me nothing but a desire that so necessary a work may find a more able pen.

JOHN OWEN.

ENDNOTES:

[vii][1] This committee was appointed by the House of Lords, March 12,1640. It sometimes bears the name of the Committee of Accommodation, and consisted of ten earls, ten bishops, and ten barons. To prepare the subjects of discussion, some bishops and several divines of different persuasions were appointed a sub-committee. The duty of the committee was to examine all innovations in doctrine and discipline, illegally introduced into the church since the Reformation. See Neal’s History, vol. 2:395.—ED.

[viii][2] He alludes to the attempted invasion of England by the Spanish Armada in 1588. In France the civil wars on account of religion were terminated about 1628, when the Protestants secured the confirmation of the Edict of Nantes, but lost possession of the towns that had been given in guarantee for the faithful observance of it.—ED.

[ix][3] Sleid. Com.

[x][4] Greg. Naz.

[xi][5] Profitentur Remonst, hasce ad promotionem causae sure artes adhibere, ut apud vulgus non ulterius progrediantur quam de articulis vulgo notis, ut pro ingeniorum diversitate quosdam lacte din alant, alios solidiore cibo, etc.—Festus Hom. praestat ad specimen Con. Bel.

[xii][6] Hieron. Zanch. ad Holderum. Res. Miscel.

CHAPTER 1.

OF THE TWO MAIN ENDS AIMED
AT BY THE ARMINIANS, BY THEIR INNOVATIONS
IN THE RECEIVED DOCTRINE OF THE REFORMED CHURCHES.

The soul of man, by reason of the corruption of nature, is not only darkened (Ephesians 4:18; John 1:5; 1 Corinthians 2:14) with a mist of ignorance, whereby he is disenabled for the comprehending of divine truth, but is also armed with prejudice and opposition against some parts thereof,[xiii][1][xiv] which are either most above or most contrary to some false principles which he hath framed unto himself. As a desire of self-sufficiency was the first cause of this infirmity, so a conceit thereof is that wherewith he still languisheth; nothing doth he more contend for than an independency of any supreme power, which might either help, hinder, or control him in his actions. This is that bitter root from whence have sprung all those heresies[xv][2][xvi] and wretched contentions which have troubled the church, concerning the power of man in working his own happiness, and his exemption from the over-ruling providence of Almighty God. All which wrangling disputes of carnal reason against the word of God come at last to this head, Whether the first, and chiefest part, in disposing of things in this world, ought to be ascribed to God or man? Men for the most part have vindicated this pre-eminence unto themselves,[xvii][3][xviii] by exclamations that so it must be, or else that God is unjust, and his ways unequal. Never did any men, “postquam Christiana gens esse caepit,” more eagerly endeavor the erecting of this Babel than the Arminians, the modern blinded patrons of human self-sufficiency; all whose innovations in the received doctrine of the reformed churches aim at and tend to one of these two ends:—

FIRST, To exempt themselves from God’s jurisdiction,—to free themselves from the supreme dominion of his all-ruling providence; not to live and move in him, but to have an absolute independent power in all their actions, so that the event of all things wherein they have any interest might have a considerable relation to nothing but chance, contingency, and their own wills;—a most nefarious, sacrilegious attempt! To this end,—

First, They deny the eternity and unchangeableness of God’s decrees; for these being established, they fear they should be kept within bounds from doing any thing but what his counsel hath determined should be done. If the purposes of the Strength of Israel be eternal and immutable, their idol free-will must be limited, their independency prejudiced; wherefore they choose rather to affirm that his decrees are temporary and changeable, yea, that he doth really change them according to the several mutations he sees in us: which, how wild a conceit it is, how contrary to the pure nature of God, how destructive to his attributes, I shall show in the second chapter.

Secondly, They question the prescience or foreknowledge of God; for if known unto God are all his works from the beginning, if he certainly foreknew all things that shall hereafter come to pass, it seems to cast an infallibility of event upon all their actions, which encroaches upon the large territory of their new goddess, contingency; nay, it would quite dethrone the queen of heaven, and induce a kind of necessity of our doing all, and nothing but what God foreknows. Now, that to deny this prescience is destructive to the very essence of the Deity, and plain atheism, shall be declared, chapter the third.

Thirdly, They depose the all-governing providence of this King of nations, denying its energetical, effectual power, in turning the hearts, ruling the thoughts, determining the wills, and disposing the actions of men, by granting nothing unto it but a general power and influence, to be limited and used according to the inclination and will of every particular agent; so making Almighty God a desirer that many things were otherwise than they are, and an idle spectator of most things that are done in the world: the falseness of which assertions shall be proved, chapter the fourth.

Fourthly, They deny the irresistibility and uncontrollable power of God’s will, affirming that oftentimes he seriously willeth and in-tendeth what he cannot accomplish, and so is deceived of his aim; nay, whereas he desireth, and really intendeth, to save every man, it is wholly in their own power whether he shall save any one or no; otherwise their idol free-will should have but a poor deity, if God could, how and when he would, cross and resist him in his dominion. Concerning this see chapter the fifth. “His gradibus itur in coelum.” Corrupted nature is still ready, either nefariously, with Adam, to attempt to be like God, or to think foolishly that he is altogether like unto us, Psalm 50; one of which inconveniences all men run into, who have not learned to submit their frail wills to the almighty will of God, and captivate their understandings to the obedience of faith.[See chapter fifth.]

SECONDLY, The second end at which the new doctrine of the Arminians aimeth is, to clear human nature from the heavy imputation of being sinful, corrupted, wise to do evil but unable to do good; and so to vindicate unto themselves a power and ability of doing all that good which God can justly require to be done by them in the state wherein they are,—of making themselves differ from others who will not make so good use of the endowments of their natures; that so the first and chiefest part in the work of their salvation may be ascribed unto themselves;—a proud Luciferian endeavor! To this end,—

First, They deny that doctrine of predestination whereby God is affirmed to have chosen certain men before the foundation of the world, that they should be holy, and obtain everlasting life by the merit of Christ, to the praise of his glorious grace,—any such predestination which may be the fountain and cause of grace or glory, determining the persons, according to God’s good pleasure, on whom they shall be bestowed: for this doctrine would make the special grace of God to be the sole cause of all the good that is in the elect more than[in] the reprobates; would make faith the work and gift of God, with divers other things, which would show their idol to be nothing, of no value. Wherefore, what a corrupt heresy they have substituted into the place hereof see chapter the sixth.

Secondly, They deny original sin and its demerit; which being rightly understood, would easily demonstrate that, notwithstanding all the labor of the smith, the carpenter, and the painter, yet their idol is of its own nature but an unprofitable block; it will discover not only the impotency of doing good which is in our nature, but show also whence we have it: see chapter the seventh.

Thirdly, If ye will charge our human nature with a repugnancy to the law of God, they will maintain that it was also in Adam when he was first created, and so comes from God himself: chapter the eighth.

Fourthly, They deny the efficacy of the merit of the death of Christ;—both that God intended by his death to redeem his church, or to acquire unto himself a holy people; as also, that Christ by his death hath merited and procured for us grace, faith, or righteousness, and power to obey God, in fulfilling the condition of the new covenant. Nay, this were plainly to set up an ark to break their Dagon’s neck; for, “what praise,” say they, “can be due to ourselves for believing, if the blood of Christ hath procured God to bestow faith upon us?” “Increpet to Deus, O Satan!” See chapters nine and ten.

Fifthly, If Christ will claim such a share in saving of his people, of them that believe in him, they will grant some to have salvation quite without him, that never heard so much as a report of a Savior; and, indeed, in nothing do they advance their idol nearer the throne of God than in this blasphemy: chapter eleven.

Sixthly, Having thus robbed God, Christ, and his grace, they adorn their idol free-will with many glorious properties no way due unto it: discussed, chapter twelve, where you shall find how, “movet cornicula risum, furtivis nudata coloribus.”

Seventhly, They do not only claim to their new-made deity a saving power, but also affirm that he is very active and operative in the great work of saving our souls,—

 First, In fitly preparing us for the grace of God, and so disposing of ourselves that it becomes due unto us: chapter thirteen.

Secondly, In the effectual working of our conversion together with it: chapter fourteen.

And so at length, with much toil and labor, they have placed an altar for their idol in the holy temple, on the right hand of the altar of God, and on it offer sacrifice to their own net and drag; at least, “nec Deo, nec libero arbitrio, sed dividatur,”—not all to God, nor all to free-will, but let the sacrifice of praise, for all good things, be divided between them.

ENDNOTES:

[xix][1] John 6:42, 7:52. “Natura sic apparet vitiata ut hoc majoris vitii sit, non videre.”—Aug.

[xx][2] Pelag. Semipelag. Scholastic.

[xxi][3] “In hac causa non judicant secundum aequitatem, sed secundum affectum commodi sui.”—Luth, de Arbit. Serv.

CHAPTER 2.

OF THE ETERNITY AND
IMMUTABILITY OF THE DECREES OF
ALMIGHTY GOD, DENIED AND OVERTHROWN BY THE ARMINIANS.

It hath been always believed among Christians, and that upon infallible grounds, as I shall show hereafter, that all the decrees of God, as they are internal, so they are eternal, acts of his will; and therefore unchangeable and irrevocable. Mutable decrees and occasional resolutions are most contrary to the pure nature of Almighty God. Such principles as these, evident and clear by their own light, were never questioned by any before the Arminians began ajki>nhta kinei~n, and to profess themselves to delight in opposing common notions of reason concerning God and his essence, that they might exalt themselves into his throne. To ascribe the least mutability to the divine essence, with which all the attributes and internal free acts of God are one and the same, was ever accounted uJperbolhthtov, “transcendent atheism,” in the highest degree.[xxii] [1] Now, be this crime of what nature it will, it is no unjust imputation to charge it on the Arminians, because they confess themselves guilty, and glory in the crime.

First, They undermine and overthrow the eternity of God’s purposes, by affirming that, in the order of the divine decrees, there are some which precede every act of the creature, and some again that follow them: so Corvinus,[xxiii] [2] the most famous of that sect. Now, all the acts of every creature being but of yesterday, temporary, like themselves, surely, those decrees of God cannot be eternal which follow them in order of time; and yet they press this, especially in respect of human actions, as a certain, unquestionable verity. “It is certain that God willeth or determineth many things which he would not, did not some act of man’s will go before it,” saith their great master, Arminius.[xxiv] [3] The like affirmeth, with a little addition (as such men do always “proficere in pejus”), his genuine scholar, Nic. Grevin-chovius. [xxv] [4] “I suppose,” saith he, “that God willeth many things which he neither would nor justly could will and purpose, did not some action of the creature precede.” And here observe, that in these places they speak not of God’s external works, of those actions which outwardly are of him,—as inflicting of punishments, bestowing of rewards, and other such outward acts of his providence, whose administration we confess to be various, and diversely applied to several occasions,—but of the internal purposes of God’s will, his decrees and intentions, which have no present influence upon, or respect unto, any action of the creature; yea, they deny that concerning many things God hath any determinate resolution at all, or any purpose farther than a natural affection towards them. “God doth or omitteth that towards which, in his own nature and his proper inclination, he is affected, as he findeth man to comply or not to comply with that order which he hath appointed,” saith Corvinus.[xxvi] [5] Surely these men care not what indignities they cast upon the God of heaven, so they may maintain the pretended endowments of their own wills; for such an absolute power do they here ascribe unto them, that God himself cannot determine of a thing whereunto, as they strangely phrase it, he is well affected, before, by an actual concurrence, he is sure of their compliance. Now, this imputation, that they are temporary, which they cast upon the decrees of God in general, they press home upon that particular which lies most in their way, the decree of election. Concerning this they tell us roundly, that it is[xxvii] [6] false that election is confirmed from eternity: so the Remonstrants in their Apology, notwithstanding that St Paul tells us that it is the “purpose of God,” Romans 9:11, and that we were “chosen before the foundation of the world,” Ephesians 1:4. Neither is it any thing material what the Arminians there grant,—namely, that there is a decree preceding this, which may be said to be from everlasting: for seeing that St Paul teacheth us that election is nothing but God’s purpose of saving us, to affirm that God eternally decreed that he would elect us is all one as to say that God purposed that in time he would purpose to save us. Such resolutions may be fit for their own wild heads, but must not be ascribed to God only wise.

Secondly, As they affirm them to be temporary and to have had a beginning, so also to expire and have an ending, to be subject to change and variableness. “Some acts of God’s will do cease at a certain time,” saith Episcopius.[xxviii] [7] What? doth say thing come into his mind that changeth his will? “Yes,” saith Arminius, [xxix] [8] “He would have all men to be saved; but, compelled with the stubborn and incorrigible malice of some, he will have them to miss it.” However, this is some recompense,—denying God a power to do what he will, they grant him to be contented to do what he may, and not much repine at his hard condition. Certainly, if but for this favor, he is a debtor to the Arminians. Thieves give what they do not take. Having robbed God of his power, they will leave him so much goodness as that he shall not be troubled at it, though he be sometimes compelled to what he is very loath to do. How do they and their fellows, the Jesuits,[xxx] [9] exclaim upon poor Calvin, for sometimes using the hard word of compulsion, describing the effectual, powerful working of the providence of God in the actions of men; but they can fasten the same term on the will of God, and no harm done! Surely he will one day plead his own cause against them. But yet blame them not, “si violandum est jus, regnandi causa violandum est.” It is to make themselves absolute that they thus cast off the yoke of the Almighty, and that both in things concerning this life and that which is to come. They are much troubled that it should be said that [xxxi] [10] every one of us bring along with us into the world an unchangeable pre-ordination of life and death eternal; for such a supposal would quite overthrow the main foundation of their heresy,—namely, that men can make their election void and frustrate, as they jointly lay it down in their Apology.[xxxii] [11] Nay, it is a dream, saith Dr Jackson,[xxxiii] [12] to think of God’s decrees concerning things to come as of acts irrevocably finished; which would hinder that which Welsingius lays down for a truth,—to wit, [xxxiv] [13] “that the elect may become reprobates, and the reprobates elect.” Now, to these particular sayings is their whole doctrine concerning the decrees of God, inasmuch as they have any reference to the actions of men, most exactly conformable; as,—

First, [xxxv] [14] Their distinction of them into peremptory and not peremptory (terms rather used in the citations of litigious courts than as expressions of God’s purpose in sacred Scripture), is not, as by them applied, compatible with the unchangeableness of God’s eternal purposes. Pro>skairoi, say they, or temporary believers, are elected (though not peremptorily) with such an act of God’s will as hath a co-existence every way commensurate, both in its original, continuance, and end, with their fading faith; which sometimes, like Jonah’s gourd, is but “filia unius noctis,”—in the morning it flourisheth, in the evening it is cut down, dried up, and withereth. A man in Christ by faith, or actually believing (which to do is, as they say, in every one’s own power), [xxxvi] [15] is, in their opinion, the proper object of election;—of election, I say, not peremptory, which is an act pendent, expecting the final perseverance and consummation of his faith; and therefore immutable, because man having fulfilled his course, God hath no cause to change his purpose of crowning him with reward. Thus also (as they teach), a man according to his infidelity, whether present and removable, or obdurate and final, is the only object of reprobation; which, in the latter case, is peremptory and absolute, in the former conditional and alterable. It is the qualities of faith and unbelief on which their election and reprobation do attend.[xxxvii] [16] Now, let a faithful man, elected of God according to his present righteousness, apostate [apostatize] totally from grace (as to affirm that there is any promise of God implying his perseverance is with them to overthrow all religion), and let the unbelieving reprobate depose his incredulity and turn himself unto the Lord; answerable to this mutation of their conditions are the changings of the purpose of the Almighty concerning their everlasting state. Again; suppose these two, by alternate courses (as the doctrine of apostasy maintaineth they may), should return each to their former estate, the decrees of God concerning them must again be changed; for it is unjust with him either not to elect him that believes, though it be but for an hour, or not to reprobate unbelievers. Now, what unchangeableness can we fix to these decrees, which it lies in the power of man to make as inconstant as Euripus; making it, beside, to be possible that all the members of Christ’s church, whose names are written in heaven, should within one hour be enrolled in the black book of damnation?

Secondly, As these not-peremptory decrees are mutable, so they make the peremptory decrees of God to be temporal. “Final impenitency,” say they, “is the only cause, and the finally unrepenting sinner is the only object, of reprobation, peremptory and irrevocable.” As the poet thought none happy,[xxxviii] [17] so they think no man to be elected, or a reprobate, before his death. Now, that denomination he doth receive from the decrees of God concerning his eternal estate, which must necessarily then be first enacted. The relation that is between the act of reprobation and the person reprobated importeth a co-existence of denomination. When God reprobates a man, he then becomes a reprobate; which if it be not before he hath actually fulfilled the measure of his iniquity, and sealed it up with the talent of final impenitency in his death, the decree of God must needs be temporal, the just Judge of all the world having till then suspended his determination, expecting the last resolution of this changeable Proteus. Nay, that God’s decrees concerning men’s eternal estates are in their judgment temporal, and not beginning until their death, is plain from the whole course of their doctrine, especially where they strive to prove that if there were any such determination, God could not threaten punishments or promise rewards. “Who,”[xxxix] [18] say they, “can threaten punishment to him whom, by a peremptory decree, he will have to be free from punishment?” It seems he cannot have determined to save any whom he threatens to punish if they sin, which [it] is evident he doth all so long as they live in this world; which makes God not only mutable, but quite deprives him of his foreknowledge, and makes the form of his decree run thus:—“If man will believe, I determine he shall be saved; if he will not, I determine he shall be damned,”—that is, “I must leave him in the meantime to do what he will, so I may meet with him in the end.”

Thirdly, They affirm no decree of Almighty God concerning men is so unalterable[xl] [19] but that all those who are now in rest or misery might have had contrary lots;—that those which are damned, as Pharaoh, Judas, etc., might have been saved; and those which are saved, as the blessed Virgin, Peter, John, might have been damned: which must needs reflect with a strong charge of mutability on Almighty God, who knoweth who are his. Divers other instances in this nature I could produce, whereby it would be farther evident that these innovators in Christian religion do overthrow the eternity and unchangeableness of God’s decrees; but these are sufficient to any discerning man. And I will add, in the close, an antidote against this poison, briefly showing what the Scripture and right reason teach us concerning these secrets of the Most High.

First, “Known unto God,” saith St James, “are all his works from the beginning,” Acts 15:18; whence it hath hitherto been concluded that whatever God doth in time bring to pass, that he decreed from all eternity so to do. All his works were from the beginning known unto him. Consider it particularly in the decree of election, that fountain of all spiritual blessings, that a saving sense and assurance thereof (2 Peter 1:10) being attained, might effect a spiritual rejoicing in the Lord, 1 Corinthians 15:31. Such things are everywhere taught as may raise us to the consideration of it as of an eternal act, irrevocably and immutably established: “He hath chosen us before the foundation of the world,” Ephesians 1:4: his “purpose according to election,” before we were born, must “stand,” Romans 9:11; for to the irreversible stability of this act of his will he hath set to the seal of his infallible knowledge, 2 Timothy 2:19. His purpose of our salvation by grace, not according to works, was “before the world began,” 2 Timothy 1:9: an eternal purpose, proceeding from such a will as to which none can resist, joined with such a knowledge as to which all things past, present, and to come are open and evident, must needs also be, like the laws of the Medes and Persians, permanent and unalterable.

Secondly, The [xli][20][xlii] decrees of God, being conformable to his nature and essence, do require eternity and immutability as their inseparable properties. God, and he only, never was, nor ever can be, what now he is not. Passive possibility to any thing, which is the fountain of all change, can have no place in him who is “actus simplex,” and purely free from all composition; whence St James affirmeth that “with him is no variableness, neither shadow of turning,” James 1:17; with him, that is, in his will and purposes: and himself by his prophet, “I am the LORD, I change not; therefore ye sons of Jacob are not consumed,” Malachi 3:6; where he proveth the not changing of his gracious purposes, because he is the LORD. The eternal acts of his will not really differing from his unchangeable essence, must needs be immutable.

Thirdly, Whatsoever God hath determined, according to the counsel of his wisdom and good pleasure of his will, to be accomplished, to the praise of his glory, standeth sure and immutable; for “the Strength of Israel will not lie nor repent; for he is not a man, that he should repent,” 1 Samuel 15:29. “He declareth the end from the beginning, and from ancient times the things that are not yet done, saying, My counsel shall stand, and I will do all my pleasure,” Isaiah 46:10; which certain and infallible execution of his pleasure is extended to particular contingent events, Isaiah 48:14. Yea, it is an ordinary thing with the Lord to confirm the certainty of those things that are yet for to come from his own decree; as, “The LORD of hosts hath sworn, saying, Surely as I have thought, so it shall come to pass; and as I have purposed, it shall stand, that I will break the Assyrian,” etc., Isaiah 14:24,25;—“It is certain the Assyrian shall be broken, because the Lord hath purposed it;” which were a weak kind of reasoning, if his purpose might be altered. Nay “He is of one mind, and who can turn him? and what his soul desireth, that he doeth,” Job 23:13. “The Lord of hosts hath purposed, and who shall disannul it?” Isaiah 14:27. So that the purpose of God and immutability of his counsel (Hebrews 6:17) have their certainty and firmness from eternity, and do not depend on the variable lubricity of mortal men; which we must needs grant, unless we intend to set up impotency against omnipotency, and arm the clay against the potter.

Fourthly, If God’s determination concerning any thing should have a temporal original, it must needs be either because he then perceived some goodness in it of which before he was ignorant, or else because some accident did affix a real goodness to some state of things which it had not from him; neither of which, without abominable blasphemy, can be affirmed, seeing he knoweth the end from the beginning, all things from everlasting, being always the same, the fountain of all goodness, of which other things do participate in that measure which it pleaseth him to communicate it unto them. Add to this the omnipotency of God: there is “power and might in his hand,”[so] that none is able to withstand him, 2 Chronicles 20:6; which will not permit that any of his purposes be frustrate. In all our intentions, if the defect be not in the error of our understandings, which may be rectified by better information, when we cannot do that which we would, we will do that which we can: the alteration of our purpose is for want of power to fulfill it; which impotency cannot be ascribed to Almighty God, who is “in heaven, and hath done whatsoever he pleased,” Psalm 115:3. So that the immutability of God’s nature, his almighty power, the infallibility of his knowledge, his immunity from error in all his counsels, do show that he never faileth in accomplishing any thing that he proposeth for the manifestation of his glory. To close up this whole discourse, wherein I have not discovered half the poison contained in the Arminian doctrine concerning God’s decrees, I will in brief present to your view the opposition that is in this matter betwixt the word of God and the patrons of free-will:—

ENDNOTES:

[xliii][1][xliv] Philippians lib. quod sit Deus immutabilis.

[xlv][2][xlvi] “In ordine volitorum divinorum, quaedam sunt quae omnem actum creaturae praece-dunt, quaedam quae sequuntur.”—Corv, ad Molin., cap. 5. sect. 1, p. 67.

[xlvii][3][xlviii] “Certum est Deum quaedam velle, quae non vellet nisi aliqua volitio humana antece-deret.”—Armin., Antip., p. 211.

[xlix][4][l] “Multa tamen arbitror Deum velle; quae non vellet, adeoque nec juste velle posset, nisi aliqua actio creaturae praecederet.”—Ad Ames., p. 24

[li][5][lii] “Deus facit vel non facit id ad quod, ex se et natura sua ac inclinatione propria est affectus, prout homo cum isto ordine conspirat, vel non conspirat.”—Corv. ad Molin., cap. 5. ad sect. 3.

[liii][6][liv] “Falsum est quod electio facta est ab seterno.”—Rem. Apol., cap. 18. p. 190.

[lv][7][lvi] “Volitiones aliquae Dei cessant certo quodam tempore.”—Episcop. Disp. de Vol. Dei., thes. 7

[lvii][8][lviii] “Deus vult omnes salvos fieri, sed compulsus pertinaci et incorrigibili malitia quorundam, vult illos jacturam facere salutis.”—Armin. Antip. fol. 195.

[lix][9][lx] Bell. Amiss. Grat.; Armin. Antip. Rem. Apol.

[lxi][10][lxii] “(Docent) unumquemque invariabilem vitae, ac morris protagh<n una cum ipso ortu, in lucern hanc nobiscum adferre.”—Filii Armin. In Epist. Ded. ad Examen Lib. Perk.

[lxiii][11][lxiv] “Possunt homines etectionem suam irritam et frustraneam reddere.”—Rem. Apol., cap. 9. p. 105.

[lxv][12][lxvi] Jackson, of the Divine Essence.

[lxvii][13][lxviii] “Non mirum videri debet quod aliquando ex electis reprobi et ex reprobis electi fiant.”—Welsin, de Of. Ch. Hom.

[lxix][14][lxx] “Omnia Dei decreta, non sunt peremptoria, sed quaedam conditionata ac mutabilia.”—Concio. ad Cler. Oxon. ann. 1641, Rem. Decla. Sent. in Synod., alibi passim. “Electio sicut et justificatio, et incerta et revocabilis, utramque vero conditionatam qui negaverit, ipsum quoque evangelium negabit.”—Grevinch, ad Ames., pp. 136,137.

[lxxi][15][lxxii] “Ad gloriam participandam pro isto tempore quo credunt electi sunt.”—Rem. Apol., p. 190.

[lxxiii][16][lxxiv] “ Decreta hypothetica possunt mutari, quia conditio respectu hominis vel prsestatur vel non praestatur, atque ita existit vel non existit. Et quum extitit aliquandiu, saepe existere desinit, et rursus postquam aliquandiu desiit, existere incipit.”—Corv. ad Molin., cap. 5. sec. 10.

[lxxv][17][lxxvi] “Dicique beatus—Ante obitum nemo,” etc.—Ovid.

[lxxvii][18][lxxviii] “Quis enim comminetur poenam ei, quem peremptorio decreto a poena immunem esse vult ?”—Rem. Apol., cap. 17. p. 187.

[lxxix][19][lxxx] Author of “God’s Love to Mankind,” p. 4, [a treatise written by Hoard. Davenant, professor of divinity in Cambridge, and afterwards bishop of Salisbury, wrote in reply his “Animadversions” on it. Dr Hill, in his Lectures on Divinity, pronounces this work of Davenant to be “one of the ablest defences of the Calvinistic system of predestination.”—ED.]

[lxxxi][20][lxxxii] “Quicquid operatur, operatur ut est.”

CHAPTER 3.

OF THE PRESCIENCE OR
FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD, AND HOW
IT IS QUESTIONED AND OVERTHROWN BY THE ARMINIANS.

The prescience or foreknowledge of God hath not hitherto, in express terms, been denied by the Arminians, but only questioned and overthrown by consequence, inasmuch as they deny the certainty and unchangeableness of his decrees, on which it is founded. It is not a foreknowledge of all or any thing which they oppose, but only of things free and contingent, and that only to comply with their formerly-exploded error, that the purposes of God concerning such things are temporal and mutable; which obstacle being once removed, the way is open how to ascribe the presidentship of all human actions to omnipotent contingency, and her sire free-will. Now, we call that contingent which, in regard of its next and immediate cause, before it come to pass, may be done or may be not done; as, that a man shall do such a thing tomorrow, or any time hereafter, which he may choose whether ever he will do or no. Such things as these are free and changeable, in respect of men, their immediate and second causes; but if we, as we ought to do, (James 4:13-15.) look up unto Him who foreseeth and hath ordained the event of them or their omission, they may be said necessarily to come to pass or to be omitted. It could not be but as it was. Christians hitherto, yea, and heathens,[lxxxiii] [1] in all things of this nature, have usually, upon their event, reflected on God as one whose determination was passed on them from eternity, and who knew them long before; as the killing of men by the fall of a house, who might, in respect of the freedom of their own wills, have not been there. Or if a man fall into the hands of thieves, we presently conclude it was the will of God. It must be so; he knew it before.

Divines, for distinction’s sake, [lxxxiv] [2] ascribe unto God a twofold knowledge; one, intuitive or intellective, whereby he foreknoweth and seeth all things that are possible,—that is, all things that can be done by his almighty power,—without any respect to their future existence, whether they shall come to pass or no. Yea, infinite things, whose actual being eternity shall never behold, are thus open and naked unto him; for was there not strength and power in his hand to have created another world? was there not counsel in the storehouse of his wisdom to have created this otherwise, or not to have created it at all? Shall we say that his providence extends itself every way to the utmost of its activity? or can he not produce innumerable things in the world which now he doth not. Now, all these, and every thing else that is feasible to his infinite power, he foresees and knows, “scientia,” as they speak, “simplicis intelligentiae,” by his essential knowledge.

Out [lxxxv] [3] of this large and boundless territory of things possible, God by his decrees freely determineth what shall come to pass, and makes them future which before were but possible. After this decree, as they commonly speak, followeth, or together with it, as [lxxxvi] [4] others more exactly, taketh place, that prescience of God which they call “visionis,” “of vision,” [lxxxvii] [5] whereby he infallibly seeth all things in their proper causes, and how and when they shall come to pass. Now, these two sorts of knowledge differ, [lxxxviii] [6] inasmuch as by the one God knoweth what it is possible may come to pass; by the other, only what it is impossible should not come to pass. Things are possible in regard of God’s power, future in regard of his decree. So that (if I may so say) the measure of the first kind of science is God’s omnipotency, what he can do; of the other his purpose, what certainly he will do, or permit to be done. With this prescience, then, God foreseeth all, and nothing but what he hath decreed shall come to pass.

For every thing to be produced next and under him, [lxxxix] [7] God hath prepared divers and several kinds of causes, diversely operative in producing their effects, some whereof are said to work necessarily, the institution of their nature being to do as they do, and not otherwise; so the sun giveth light, and the fire heat. And yet, in some regard, their effects and products may be said to be contingent and free, inasmuch as the concurrence of God, the first cause, is required to their operation, who doth all things most freely, according to the counsel of his will. Thus the sun stood still in the time of Joshua, and the fire burned not the three children; but ordinarily such agents working “necessitate naturae,” their effects are said to be necessary. Secondly, To some things God hath fitted free and contingent causes, which either apply themselves to operation in particular, according to election, choosing to do this thing rather than that; as angels and men, in their free and deliberate actions, which they so perform as that they could have not done them;—or else they produce effects to< sumbebhko>v, merely by accident, and the operation of such things we say to be casual; as if a hatchet, falling out of the hand of a man cutting down a tree, should kill another whom he never saw. Now, nothing in either of these ways comes to pass but God hath determined it, both for the matter and manner, [xc] [8] even so as is agreeable to their causes,—some necessarily, some freely, some casually or contingently, yet also, as having a certain futurition from his decree, he infallibly foreseeth that they shall so come to pass. But yet that he doth so in respect of things free and contingent is much questioned by the Arminians in express terms, and denied by consequence, notwithstanding St Jerome affirmeth [xci] [9] that so to do is destructive to the very essence of the Deity.

First, Their doctrine of the mutability of God’s decrees, on whose firmness is founded the infallibility of this prescience, doth quite overthrow it. God thus foreknowing only what he hath so decreed shall come to pass, if that be no firmer settled but that it may[be] and is often altered, according to the divers inclinations of men’s wills, which I showed before they affirm, he can have at best but a conjectural foreknowledge of what is yet for to come, not founded on his own unchangeable purpose, but upon a guess at the free inclination of men’s wills. For instance, [xcii] [10] God willeth that all men should be saved. This act of his will, according to the Arminian doctrine, is his conditionate decree to save all men if they will believe. Well, among these is Judas, as [xciii] [11] equal a sharer in the benefit of this decree as Peter. God, then, will have him to be saved, and to this end allows him all those means which are necessary to beget faith in him, and are every way sufficient to that purpose, and do produce that effect in others; what can God foresee, then, but that Judas as well as Peter will believe? He intendeth he should, he hath determined nothing to the contrary. Let him come, then, and act his own part. Why, he proves so obstinately malicious, [xciv] [12] that God, with all his omnipotency, as they speak, by any way that becomes him, which must not be by any irresistible efficacy, cannot change his obdurate heart. Well, then, he determineth, according to the exigence of his justice, that he shall be damned for his impenitency, and foreseeth that accordingly. But now, suppose this wretch, even at his last moment, should bethink himself and return to the Lord, which in their conceit he may, notwithstanding his former reprobation (which, [xcv] [13] as they state it, seems a great act of mercy), [xcvi] [14] God must keep to the rules of his justice, and elect or determine to save him; by which the varlet hath twice or thrice deceived his expectation.

Secondly, [xcvii] [15] They affirm that God is said properly to expect and desire divers things which yet never come to pass. “We grant,” saith Corvinus, “that there are desires in God that never are fulfilled.” Now, surely, to desire what one is sure will never come to pass is not an act regulated by wisdom or counsel; and, therefore, they must grant that before he did not know but perhaps so it might be. “God wisheth and desireth some good things, which yet come not to pass,”[xcviii] [16] say they, in their Confession; whence one of these two things must needs follow,—either, first, that there is a great deal of imperfection in his nature, to desire and expect what he knows shall never come to pass; or else he did not know but it might, which overthrows his prescience. Yea, and say they expressly, [xcix] [17] “That the hope and expectation of God is deceived by man;” and confess, “that the strength of their strongest argument lies in this, that God hoped and expected obedience from Israel.” Secondly, That he complaineth that his hope is deluded, which, being taken properly, and as they urge it, cannot consist with his eternal prescience; for they disesteem the usual answer of divines, that hope, expectation, and such like passions, which include in them any imperfection, are ascribed unto God per ajnqrwpopa>qeian,—in regard of that analogy his actions hold with such of ours as we perform having those passions.

Thirdly, [c] [18] They teach that God hath determined nothing concerning such things as these in question. “That God hath determined future contingent things unto either part (I mean such as issue from the free-will of the creature), I abominate, hate, and curse, as false, absurd, and leading us on unto blasphemy,” saith Arminius. To determine of them to either part is to determine and ordain whether they shall be, or whether they shall not be; as, that David shall or shall not go up tomorrow against the Philistines, and prevail. Now, the infallibility of God’s foreknowing of such things depending on the certainty of his decree and determination, if there be no such thing as this, that also must needs fall to the ground.

Fourthly, [ci] [19] See what positively they write concerning this everlasting foreknowledge of God:—First, They call it a troublesome question; secondly, They make it a thing disputable whether there be any such thing or no; and though haply it may be ascribed unto God, yet, thirdly, They think it no motive to the worship of him; fourthly, They say, better it were quite exploded, because the difficulties that attend it can scarcely be reconciled with man’s liberty, God’s threatenings and promises; yea, fifthly, It seems rather to be invented to crucify poor mortals than to be of any moment in religion. So Episcopius. It may be excepted that this is but one doctor’s opinion. It is true, they are one man’s words; but the thing itself is countenanced by the whole sect. As, first, in the large prolix declaration of their opinions, they speak not one word of it; and being taxed for this omission by the professors of Leyden, they vindicate themselves so coldly in their Apology, that some learned men do from hence conclude,[cii] [20] that certainly, in their most secret judgments, all the Arminians do consent with Socinus in ascribing unto God only a conjectural foreknowledge. And one great prophet of their own affirms roundly, [ciii] [21] “That God, after his manner, oftentimes feareth, that is, suspecteth, and that not without cause, and prudently conjectureth, that this or that evil may arise,” Vorstius. And their chiefest patriarchs, [civ] [22] “That God doth often intend what he doth not foresee will come to pass,” Armin., Corv. Now, whether this kind of atheism be tolerable among Christians or no, let all men judge who have their senses exercised in the word of God; which, I am sure, teaches us another lesson. For,—

First, It is laid down as a firm foundation, that “known unto God are all his works from the beginning of the world,” Acts 15:18. Every thing, then, that in any respect may be called his work, is known unto him from all eternity. Now, what in the world, if we may speak as he hath taught us, can be exempted from this denomination? Even actions in themselves sinful are not; though not as sinful, yet in some other regard, as punishments of others. “Behold,” saith Nathan to David, in the name of God, “I will take thy wives before thine eyes, and give them unto thy neighbor, and he shall lie with thy wives in the sight of this sun; for thou didst it secretly, but I will do this thing before all Israel,” 2 Samuel 12:11,12. So, also, when wicked robbers had nefariously spoiled Job of all his substance, the holy man concludeth, “The LORD gave, and the LORD hath taken away,” Job 1:21. Now, if the working of God’s providence be so mighty and effectual, even in and over those actions wherein the devil and men do most maliciously offend, as did Absalom and the Sabean with the Chaldean thieves, that it may be said to be his work, and he may be said to “do it” (I crave liberty to use the Scripture phrase), then certainly nothing in the world, in some respect or other, is independent of his all-disposing hand; yea, Judas himself betraying our Savior did nothing but “what his hand and counsel determined before should be done,”[cv] [23] Acts 4:28, in respect of the event of the thing itself. And if these actions, notwithstanding these two hindrances,—first, that they were contingent, wrought by free agents, working according to election and choice; secondly, that they were sinful and wicked in the agents,—had yet their dependence on his purpose and determinate counsel, surely he hath an interest of operation in the acts of every creature. But his works, as it appears before, are all known unto him from the beginning, for he worketh nothing by chance or accidentally, but all things determinately, according to his own decree, or “the counsel of his own will,” Ephesians 1:11.

Secondly, The manner of God’s knowing of things doth evidently show that nothing that is, or may be, can be hid from him; [cvi] [24] which is not by discourse and collection of one thing out of another, conclusions out of principles, but altogether and at once, evidently, clearly, and distinctly, both in respect tou~ o[ti, and tou~ dio>ti. By one most pure act of his own essence he discerneth all things: for there is “no creature that is not manifest in his sight, but all are naked and opened unto his eyes,” Hebrews 4:13. So that those things concerning which we treat [cvii] [25] he knoweth three ways:—First, In himself and his own decree, as the first cause; in which respect they may be said to be necessary, in respect of the certainty of their event. Secondly, In their immediate causes, wherein their contingency doth properly consist. Thirdly, In their own nature as future, but to his infinite knowledge ever present.

Thirdly, The Scripture (Psalm 44:21; Job 11:11; Daniel 2:47; Psalm 7:9, 26:2, 147:4; Luke 2:27; Matthew 10:29, 30; Psalm 139:2) is full of expressions to this purpose,—to wit, “That God knoweth all secrets, and revealeth hidden things: he searcheth the reins and the heart: he knoweth the number of the stars, and the birds of the air, the lilies of the field, the falling of sparrows, the number of the hairs of our heads.” Some places are most remarkable, as that of the Psalmist, “He knoweth my thoughts long before;” even before ever they come into our minds, before their first rising. And yet many actions that are most contingent depend upon those thoughts known unto God from eternity; nay,—which breaketh the very neck of the goddess contingency,—those things wherein her greatest power is imagined to consist are directly ascribed unto God, as our words, “the answer of the tongue,” Proverbs 16:1; and the directing of an arrow, shot by chance, to a mark not aimed at, 1 Kings 22:34. Surely God must needs foreknow the event of that contingent action; he must needs know the man would so shoot who had determined his arrow should be the death of a king. He maketh men poor and rich, Proverbs 22:2; He lifteth up one, and pulleth down another, Psalm 75:7. How many contingencies did gorgo<n o]mma tou~ despo>tou, his piercing eye run through to foresee the crowning of Esther for the deliverance of his people! In a word, “Known unto God are all his works.” Now, what can possibly be imagined to be more contingent than the killing of a man by the fall of an axe from out of his hand who intended no such thing? Yet this God assumeth as his own work, Deuteronomy 19:5, Exodus 21:13; and so surely was by him foreknown.

Fourthly, Do but consider the prophecies in Scripture, especially those concerning our Savior, how many free and contingent actions did concur for the fulfilling of them; as Isaiah 7:14, 9:6,53; Genesis 3:15, etc. The like may be said of other predictions; as of the wasting of Jerusalem by the Babylonians, which though, in regard of God’s prescience, it was certainly to come to pass, yet they did it most freely, not only following the counsel of their own wills, but also using divination, or chanceable lots, for their direction, Ezekiel 21:21. Yet he who made the eye seeth all these things, Psalm 94:9.

Divers other reasons and testimonies might be produced to confirm our doctrine of God’s everlasting prescience; which, notwithstanding Episcopius’ blasphemy, that it serves for nought but to cruciate poor mortals, we believe to be a good part of the foundation of all that consolation which God is pleased to afford us in this vale of tears. Amidst all our afflictions and temptations, under whose pressure we should else faint and despair, it is no small comfort to be assured that we do nor can suffer nothing but what his hand and counsel guides unto us, what is open and naked before his eyes, and whose end and issue he knoweth long before; which is a strong motive to patience, a sure anchor of hope, a firm ground of consolation. Now, to present in one view how opposite the opinions of the worshippers of the great goddess contingency are to this sacred truth, take this short antithesis:—

ENDNOTES:

[cviii]  [1] Dio<v d j otelei>eto boulh>, Hom;—“God’s will was done.”

[cix]  [2] “Quaecunque possunt per creaturam fieri, vel cogitari, vel dici, et etiam quaecunque ipse facere potest, omnia cognoscit Deus, etiamsi neque sunt, neque erunt, neque fuerunt, scientia simplicis intelligentiae.”—Aquin, p. q. 14, a. 9, c. Ex verbis apostoli, Romans 3, “Qui vocat ea quae non sunt tanquam ea quae sunt.” Sic scholastici omnes. Fer. Scholast. Orthod. Speci. cap. in., alii passim. Vid. Hieron. Zanch. De Scientia Dei, lib. diatrib. 3., cap. 2, q. 5.

[cx]  [3] Vid. Sam. Rhaetorfort. Exercit. de Grat., ex. 1. cap. 4.

[cxi]  [4] “Res ipsae nullo naturae momento possibiles esse dicendae sunt priusquam a Deo in-telliguntur, scientia quae dicitur simplicis intelligentiae, ita etiam scientia quae dicitur visionis, et fertur in res futuras, nullo naturae momento, posterior statuenda videtur, ista futuritione, rerum; cum scientia,” etc.—Dr Twiss. ad Errat. Vind. Grat.

[cxii]  [5] “Scientia visionis dicitur, quia ea quae videntur, apud nos habent esse distinctum extra videntem.”—Aq. p. q. 14, a. 9, c.

[cxiii]  [6] “In eo differt praescientia intuitionis, ab ea, quae approbationis est, quod illa praesciat, quod evenire possibile est; hoc vero quod impossibile est non evenire.”—Ferrius. Orthod. Scholast. Spoci. cap. 23. Caeterum posterior ista scientia non proprie dicitur a Ferrio scientia approbationis, illa enim est, qua Deus dicitur nosse quae amat et ap-probat; ab utraque altera distincta. Matthew 7:23; Romans 11:2; 2 Timothy 2:19. “Quamvis infinitorum numerorum, nullus sit numerus, non tamen est incomprehensibilis ei, cujus scientiae non est numerus.”—Aug. de Civit. Dei, lib. 12. cap. 18.

[cxiv]  [7] “Quibusdam effectibus praeparavit causas necessarias, ut necessario eveniret, quibus-dam vero causas contingentes ut evenirent contingenter, secundum conditionem proximarum causarum.”—Aquin. p. q. 28, a. 4, in Cor. Zanch. de Natur. Dei, lib. v., qu. 4, thes.

[cxv]  [8] “Res et modos rerum”—Aquin.

[cxvi]  [9] “Cui praescientiam tollis, aufers divinitatem.”—Hieron. ad Pelag., lib.

[cxvii]  [10] “Deus ita omnium salutem ex aequo vult, ut illam ex aequo optet et desideret.”—Corv. ad Molin., cap. 31. sect. 1

[cxviii]  [11] “Talis gratia omnibus datur quae sufficiat ad fidem generandam.”—Idem, ibid, sect. 15.

[cxix]  [12] “Pertinaci quorundam malitia compulsus.”—Armin., ubi sup.

[cxx]  [13] “Reprobatio populi Judaici fuit actio temporaria et quae bono ipsorum Judaeorum si modo sanabiles adhuc essent, animumque advertere vellent, servire poterat, utque ei fini serviret a Deo facta erat.”—Rem. Apol., cap. 20. p. 221.

[cxxi]  [14] “Injustum est apud Deum vel non credentem eligere, vel credentem non eligere.”—Rem. Apol.

[cxxii]  [15] “Concedimus in Deo desideria, quae nunquam implentur.”—Corv. Ad Molin., cap. v. sect. 2.

[cxxiii]  [16] “Bona quaedam Deus optat et desiderat.”—Rem. Confes., cap. 2. sect. 9.

[cxxiv]  [17] “Dei spes et expectatio est ab hominibus elusa.”—Rem. Scrip. Syn. in cap. v., Isaiah 5:1. “In eo vis argumenti est, quod Deus ab Israele obedientiam et sperarit, et expectarit.”—Idem, ibid. “Quod Deus de elusa spe sua conqueratur.”—Idem, ubi supra.

[cxxv]  [18] “Deum futura contingentia, decreto suo determinasse ad alterutram partem (intellige quae a libera creaturae voluntate patrantur), falsum, absurdum, et multiplicis blasphemiae praevium abominor et exsecror.”—Armin. Declarat. Senten.

[cxxvi]  [19] “Disquiri permittimus:—1. Operosam illam quaestionem, de scientia futurorum contingentium absoluta et conditionata; 2. Etsi non negemus Deo illam scientiam attribui posse; 3. Tamen an necessarium saluti sit ad hoc ut Deus recte colatur examinari permittimus; 4. Tum merito facessere debent a scholis et ecclesiis, intricatae et spinosae istae quaestiones quae de ea agitari solent,—quomodo illa cum libertate arbitrii, cum seriis Dei comminationibus, aliisque actionibus, consistere possit: quae omnia crucem potius miseris mortalibus fixerunt, quam ad religionem cultumque divinum, momenti aliquid inquisitoribus suis attulerunt.”—Episcopius, Disput. 4. sect. 10.; Rem. Apol., pp. 43,44.

[cxxvii]  [20] Ames. Antisynod, p. 10.

[cxxviii]  [21] “Deus suo modo aliquando metuit, hoc est, merito suspicatur et prudenter conjicit, hoc vel illud malum oriturum.”—Vorsti. de Deo, p. 451.

[cxxix]  [22] “Deus non semper ex praescientia finem intendit.”—Armin., Antip., p. 667; Corv. ad Molin., cap. 5. sect. 5.

[cxxx]  [23] “Cum et pater tradiderit filium suum, et ipse Christus corpus suum: et Judas dominum suum: cur in hac traditione Deus est pius, et homo reus, nisi quia in re una quam fecerunt, causa non fuit una propter quam fecerunt.”—Aug., Epist. 48.

[cxxxi]  [24] “Deus non particulatim, vel singillatim omnia videt, velut alternanter concepta, hinc illuc, inde huc, sed omnia videt simul.”—Aug., lib. 15. de Trinit., cap. 14. “In scientia divina nullus est discursus, sed omnia perfecte intelligit.”—Tho., p. q. 14, a. 7. c.

[cxxxii] [25] Tilen. Syntag. de Attrib. Dei, thes. 22; Zanch. de Nat. Dei. Unumquodque quod est, dum est, necesse est, ut sit

CHAPTER 4.

OF THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD
IN GOVERNING THE WORLD DIVERSELY, THRUST
FROM THIS PRE-EMINENCE BY THE ARMINIAN IDOL OF FREE-WILL.

I come now to treat of that betwixt which and the Pelagian idol there is bellum a]spondon, implacable war and immortal hatred, absolutely destructive to the one side,—to wit, the providence of God. For this, in that notion Christianity hath hitherto embraced it, and that, in such a sense as the Arminians maintain it, can no more consist together than fire and water, light and darkness, Christ and Belial, and he that shall go to conjoin them ploughs with an ox and an ass; they must be tied together with the same ligament “quo ille mortua jungebat corpora vivis,”—wherewith the tyrant tied dead bodies to living men. This strange advancement of the clay against the potter, not by the way of repining, and to say, “Why hast thou made me thus?” but by the way of emulation, “I will not be so, I will advance myself to the sky, to the sides of thy throne,” was heretofore unknown to the more refined Paganism.[cxxxiii] [1] As these of contingency, so they, with a better error, made a goddess of providence, because, as they feigned, she helped Latona to bring forth in the isle of Delos; intimating that Latona, or nature, though big and great with sundry sorts of effects, could yet produce nothing without the interceding help of divine providence: which mythology of theirs seems to contain a sweeter gust of divine truth than any we can expect from their towering fancies [cxxxiv] [2] who are inclinable to believe that God for no other reason is said to sustain all things, but because he doth not destroy them. Now, that their proud, God-opposing errors may the better appear, according to my former method, I will plainly show what the Scripture teacheth us concerning this providence, with what is agreeable to right and Christian reason, not what is dictated by tumultuating affections.

Providence is a word which, in its proper signification, may seem to comprehend all the actions of God that outwardly are of him, that have any respect unto his creatures, all his works that are not ad intra, essentially belonging unto the Deity. Now, because God “worketh all things according to his decree, or the counsel of his will,” Ephesians 1:11, for whatsoever he doth now it pleased him from the beginning, Psalm 115:3; seeing, also, that known unto God are all his works from eternity; therefore, three things concerning his providence are considerable:—1. His decree or purpose, [cxxxv] [3] whereby he hath disposed of all things in order, and appointed them for certain ends, which he hath fore-ordained. 2. His prescience, whereby he certainly fore-knoweth all things that shall come to pass. 3. His temporal operation, or working in time,—“My Father worketh hitherto,” John 5:17,—whereby he actually executeth all his good pleasure. The first and second of these have been the subject of the former chapters; the latter only now requireth our consideration. This, then, we may conceive as an ineffable act or work of Almighty God, whereby he cherisheth, sustaineth, and governeth the world, or all things by him created, moving them, agreeably to those natures which he endowed them withal in the beginning, unto those ends which he hath proposed. To confirm this, I will first prove this position, That the whole world is cared for by God, and by him governed, and therein all men, good or bad, all things in particular, be they never so small and in our eyes inconsiderable. Secondly, show the manner how God worketh all, in all things, and according to the diversity of secondary causes which he hath created; whereof some are necessary, some free, others contingent, which produce their effects nec pa>ntwv, nec ejpi< to< polu>, sed kata< sumqeqhko>v, merely by accident.

The providence of God in governing the world is plentifully made known unto us, both by his works and by his word. I will give a few instances of either sort:—1. In general, that the almighty Dhmiourgo>v, and Framer of this whole universe, should propose unto himself no end in the creation of all things,—that he should want either power, goodness, will, or wisdom, to order and dispose the works of his own hands,—is altogether impossible. 2. Take a particular instance in one concerning accident, the knowledge whereof by some means or other, in some degree or other, hath spread itself throughout the world,—and that is that almost universal destruction of all by the flood, whereby the whole world was well-nigh reduced to its primitive confusion. Is there nothing but chance to be seen in this? was there any circumstance about it that did not show a God and his providence? Not to speak of those revelations whereby God foretold that he would bring such a deluge, what chance, what fortune, could collect such a small number of individuals of all sorts, wherein the whole kind might be preserved? What hand guided that poor vessel from the rocks and gave it a resting-place on the mountains? Certainly, the very reading of that story, Genesis 7,8, having for confirmation the catholic tradition of all mankind, were enough to startle the stubborn heart of an atheist.

The word of God doth not less fully relate it than his works do declare it, Psalm 19, “My Father worketh hitherto,” saith our Savior, John 5:17. But did not God end his work on the seventh day, and did he not then “rest from all his work?” Genesis 2:2. True, from his work of creation by his omnipotence; but his work of gubernation by his providence as yet knows no end. Yea, and divers particular things he doth besides the ordinary course, only to make known “that he thus worketh,” John 9:3. As he hath framed all things by his wisdom, so he continueth them by his providence in excellent order, as is at large declared in that golden Psalm 104: and this is not bounded to any particular places or things, but “his eyes are in every place, beholding the evil and the good,” Proverbs 15:3; so that “none can hide himself in secret places that he shall not see him,” Jeremiah 23:24; Acts 17:24; Job 5:10,11; Exodus 4:11. And all this he saith that men “may know from the rising of the sun, and from the west, that there is none beside him. He is the LORD, and there is none else. He formeth the light, and createth darkness: he maketh peace, and createth evil: he doeth all these things,” Isaiah 45:6,7. In these and innumerable like places doth the Lord declare that there is nothing which he hath made, that with the good hand of his providence he doth not govern and sustain.

Now, this general extent of his common providence to all doth no way hinder but that he may exercise certain special acts thereof towards some in particular, even by how much nearer than other things they approach unto him and are more assimilated unto his goodness. I mean his church here on earth, and those whereof it doth consist; “for what nation is there so great, who hath God so nigh unto them?” Deuteronomy 4:7. In the government hereof he most eminently showeth his glory, and exerciseth his power. Join here his works with his word, what he hath done with what he hath promised to do for the conservation of his church and people, and you will find admirable issues of a more special providence. Against this he promiseth “the gates of hell shall not prevail,” Matthew 16:18;—amidst of these he hath promised to remain, Matthew 28:20; supplying them with an addition of all things necessary, Matthew 6:33; desiring that “all their care might be cast upon him, who careth for them,” 1 Peter 5:7; forbidding any to “touch his anointed ones,” Psalm 105:15, and that because they are unto him as “the apple of his eye,” Zechariah 2:8. Now, this special providence hath respect unto a supernatural end, to which that, and that alone, is to be conveyed.

For wicked men, as they are excepted from this special care and government, so they are not exempted from the dominion of his almighty hand. He who hath created them “for the day of evil,” Proverbs 16:4, and provided a” place of their own” for them to go unto, Acts 1:25, doth not in this world suffer them to live without the verge of his all-ruling providence; but by suffering and enduring their iniquities with great patience and “long-suffering,” Romans 9:22, defending them oftentimes from the injuries of one another, Genesis 4:15, by granting unto them many temporal blessings, Matthew 5:45, disposing of all their works to the glory of his great name, Proverbs 21:1,2, he declareth that they also live, and move, and have their being in him, and are under the government of his providence. Nay, there is not the least thing in this world to which his care and knowledge doth not descend. In would it become his wisdom not to sustain, order, and dispose of all things by him created, but leave them to the ruin of uncertain chance. Jerome[cxxxvi] [4] then was injurious to his providence, and cast a blemish on his absolute perfection, whilst he thought to have cleared his majesty from being defiled with the knowledge and care of the smallest reptiles and vermin every moment; and St Austin is express to the contrary: [cxxxvii] [5] “Who,” saith he, “hath disposed the several members of the flea and gnat, that hath given unto them order, life, and motion?” etc.,—even most agreeable to holy Scriptures: so Psalm 104:20,21, 145:15; Matthew 6:26,30, “He feedeth the fowls, and clotheth the grass of the field;” Job 39:1,2; Jonah 4:6,7. Sure it is not troublesome to God to take notice of all that he hath created. Did he use that great power in the production of the least of his creatures, so far beyond the united activity of men and angels, for no end at all? Doubtless, even they also must have a well-disposed order, for the manifestation of his glory. “Not a sparrow falleth on the ground without our Father;” even “the hairs of our head are all numbered,” Matthew 10:29,30. “He clotheth the lilies and grass of the field, which is to be cast into the oven,” Luke 12:27,28. Behold his knowledge and care of them! Again, he used frogs and lice for the punishment of the Egyptians, Exodus 8; with a gourd and a worm he exercised his servant Jonah, chapter 4; yea, he calls the locusts his “terrible army;”—and shall not God know and take care of the number of his soldiers, the ordering of his dreadful host?

That God by his providence governeth and disposeth of all things by him created is sufficiently proved; the manner how he worketh all in all, how he ordereth the works of his own hands, in what this governing and disposing of his creatures doth chiefly consist, comes now to be considered. And here four things are principally to be observed:—First, The sustaining, preserving, and upholding of all things by his power; for “he upholdeth all things by the word of his power,” Hebrews 1:3. Secondly, His working together with all things, by an influence of causality into the agents themselves; “for he also hath wrought all our works in us,” Isaiah 26:12. Thirdly, His powerful overruling of all events, both necessary, free, and contingent, and disposing of them to certain ends for the manifestation of his glory. So Joseph tells his brethren, “As for you, ye thought evil against me; but God meant it unto good, to bring to pass, as it is at this day, to save much people live,” Genesis 1:20. Fourthly, His determining and restraining second causes to such and such effects: “The king’s heart is in the hand of the LORD, as the rivers of water: he turneth it whithersoever he will,” Proverbs 21:1.

First, His sustentation or upholding of all things is his powerful continuing of their being, natural strength, and faculties, bestowed on them at their creation: “In him we live, and move, and have our being,” Acts 17. So that he doth neither work all himself in them, without any co-operation of theirs, which would not only turn all things into stocks, yea, and take from stocks their own proper nature, but also is contrary to that general blessing he spread over the face of the whole world in the beginning, “Be fruitful, and multiply,” Genesis 1:22;—nor yet leave them to a self-subsistence, he in the meantime only not destroying them;[cxxxviii] [6] which would make him an idle spectator of most things in the world, not to “work hitherto,” as our Savior speaks, and grant to divers things here below an absolute being, not derivative from him: the first whereof is blasphemous, the latter impossible.

Secondly, For God’s working in and together with all second causes for producing of their effects, what part or portion in the work punctually to assign unto him, what to the power of the inferior causes, seems beyond the reach of mortals; neither is an exact comprehension thereof any way necessary, so that we make every thing beholding to his power for its being, and to his assistance for its operation.

Thirdly, His supreme dominion exerciseth itself in disposing of all things to certain and determinate ends for his own glory, and is chiefly discerned advancing itself over those things which are most contingent, and making them in some sort necessary, inasmuch as they are certainly disposed of to some proposed ends. Between the birth and death of a man, how many things merely contingent do occur! how many chances! how many diseases! in their own nature all evitable, and, in regard of the event, not one of them but to some proves mortal; yet, certain it is that a man’s “days are determined, the number of his months are with the Lord, he hath appointed his bounds that he cannot pass,” Job 14:5. And oftentimes by things purely contingent and accidental he executeth his purposes,—bestoweth rewards, inflicteth punishments, and accomplisheth his judgments; as when he delivereth a man to be slain by the head of an axe, flying from the helve in the hand of a man cutting a tree by the way. But in nothing is this more evident than in the ancient casting of lots, a thing as casual and accidental as can be imagined, huddled in the cap at a venture. Yet God overruleth them to the declaring of his purpose, freeing truth from doubts, and manifestation of his power: Proverbs 16:33, “The lot is cast into the lap, but the whole disposing thereof is of the LORD;”—as you may see in the examples of Achan, Joshua 7:16-18; Saul, 1 Samuel 10:20,21; Jonathan, 1 Samuel 14:41,42; Jonah, Jonah 1:7; Matthias, Acts 1:26. And yet this overruling act of God’s providence (as no other decree or act of his) doth not rob things contingent of their proper nature; for cannot he who effectually causeth that they shall come to pass, cause also that they shall come to pass contingently?

Fourthly, God’s predetermination of second causes (which I name not last as though it were the last act of God’s providence about his creatures, for indeed it is the first that concerneth their operation) is that effectual working of his, according to his eternal purpose, whereby, though some agents, as the wills of men, are causes most free and indefinite, or unlimited lords of their own actions, in respect of their internal principle of operation (that is, their own nature), [they] are yet all, in respect of his decree, and by his powerful working, determined to this or that effect in particular; not that they are compelled to do this, or hindered from doing that, but are inclined and disposed to do this or that, according to their proper manner of working, that is, most freely: for truly such testimonies are everywhere obvious in Scripture, of the stirring up of men’s wills and minds, of bending and inclining them to divers things, of the governing of the secret thoughts and motions of the heart, as cannot by any means be referred to a naked permission, with a government of external actions, or to a general influence, whereby they should have power to do this or that, or any thing else; wherein, as some suppose, his whole providence consisteth.

Let us now jointly apply these several acts to free agents, working according to choice, or relation, such as are the wills of men, and that will open the way to take a view of Arminian heterodoxies, concerning this article of Christian belief. And here two things must be premised:—First, That they be not deprived of their own radical or original internal liberty; secondly, That they be not exempt from the moving influence and gubernation of God’s providence;—the first whereof would leave no just room for rewards and punishments; the other, as I said before, is injurious to the majesty and power of God. St Augustine[cxxxix] [7] judged Cicero worthy of special blame, even among the heathens, for so attempting to make men free that he made them sacrilegious, by denying them to be subject to an overruling providence: which gross error was directly maintained by Damascen,[cxl] [8] a learned Christian, teaching, “Things whereof we have any power, not to depend on providence, but on our own free will;” an opinion fitter for a hog of the Epicurus herd than for a scholar in the school of Christ. And yet this proud, prodigious error is now, though in other terms, stiffly maintained: for what do they else who ascribe such an absolute independent liberty to the will of man, that it should have in its own power every circumstance, every condition whatsoever, that belongs to operation, so that all things required on the part of God, or otherwise, to the performance of an action being accomplished, it remaineth solely in the power of a man’s own will whether he will do it or no? which supreme and plainly divine liberty, joined with such an absolute uncontrollable power and dominion over all his actions, would exempt and free the will of man, not only from all fore-determining to the production of such and such effects, but also from any effectual working or influence of the providence of God into the will itself, that should sustain, help, or cooperate with it in doing or willing any thing; and, therefore, the authors of this imaginary liberty have wisely framed an imaginary concurrence of God’s providence, answerable unto it,—namely, a general and indifferent influence, always waiting and expecting the will of man to determine itself to this or that effect, good or bad; God being, as it were, always ready at hand to do that small part which he hath in our actions, whensoever we please to use him, or, if we please to let him alone, he no way moveth us to the performance of any thing. Now, God forbid that we should give our consent to the choice of such a captain, under whose conduct we might go down again unto Paganism,—to the erecting of such an idol into the throne of the Almighty. No, doubtless, let us be most indulgent to our wills, and assign them all the liberty that is competent unto a created nature, to do all things freely according to election and foregoing counsel, being free from all natural necessity and outward compulsion; but for all this, let us not presume to deny God’s effectual assistance, his particular powerful influence into the wills and actions of his creatures, directing of them to a voluntary performance of what he hath determined: which the Arminians opposing in the behalf of their darling free-will, do work in the hearts of men an overweening of their own power, and an absolute independence of the providence of God; for,—

First, they deny that God (in whom we live, and move, and have our being) doth any thing by his providence, [cxli] [9] “whereby the creature should be stirred up, or helped in any of his actions.” That is, God wholly leaves a man in the hand of his own counsel, to the disposal of his own absolute independent power, without any respect to his providence at all; whence, as they do, they may well conclude, [cxlii] [10] “that those things which God would have to be done of us freely” (such as are all human actions), “he cannot himself will or work more powerfully and effectually than by the way of wishing or desiring,” as Vorstius speaks; which is no more than one man can do concerning another, perhaps far less than an angel. I can wish or desire that another man would do what I have a mind he should; but, truly, to describe the providence of God by such expressions seems to me intolerable blasphemy. But thus it must be; without such helps as these, Dagon cannot keep on his head, nor the idol of uncontrollable free-will enjoy his dominion.

Hence Corvinus will grant[cxliii] [11] that the killing of a man by the slipping of an axe’s head from the helve, although contingent, may be said to happen according to God’s counsel and determinate will; but on no terms will he yield that this may be applied to actions wherein the counsel and freedom of man’s will do take place, as though that they also should have dependence on any such overruling power;—whereby he absolutely excludeth the providence of God from having any sovereignty within the territory of human actions, which is plainly to shake off the yoke of his dominion, and to make men lords paramount within themselves: so that they may well ascribe unto God (as they do[cxliv] [12] ) only a deceivable expectation of those contingent things that are yet for to come, there being no act of his own in the producing of such effects on which he can ground any certainty; only, he may take a conjecture, according to his guess at men’s inclinations. And, indeed, this is the Helen for whose enjoyment, these thrice ten years, they have maintained warfare with the hosts of the living God; their whole endeavor being to prove, that, notwithstanding the performance of all things, on the part of God, required for the production of any action, [cxlv] [13] yet the will of man remains absolutely free, yea, in respect of the event, as well as its manner of operation, to do it or not to do it. That is, notwithstanding God’s decree that such an action shall be performed, and his foreknowledge that it will so come to pass; notwithstanding his cooperating with the will of man (as far as they will allow him) for the doing of it, and though he hath determined by that act of man to execute some of his own judgments;[cxlvi] [14] yet there is no kind of necessity but that he may as well omit as do it: which is all one as if they should say, “Our tongues are our own; we ought to speak: who is lord over us? We will vindicate ourselves into a liberty of doing what and how we will, though for it we cast God out of his throne.” And, indeed, if we mark it, we shall find them undermining and pulling down the actual providence of God, at the root and several branches thereof; for,—

First, For his conservation or sustaining of all things, they affirm[cxlvii] [15] it to be very likely that this is nothing but a negative act of his will, whereby he willeth or determineth not to destroy the things by him created; and when we produce places of Scripture which affirm that it is an act of his power, they say they are foolishly cited. So that, truly, let the Scripture say what it will, (in their conceit,) God doth no more sustain and uphold all his creatures than I do a house when I do not set it on fire, or a worm when I do not tread upon it.

Secondly, For God’s concurring with inferior causes in all their acts and working, they affirm it to be only [cxlviii] [16] a general influence, alike upon all and every one, which they may use or not use at their pleasure, and in the use determine it to this or that effect, be it good or bad (so Corvinus), as it seems best unto them. In a word, to the will of man [cxlix] [17] it is nothing but what suffers it to play its own part freely, according to its inclination; as they jointly speak in their Confession. Observe, also, that they account this influence of his providence not to be into the agent, the will of man, whereby that should be helped or enabled to do any thing (no, that would seem to grant a self-sufficiency), [cl] [18] but only into the act itself for its production: as if I should help a man to lift a log, it becomes perhaps unto him so much the lighter, but he is not made one jot the stronger; which takes off the proper work of providence, consisting in an internal assistance.

Thirdly, For God’s determining or circumscribing the will of man to do this or that in particular, they absolutely explode it, as a thing destructive to their adored liberty. [cli] [19] “It is no way consistent with it,” say they, in their Apology. So also Arminius: [clii] [20] “The providence of God doth not determine the will of man to one part of the contradiction.” That is, “God hath not determined that you shall, nor doth by any means overrule your wills, to do this thing rather than that, to do this or to omit that.” So that the sum of their endeavor is, to prove that the will of man is so absolutely free, independent, and uncontrollable, that God doth not, nay, with all his power cannot, determine it certainly and infallibly to the performance of this or that particular action, thereby to accomplish his own purposes, to attain his own ends. Truly, it seems to me the most unfortunate attempt that ever Christians lighted on; which, if it should get success answerable to the greatness of the undertaking, the providence of God, in men’s esteem, would be almost thrust quite out of the world. “Tantae molis erat.” The new goddess contingency could not be erected until the God of heaven was utterly despoiled of his dominion over the sons of men, and in the room thereof a home-bred idol of self-sufficiency set up, and the world persuaded to worship it. But that the building climb no higher, let all men observe how the word of God overthrows this Babylonian tower.

First, then, In innumerable places it is punctual that his providence doth not only bear rule in the counsels of men and their most secret resolutions, (whence the prophet declareth that he knoweth that “the way of man is not in himself,”—that “it is not in man that walketh to direct his steps,” Jeremiah 10:23; and Solomon, that “a man’s heart, deviseth his way, but the LORD directeth his steps,” Proverbs 16:9; David, also, having laid this ground, that “the Lord bringeth the counsel of the heathen to naught,” and “maketh the devices of the people of none effect,” but “his own counsel standeth for ever, the thoughts of his heart to all generations,” Psalm 33:10,11, proceedeth accordingly, in his own distress, to pray that the Lord would infatuate and make [cliii] [21] “foolish the counsel of Ahithophel,” 2 Samuel 15:31,—which also the Lord did, by working in the heart of Absalom to hearken to the cross counsel of Hushai); but also, secondly, That the working of his providence is effectual even in the hearts and wills of men to turn them which way he will, and to determine them to this or that in particular, according as he pleaseth: “The preparations of the heart in man, and the answer of the tongue, is from the LORD,” saith Solomon, Proverbs 16:1;—which Jacob trusted and relied on when he prayed that the Lord would grant his sons to find favor and mercy before that man whom then he supposed to be some atheistical Egyptian, Genesis 43:14; whence we must grant, either that the good old man believed that it was in the hand of God to incline and unalterably turn and settle the heart of Joseph to favor his brethren, or else his prayer must have had such a senseless sense as this: “Grant, O Lord, such a general influence of thy providence, that the heart of that man may be turned to good towards my sons, or else that it may not, being left to its own freedom.” A strange request! yet how it may be bettered by one believing the Arminian doctrine I cannot conceive. Thus Solomon affirmeth that “the king’s heart is in the hand of the LORD, like the rivers of water: he turneth it whithersoever he will,” Proverbs 21:1. If the heart of a king, who hath an inward natural liberty equal with others, and an outward liberty belonging to his state and condition above them, be yet so in the hand of the Lord as that he always turneth it to what he pleaseth in particular, then certainly other men are not excepted from the rule of the same providence; which is the plain sense of these words, and the direct thesis which we maintain in opposition to the Arminian idol of absolute independent free-will. So Daniel, also, reproving the Babylonian tyrant, affirmeth that he “glorified not the God in whose hand was his breath, and whose were all his ways,” Daniel 5:23. Not only his breath and life, but also all his ways, his actions, thoughts, and words, were in the hand of God.

Yea, thirdly, sometimes the saints of God, as I touched before, do pray that God would be pleased thus to determine their hearts, and bend their wills, and wholly incline them to some one certain thing, and that without any prejudice to their true and proper liberty: so David, Psalm 119:36, “Incline my heart unto thy testimonies, and not to covetousness.” This prayer being his may also be ours, and we may ask it in faith, relying on the power and promise of God in Christ that he will perform our petitions, John 14:14. Now, I desire any Christian to resolve, whether, by these and the like requests, he intendeth to desire at the hand of God nothing but such an indifferent motion to any good as may leave him to his own choice whether he will do it or no, which is all the Arminians will grant him; or rather, that he would powerfully bend his heart and soul unto his testimonies, and work in him an actual embracing of all the ways of God, not desiring more liberty, but only enough to do it willingly. Nay, surely the prayers of God’s servants, requesting, with Solomon, that the Lord would be with them, and “incline their heart unto him, to keep his statutes and walk in his commandments,” 1 Kings 8:57,58; and with David, to “create in them a clean heart, and renew a right spirit within them,” Psalm 51:10; when, according to God’s promises, they entreat him “to put his fear into their hearts,” Jeremiah 32:40, “to unite their hearts to fear his name,” Psalm 86:11, to work in them both the will and the deed, an actual obedience unto his law;—cannot possibly aim at nothing but a general influence, enabling them alike either to do or not to do what they so earnestly long after.

Fourthly, The certainty of divers promises and threatenings of Almighty God dependeth upon his powerful determining and turning the wills and hearts of men which way he pleaseth; thus, to them that fear him he promiseth that they shall find favor in the sight of men, Proverbs 3:4. Now, if, notwithstanding all God’s powerful operation in their hearts, it remaineth absolutely in the hands of men whether they will favor them that fear him or no, it is wholly in their power whether God shall be true in his promises or no. Surely when Jacob wrestled with God on the strength of such promise, Genesis 32:12, he little thought of any question whether it were in the power of God to perform it. Yea, and the event showed that there ought to be no such question, chapter 33; for the Lord turned the heart of his brother Esau, as he doth of others when he makes them pity his servants when at any time they have carried them away captives, Psalm 106:46. See, also, the same powerful operation required to the execution of his judgments, Job 12:17, 20:21, etc. In brief, there is no prophecy nor prediction in the whole Scripture, no promise to the church or faithful, to whose accomplishment the free actions and concurrence of men are required, but evidently declareth that God disposeth of the hearts of men, ruleth their wills, inclineth their affections, and determines them freely to choose and do what he in his good pleasure hath decreed shall be performed;—such as were the prophecies of deliverance from the Babylonish captivity by Cyrus, Isaiah 45; of the conversion of the Gentiles; of the stability of the church, Matthew 16; of the destruction of Jerusalem by the Romans, chapter 24; with innumerable others. I will add only some few reasons for the close of this long discourse.

This opinion, that God hath nothing but a general influence into the actions of men, not effectually moving their wills to this or that in particular,—

First, Granteth a goodness of entity, or being, unto divers things, whereof God is not the author, as those special actions which men perform without his special concurrence; which is blasphemous. The apostle affirms that “of him are all things.”

Secondly, It denieth God to be the author of all moral goodness, for an action is good inasmuch as it is such an action in particular;[cliv] [22] which that any is so, according to this opinion, is to be attributed merely to the will of man. The general influence of God moveth him no more to prayer than to evil communications tending to the corruption of good manners.

Thirdly, It maketh all the decrees of God, whose execution dependeth on human actions, to be altogether uncertain, and his foreknowledge of such things to be fallible and easily to be deceived; so that there is no reconciliation possible to be hoped for betwixt these following and the like assertions:—

ENDNOTES:

[clv]  [1] Qei>a pa>ntwn ajrch< di> h=v a[panta kai< e]sti kainei.—Theophrastus, apud Picum. Vid. Senecam de Provid. et Plotinum.

[clvi]  [2] “An actus divinae providentiae omnium rerum conservatrix, sit affirmativus po-tentiae, an tantum negativus voluntatis, quo nolit res ereatas perdere.”—Rem. Apol., cap. 6.

[clvii]  [3] “Providentia seu ratio ordinis ad finem duo praecipue continet: principium decernens seu ipsam rationem ordinis in mente divina, ipsi Deo coaeternum, et principium exequens, quo suo modo, per debita media, ipsa in ordine et numero disponit.”—Thom.

[clviii]  [4] “Majestatem Dei dedecet scire per momenta singula, quot nascantur culices, quae pulicum et muscarum in terra multitudo.”—Hieron, in cap. 1, Hab.

[clix]  [5] “Quis disposuit membra pulicis ac culicis, ut habeant ordinem suum, habeant vitam suam, habeant motum suum,” etc. “Qui fecit in coelo angelum, ipse fecit in terra vermi culum, sed angelum in coelo pro habitatione coelesti, vermiculum in terra pro habitatione terrestri, nunquid angelum fecit repere in coeno, aut vermiculum in coelo,” etc.—Aug., tom. 8, in Psalm 148.

[clx]  [6] Rem. Apol., cap. 6.

[clxi]  [7] “Qui sic homines voluit esse liberos ut fecit sacrilegos.”—Aug.

[clxii]  [8] Ta< ejf j uJmi~n ouj th~v pronoi>av ajlla< tou~ hJmete>rou aujtezousi>ou.—Damascen.

[clxiii]  [9] “Deus influxu suo nihil confert creaturae, quo ad agendum incitetur ac adjuvetur.”—Corv. ad Molin., cap. 3. sect. 15, p. 35.

[clxiv]  [10] “Quae Deus libere prorsus et contingenter a nobis fieri vult, ea potentius aut efficacius quam per modum voti aut desiderii, velle non potest.—Vorst. Parasc., p. 4.

[clxv]  [11] “Deinde etsi in isto casu destinatum aliquod consilium ac voluntas Dei determi-nata consideranda esset, tamen in omnibus actionibus et in its quidem quae ex deliberato hominum consilio et libera voluntate et male quidem fiunt, ita se rem habere inde concludi non possit, puta, quia hic nullum consilium et arbitrii libertas locum habent.”—Corv. ad. Molin., cap. 3. sect. 14, p. 33.

[clxvi]  [12] “Respectu contingentiae quam res habent in se, tum in divina scientia Deo expectatio tribuitur.”—Rem. Defen. Sent. in Act. Syn., p. 107.

[clxvii]  [13] “Potentia voluntatis, ab omni interna et externa necessitate immunis debet mahere.”—Rem. Confes., cap. 6. sect. 3. Vid. plura. Rem. Apol., cap. 6. p. 69, a.

[clxviii]  [14] “In arbitrio creaturae semper est vel influere in actum vel influxum suum suspendere, et vel sic, vel aliter influere.”—Corv, ad. Molin., cap. 3. sect. 15.

[clxix]  [15] “An conservatio ista sit vis sive actus petentiae an actus merus voluntatis negativus, quo vult res creatas non destruere aut annihilare,—pesterius non sine magna veri specie affirmatur: locus ad Hebrews 1:3 inepte adducitur.”—Rem. Apol., cap. 6. sect. 1, p. 68, a.

[clxx]  [16] “Curandum diligenter, ut Deo quidem universalis, homini vero particularis influxus in actus tribuatur, quo universalem Dei influxum, ad particularem actum determinet.”—Corv, ad Molin., cap. 3. sect. 5.

[clxxi]  [17] “Ita concurrit Deus in agendo, cum hominis voluntate, ut istam pro genio suo agere et libere suas partes obire sinat.”—Rem. Confes., cap. 6. sect. 3.

[clxxii]  [18] “Influxus divinus est in ipsum actum non in voluntatem.”—Armin. Antip., alii passim.

[clxxiii]  [19] “Determinatio cum libertate vera nullo modo consistere potest.”— Rem. Apol., cap. 7. fol. 82

[clxxiv]  [20] “Providentia divina non determinat voluntatem liberam ad unam contradictionis vel contrarietatis partem.”—Armin. Artic. Perpen.

[clxxv]  [21] “Dominus dissipavit consilium quod dederat Achitophel agendo in corde Absolon, nt tale consilium repudiaret, et aliud quod ei non expediebat eligeret.”—Aug, do Grat., et Lib. Arbit., cap. 20.

[clxxvi]  [22] “Qui aliquid boni a Deo non effici affirmat, ille Deum esse negat: si namque vel tantillum boni a Deo non est: jam non omnis boni effector est eoque nec Deus.”—Bucer. 3 cap. 9. ad Rom.

CHAPTER 5.

WHETHER THE WILL AN
 PURPOSE OF GOD MAY BE RESISTED,
AND HE BE FRUSTRATE OF HIS INTENTIONS.

By the former steps is the altar of Ahaz set on the right hand of the altar of God,—the Arminian idol, in a direct opposition, exalted to an equal pitch with the power and will of the Most High. I shall now present unto you the Spirit of God once more contending with the towering imaginations of poor mortals, about a transcendent privilege of greatness, glory, and power: for having made his decrees mutable, his prescience fallible, and almost quite divested him of his providence, as the sum and issue of all their endeavors, they affirm that his will may be resisted, he may fail of his intentions, be frustrate of his ends,—he may and doth propose such things as he neither doth nor can at any time accomplish, and that because the execution of such acts of his will might haply clash against the freedom of the will of men; which, if it be not an expression of spiritual pride above all that ever the devil attempted in heaven, divines do not well explicate that sin of his. Now, because there may seem some difficulty in this matter, by reason of the several acceptations of the will of God, especially in regard of that whereby it is affirmed that his law and precepts are his will, which, alas! we all of us too often resist or transgress, I will unfold one distinction of the will of God, which will leave it clear what it is that the Arminians oppose, for which we count them worthy of so heavy a charge.

“Divinum velle est ejus esse,” say the schoolmen,[clxxvii] [1] “The will of God is nothing but God willing;” not differing from his essence “secundem rem,” in the thing itself, but only “secundem rationem,” in that it importeth a relation to the thing willed. The essence of God, then, being a most absolute, pure, simple act or substance, his will consequently can be but simply one; whereof we ought to make neither division nor distinction. If that whereby it is signified were taken always properly and strictly for the eternal will of God, the differences hereof that are usually given are rather distinctions of the signification of the word than of the thing.

In which regard they are not only tolerable, but simply necessary, because without them it is utterly impossible to reconcile some places of Scripture seemingly repugnant. In the 22d chapter of Genesis, verse 2, God commandeth Abraham to take his only son Isaac, and offer him for a burnt-offering in the land of Moriah. Here the words of God are declarative of some will of God unto Abraham, who knew it ought to be, and little thought but that it should be, performed; but yet, when he actually addressed himself to his duty, in obedience to the will of God, he receiveth a countermand, verse 12, that he should not lay his hand upon the child to sacrifice him. The event plainly manifesteth that it was the will of God that Isaac should not be sacrificed; and yet notwithstanding, by reason of his command, Abraham seems before bound to believe that it was well-pleasing unto God that he should accomplish what he was enjoined. If the will of God in the Scripture be used but in one acceptation, here is a plain contradiction. Thus God commands Pharaoh to let his people go. Could Pharaoh think otherwise, nay, was he not bound to believe that it was the will of God that he should dismiss the Israelites at the first hearing of the message? Yet God affirms that he would harden his heart, that he should not suffer them to depart until he had showed his signs and wonders in the land of Egypt. To reconcile these and the like places of Scripture, both the ancient fathers and schoolmen, with modern divines, do affirm that the one will of God may be said to be divers or manifold, in regard of the sundry manners whereby he willeth those things to be done which he willeth, as also in other respects, and yet, taken in its proper signification, is simply one and the same. The vulgar distinction of God’s secret and revealed will is such as to which all the others may be reduced; and therefore I have chosen it to insist upon.

The secret will of God is his eternal, unchangeable purpose concerning all things which he hath made, to be brought by certain means to their appointed ends: of this himself affirmeth, that “his counsel shall stand, and he will do all his pleasure,” Isaiah 46:10. This some call the absolute, efficacious will of God, the will of his good pleasure, always fulfilled; and indeed this is the only proper, eternal, constant, immutable will of God, whose order can neither be broken nor its law transgressed, so long as with him there is neither change nor shadow of turning.

The revealed will of God containeth not his purpose and decree, but our duty,—not what he will do according to his good pleasure, but what we should do if we will please him; and this, consisting in his word, his precepts and promises, belongeth to us and our children, that we may do the will of God. Now this, indeed, is rather to< qelhto>n than to< qe>lhma, that which God willeth, rather than his will, but termed so as we call that the will of a man which he hath determined shall be done: “This is the will of him that sent me, that every one which seeth the Son, and believeth on him, may have everlasting life,” saith our Savior, John 6:40; that is, this is that which his will hath appointed. Hence it is called “voluntas signi,” or the sign of his will, metaphorically only called his will, saith Aquinas;[clxxviii] [2] for inasmuch as our commands are the signs of our wills, the same is said of the precepts of God. This is the rule of our obedience, and whose transgression makes an action sinful; for hJ aJmarti>a ejsti<n hJ ajnomi>a, “sin is the transgression of a law,” and that such a law as is given to the transgressor to be observed. Now, God hath not imposed on us the observation of his eternal decree and intention; which, as it is utterly impossible for us to transgress or frustrate, so were we unblamable if we should. A master requires of his servant to do what he commands, not to accomplish what he intends, which perhaps he never discovered unto him; nay, the commands of superiors are not always signs that the commander will have the things commanded actually performed (as in all precepts for trial), but only that they who are subjects to this command shall be obliged to obedience, as far as the sense of it doth extend. “Et hoc clarum est in praeceptis divinis,” saith Durand,[clxxix] [3] etc.,—“And this is clear in the commands of God,” by which we are obliged to do what he commandeth; and yet it is not always his pleasure that the thing itself, in regard of the event, shall be accomplished, as we saw before in the examples of Pharaoh and Abraham.

Now, the will of God in the first acceptation is said to be hid or secret, not because it is so always, for it is in some particulars revealed and made known unto us two ways:—

First, By his word; as where God affirmeth that the dead shall rise. We doubt not but that they shall rise, and that it is the absolute will of God that they shall do so. Secondly, By the effects; for when any thing cometh to pass, we may cast the event on the will of God as its cause, and look upon it as a revelation of his purpose. Jacob’s sons little imagined that it was the will of God by them to send their brother into Egypt; yet afterward Joseph tells them plainly it was not they, but God that sent him thither, Genesis 45:5. But it is said to be secret for two causes:—First, Because for the most part it is so. There is nothing in divers issues declarative of God’s determination but only the event, which, while it is future, is hidden to them who have faculties to judge of things past and present, but not to discern things for to come. Hence St James bids us not be too peremptory in our determinations that we will do this or that, not knowing how God will close with us for its performance. Secondly, It is said to be secret in reference to its cause, which for the most part is past our finding out: “His path is in the great waters, and his footsteps are not known.”

It appeareth, then, that the secret and revealed will of God are diverse in sundry respects, but chiefly in regard of their acts and their objects. First, In regard of their acts, the secret will of God is his eternal decree and determination concerning any thing to be done in its appointed time; his revealed will is an act whereby he declareth himself to love or approve any thing, whether ever it be done or no. Secondly, They are diverse in regard of their objects. The object of God’s purpose and decree is that which is good in any kind, with reference to its actual existence, for it must infallibly be performed; but the object of his revealed will is that only which is morally good (I speak of it inasmuch as it approveth or commandeth), agreeing to the law and the gospel, and that considered only inasmuch as it is good; for whether it be ever actually performed or no is accidental to the object of God’s revealed will.

Now, of these two differences the first is perpetual, in regard of their several acts; but not so the latter. They are sometimes coincident in regard of their objects. For instance, God commandeth us to believe; here his revealed will is that we should so do: withal, he intendeth we shall do so; and therefore ingenerateth faith in our hearts that we may believe. Here his secret and revealed will are coincident; the former[clxxx] [4] being his precept that we should believe, the latter his purpose that we shall believe. In this case, I say, the object of the one and the other is the same,—even what we ought to do, and what he will do. And this inasmuch as he hath “wrought all our works in us,” Isaiah 26:12. They are our own works which he works in us; his act in us and by us is ofttimes our duty towards him. He commands us by his revealed will to walk in his statutes, and keep his laws; upon this he also promiseth that he will so effect all things, that of some this shall be performed: Ezekiel 36:26, 27, “A new heart also will I give you, and a new spirit will I put within you: and I will take away the stony heart out of your flesh, and I will give you an heart of flesh. And I will put my Spirit within you, and cause you to walk in my statutes, and ye shall keep my judgments and do them.” So that the self-same obedience of the people of God is here the object of his will, taken in either acceptation. And yet the precept of God is not here, as some learned men suppose, declarative of God’s intention, for then it must be so to all to whom it is given; which evidently it is not, for many are commanded to believe on whom God never bestoweth faith. It is still to be looked upon as a mere declaration of our duty, its closing with God’s intention being accidental unto it. There is a wide difference betwixt “Do such a thing,” and, “You shall do it.” If God’s command to Judas to believe imported as much as, “It is my purpose and intention that Judas shall believe,” it must needs contradict that will of God whereby he determined that Judas, for his infidelity, should go to his “own place.” His precepts are in all obedience of us to be performed, but do not signify his will that we shall actually fulfill his commands. Abraham was not bound to believe that it was God’s intention that Isaac should be sacrificed, but that it was his duty. There was no obligation on Pharaoh to think it was God’s purpose the people should depart at the first summons; he had nothing to do with that: but there was one to believe that if he would please God, he must let them go. Hence divers things of good use in these controversies may be collected:—

First, That God may command many things by his word which he never decreed that they should actually be performed; because, in such things, his words are not a revelation of his eternal decree and purpose, but only a declaration of some thing wherewith he is well-pleased, be it by us performed or no. In the fore-cited case he commanded Pharaoh to let his people go, and plagued him for refusing to obey his command. Hence we may not collect that God intended the obedience and conversion of Pharaoh by this his precept, but was frustrated of his intention,—for the Scripture is evident and clear that God purposed by his disobedience to accomplish an end far different, even a manifestation of his glory by his punishment,—but only that obedience unto his commands is pleasing unto him; as 1 Samuel 15:22.

Secondly, That the will of God to which our obedience is required is the revealed will of God contained in his word; whose compliance with his decree is such, that hence we learn three things tending to the execution of it:—First, That it is the condition of the word of God, and the dispensation thereof, instantly to persuade to faith and obedience. Secondly, That it is our duty by all means to aspire to the performance of all things by it enjoined, and our fault if we do not. Thirdly, That God by these means will accomplish his eternal decree of saving his elect; and that he willeth the salvation of others, inasmuch as he calleth them unto the performance of the condition thereof. Now, our obedience is so to be regulated by this revealed will of God, that we may sin either by omission against its precepts or commission against its prohibitions; although by our so omitting or committing of any thing the secret will or purpose of God be fulfilled. Had Abraham disobeyed God’s precept, when he was commanded to sacrifice his son Isaac, though God’s will had been accomplished thereby, who never intended it, yet Abraham had grievously sinned against the revealed will of God, the rule of his duty. The holiness of our actions consisteth in a conformity unto his precepts, and not unto his purposes. On this ground Gregory affirmeth,[clxxxi] [5] “That many fulfill the will of God” (that is, his intentions) “when they think to change it” (by transgressing his precepts); “and by resisting imprudently, obey God’s purpose.” And to show how merely we in our actions are tied to this rule of our duty, St Austin[clxxxii] [6] shows how a man may do good in a thing cross to God’s secret will, and evil in that which complieth with it, which he illustrates by the example of a sick parent having two children, the one wicked, who desires his father’s death, the other godly, and he prays for his life. But the will of God is he shall die, agreeably to the desire of the wicked child; and yet it is the other who hath performed his duty, and done what is pleasing unto God.

Thirdly, To return from this not unnecessary digression, that which we have now in agitation is the secret will of God, which we have before unfolded; and this it is that we charge the Arminians for affirming that it may be resisted,—that is, that God may fail in his purposes, come short of what he earnestly intendeth, or be frustrated of his aim and end: as if, [when] he should determinately resolve the faith and salvation of any man, it is in the power of that man to make void his determination, and not believe, and not be saved. Now, it is only in cases of this nature, wherein our own free wills have an interest, that they thus limit and circumscribe the power of the Most High. In other things they grant his omnipotence to be of no less extent than others do; but in this case they are peremptory and resolute, without any coloring or tergiversation: for whereas there is a question proposed by the apostle, Romans 9:19, “Who hath resisted his will?” which that none hath or can he grants in the following verses, Corvinus affirms, [clxxxiii] [7] “It is only an objection of the Jews, rejected by the apostle;”—which is much like an answer young scholars usually give to some difficult place in Aristotle, when they cannot think of a better, “Loquitur ex aliorum sententia;” for there is no sign of any such rejection of it by the apostle in the whole following discourse; yea, and it is not the Jews that St Paul disputeth withal here, but weaker brethren concerning the Jews, which is manifest from the first verse of the next chapter, where he distinguisheth between “brethren” to whom and “Israel” of whom he spake. Secondly, He speaks of the Jews in the whole treatise in the third person, but of the disputer in the second. Thirdly, It is taken for a confessed principle between St Paul and the disputer, as he calls him, that the Jews were rejected, which surely themselves would not readily acknowledge. So that Corvinus rejects, as an objection of the Jews, a granted principle of St Paul and the other Christians of his time. With the like confidence the same author affirmeth, [clxxxiv] [8] “That they nothing doubt but that many things are not done which God would have to be done.” Vorstius goes farther, teaching [clxxxv] [9] “that not only many things are[not] done which he would have done, but also that many things are done which he would not have done.” He means not our transgressing of his law, but God’s failing in his purpose, as Corvinus clears it, acknowledging that the execution of God’s will is suspended or hindered by man; to whom Episcopius subscribes.[clxxxvi] [10] As, for example, God purposeth and intendeth the conversion of a sinner,—suppose it were Mary Magdalene;—can this intention of his be crossed and his will resisted? “Yea,” say the Arminians, “for God converts sinners by his grace.” “But we can resist God when he would convert us by his grace,”[clxxxvii] [11] say six of them jointly in their meeting at the Hague. “But some one may here object,” say they, “that thus God faileth of his intention, doth not attain the end at which he aims. We answer, This we grant.” Or be it the salvation of men, they say, [clxxxviii] [12] “they are certain that God intendeth that for many which never obtain it;” that end he cannot compass.

And here, methinks, they place God in a most unhappy condition, by affirming that they are often damned whom he would have to be saved, though he desires their salvation with a most vehement desire and natural affection,[clxxxix] [13] —such, I think, as crows have to the good of their young ones: for that there are in him such desires as are never fulfilled,[cxc] [14] because not regulated by wisdom and justice, they plainly affirm; for although by his infinite power, perhaps, he might accomplish them, yet it would not become him so to do.

Now, let any good-natured man, who hath been a little troubled for poor Jupiter in Homer, mourning for the death of his son Sarpedon, which he could not prevent, or hath been grieved for the sorrow of a distressed father, not able to remove the wickedness and inevitable ruin of an only son, drop one tear for the restrained condition of the God of heaven, who, when he would have all and every man in the world to come to heaven, to escape the torments of hell, and that with a serious purpose and intention that it shall be so, a vehement affection and fervent natural desire that it should be so, yet, being not in himself alone able to save one, must be forced to lose his desire, lay down his affection, change his purpose, and see the greatest part of them to perish everlastingly,[cxci] [15] yea, notwithstanding that he had provided a sufficient means for them all to escape, with a purpose and intention that they should so do.

In brief, their whole doctrine on this point is laid down by Corvinus, chapter 3, against Moulin, and the third section; where, first, he alloweth of the distinction of the will of God into that whereby he will have us do something, and that whereby he will do any thing himself. The first is nothing but his law and precepts; which we with him affirm may be said to be resisted, inasmuch as it is transgressed. The latter, he saith, if it respect any act of man’s, may be considered as preceding that act, or following it; if preceding it, then it may be resisted, if man will not cooperate. Now, this is the will of God, whereby himself intendeth to do any thing; the sum of which distinction is this, “The will of God concerning the future being of any thing may be considered as it goeth before the actual existence of the thing itself, and in this regard it may be hindered or resisted; but as it is considered to follow any act of man, it is always fulfilled:” by which latter member, striving to mollify the harshness of the former, he runs himself into inexplicable nonsense, affirming that that act of the will of God whereby he intendeth men shall do any thing cannot be hindered after they have done it,—that is, God hath irresistibly purposed they shall do it, provided they do it! In his following discourse, also, he plainly grants that there is no act of God’s will about the salvation of men that may not be made void and of none effect, but only that general decree whereby he hath established an inseparable connection between faith and salvation, or whereby he hath appointed faith in Christ to be the means of attaining blessedness, which is only an immanent act of God’s will, producing no outward effect; so that every act thereof that hath an external issue by human co-operation is frustrable and may fall to the ground: which in what direct opposition it stands to the word of God, let these following instances declare:—

First, “Our God is in the heavens,” saith the psalmist: “he hath done whatsoever he hath pleased,” Psalm 115:3. Not only part, but all, whatsoever he pleased should come to pass, by any means. “He ruleth in the kingdom of men, and giveth it to whomsoever he will,” Daniel 4:17. The transposition of kingdoms is not without the mixture of divers free and voluntary actions of men, and yet in that great work God doth all that he pleaseth. Yea, before him “all the inhabitants of the earth are reputed as nothing: and he doeth according to his will in the army of heaven, and among the inhabitants of the earth: and none can stay his hand, or say unto him, What doest thou?” verse 35. “My counsel,” saith he, “shall stand, and I will do all my pleasure,” Isaiah 46:10; “I have purposed, I will also do it,” verse 11. Nay, so certain is he of accomplishing all his purposes, that he confirms it with an oath: “The LORD of hosts hath sworn, Surely as I have thought, so it shall come to pass; and as I have purposed, so shall it stand,” Isaiah 14:24. And indeed it were a very strange thing, that God should intend what he foreseeth will never come to pass. But I confess this argument will not be pressing against the Arminians, who question that prescience; but yet, would they also would observe from the Scripture, that the failing of wicked men’s counsels and intentions is a thing that God is said to “deride in heaven,” as Psalm 2:4. He threatens them with it. “Take counsel together,” saith he, “and it shall come to nought; speak the word, and it shall not stand,” Isaiah 8:10. See also chapter 29:7,8. And shall they be enabled to recriminate, and cast the like aspersion on the God of heaven? No, surely. Saith St Austin,[cxcii] [16] “Let us take heed we be not compelled to believe that Almighty God would have any thing done which doth not come to pass.” To which truth, also, that the schoolmen have universally consented is showed by Alvarez, Disput. 32, pro. 3. And these few instances will manifest the Arminian opposition to the word of God in this particular:—

ENDNOTES:

[cxciii]  [1] Aquin., p. q. 19, ar. ad. 1.

[cxciv]  [2] Aquin., q. g. 19, a. 11, c.

[cxcv]  [3] Durand, Dist. c. 48, q. 3.

[cxcvi]  [4] The words “former” and “latter” evidently refer to the previous sentence,—“former” corresponding with the revealed will, “latter” with the secret will of God. The order is reversed in the first clause of this sentence, and hence the author’s meaning might be mistaken.—ED.

[cxcvii]  [5] “Multi voluntatem Del faciunt, cum illam nituntur vitare, et resistendo impruden-ter obsequuntur divino consilio.”—Greg. Moral., lib. 6. cap. 11.

[cxcviii]  [6] Aug. Enchirid. ad Lauren., cap. 101.

[cxcix]  [7] “Ea sententia non continet apostoli verba, sed Judseorum objectionem ab apostolo rejectam.”—Corv, ad Molin., cap. 3. per. 19.

[cc]  [8] “Multa non fieri quae Deus fieri vult, vel non dubitamus.”—Ibid, cap. 5:p. 5.

[cci]  [9] “Multa fiunt quae Deus fieri non vult: nec semper fiunt quae ipse fiere vult.”—Vorst. de Deo, p. 64.

[ccii]  [10] “Ab homine esse agnoscimus, quod voluntatis (divinae) executio saepe suspendatur.”—Corv., ubi sup. parag. 12; Episcop. Disput. Pri. De Volun. Dei, corol. 5.

[cciii]  [11] “Possumus Deo resistere, cum nos vult per gratiam suam convertere.”—Rem. Coll. Hag., p. 193. “Objiciet quis, ergo illum suum finem Deus non est assecutus, respon-demus, nos hoc concedere.”—Rem. Defens. Sent. in Synod., p. 256.

[cciv]  [12] “Nobis certum est, Deum multorum salutem intendere, in quibus eam non assequitur.”—Grevinch, ad Ames., p. 271.

[ccv]  [13] “Vehemens est in Deo affectus ad homini benefaciendum.”—Corv, ad Molin., cap. 5. sect. 8.

[ccvi]  [14] “Esse in Deo desideria quae non implentur concedimus.”—Idem, sect. 9. “Non decet ut Deus infinita sua potentia utatur ad id efficiendum, quo desiderio suo naturali fertur.”—Armim Antip., p. 584.

[ccvii]  [15] “Deus eo fine et intentione remedium praeparavit, ut omnes ejus actu fierent participes, quamvis id non actu evenit.”—Rem. Apol., cap. 7. fol. 86.

[ccviii]  [16] “Ne credere cogamur aliquid omnipotentem Deum voluisse factumque non esse.”—Aug. En., cap. 103.

CHAPTER 6.

HOW THE WHOLE DOCTRINE
OF PREDESTINATION IS CORRUPTED BY THE ARMINIANS.

The cause of all these quarrels, wherewith the Arminians and their abettors have troubled the church of Christ, comes next unto our consideration. The eternal predestination of Almighty God, that fountain of all spiritual blessings, of all the effects of God’s love derived unto us through Christ, the demolishing of this rock of our salvation hath been the chief endeavor of all the patrons of human self-sufficiency; so to vindicate unto themselves a power and independent ability of doing good, of making themselves to differ from others, of attaining everlasting happiness, without going one step from without themselves. And this is their first attempt, to attain their second proposed end, of building a tower from the top whereof they may mount into heaven, whose foundation is nothing but the sand of their own free-will and endeavors. Quite on a sudden (what they have done in effect) to have taken away this divine predestination, name and thing, had been an attempt as noted as notorious, and not likely to attain the least success amongst men professing to believe the gospel of Christ; wherefore, suffering the name to remain, they have abolished the thing itself, and substituted another so unlike it in the room thereof, that any one may see they have gotten a blear-eyed Leah instead of Rachel, and hug a cloud instead of a Deity. The true doctrine itself hath been so excellently delivered by divers learned divines, so freed from all objections, that I shall only briefly and plainly lay it down, and that with special reference to the seventeenth article of our church, where it is clearly avowed; showing withal,—which is my chief intention,—how it is thwarted, opposed, and overthrown by the Arminians. Predestination, in the usual sense[in which] it is taken, is a part of God’s providence concerning his creatures, distinguished from it by a double restriction:—

First, In respect of their objects; for whereas the decree of providence comprehendeth his intentions towards all the works of his hands, predestination respecteth only rational creatures.

Secondly, In regard of their ends; for whereas his providence directeth all creatures in general to those several ends to which at length they are brought, whether they are proportioned unto their nature or exceeding the sphere of their natural activity, predestination is exercised only in directing rational creatures to supernatural ends: so that, in general, it is the counsel, decree, or purpose of Almighty God concerning the last and supernatural end of his rational creatures, to be accomplished for the praise of his glory. But this also must receive a double restriction before we come precisely to what we in this place aim at: and these again in regard of the objects or the ends thereof.

The object of predestination is all rational creatures, Now, these are either angels or men. Of angels I shall not treat. Secondly, The end by it provided for them is either eternal happiness or eternal misery. I speak only of the former,—the act of God’s predestination transmitting men to everlasting happiness: and in this restrained sense it differs not at all from election, and we may use them as synonyma, terms of the same importance; though, by some affirming that God predestinateth them to faith whom he hath chosen, they seem to be distinguished as the decrees of the end, and the means conducing thereunto, whereof the first is election, intending the end, and then takes place predestination, providing the means. But this exact distinction appeareth not directly in the Scripture.

This election the word of God proposeth unto us as the gracious, immutable decree of Almighty God, whereby, before the foundation of the world, out of his own good pleasure, he chose certain men, determining to free them from sin and misery, to bestow upon them grace and faith, to give them unto Christ, to bring them to everlasting blessedness, for the praise of his glorious grace; or, as it is expressed in our church articles, “Predestination to life is the everlasting purpose of God, whereby, before the foundations of the world were laid, he hath constantly decreed by his counsel, secret to us, to deliver from curse and damnation those whom he hath chosen in Christ out of mankind, and to bring them by Christ unto everlasting salvation, as vessels made unto honor; wherefore, they who are endued with so excellent a benefit of God be called according to God’s purpose,” etc.

Now, to avoid prolixity, I will annex only such annotations as may clear the sense and confirm the truth of the article by the Scriptures, and show briefly how it is overthrown by the Arminians in every particular thereof:—

First, The article, consonantly to the Scripture, affirmeth that it is an eternal decree, made before the foundations of the world were laid; so that by it we must needs be chosen before we were born, before we have done either good or evil. The words of the article are clear, and so also is the Scripture: “He hath chosen us in him before the foundation of the world,” Ephesians 1:4; “The children being not yet born, neither having done any good or evil, it was said,” etc., Romans 9:11,12; “We are called with an holy calling, not according to our works, but according to his own purpose and grace, which was given us in Christ Jesus before the world began,” 2 Timothy 1:9. Now, from hence it would undoubtedly follow that no good thing in us can be the cause of our election, for every cause must in order precede its effect; but all things whereof we by any means are partakers, inasmuch as they are ours, are temporary, and so cannot be the cause of that which is eternal. Things with that qualification must have reference to the sole will and good pleasure of God; which reference would break the neck of the Arminian election. Wherefore, to prevent such a fatal ruin, they deny the principle,—to wit, that election is eternal.[ccix] [1] So the Remonstrants, in their Apology: [ccx] [2] “Complete election regardeth none but him that is dying; for this peremptory election decreeth the whole accomplishment and consummation of salvation, and therefore requireth in the object the finished course of faith and obedience,” saith Grevinchovius; which is to make God’s election nothing but an act of his justice, approving our obedience, and such an act as is incident to any weak man, who knows not what will happen in the next hour that is yet for to come. And is this post-destination that which is proposed to us in the Scripture as the unsearchable fountain of all God’s love towards us in Christ? “Yea,”[ccxi] [3] say they, “we acknowledge no other predestination to be revealed in the gospel besides that whereby God decreeth to save them who should persevere in faith;” that is, God’s determination concerning their salvation is pendulous, until he find by experience that they will persevere in obedience. But I wonder why, seeing election is confessedly one of the greatest expressions of God’s infinite goodness, love, and mercy towards us, if it follow our obedience, we have it not, like all other blessings and mercies, promised unto us. Is it not because such propositions as these, “Believe, Peter, and continue in the faith unto the end, and I will choose thee before the foundation of the world,” are fitter for the writings of the Arminians than the word of God? Neither will we be their rivals in such an election, as from whence no fruit,[ccxii] [4] no effect, no consolation can be derived to any mortal man, whilst he lives in this world.

Secondly, The article affirmeth that it is constant,—that is, one immutable decree; agreeably also to the Scriptures, teaching but one purpose, but one foreknowledge, one good pleasure, one decree of God, concerning the infallible ordination of his elect unto glory; although of this decree there may be said to be two acts,—one concerning the means, the other concerning the end, but both knit up in the “immutability of God’s counsel,” Hebrews 6:17. “The foundation of God standeth sure, having this seal, The Lord knoweth them that are his,” 2 Timothy 2:19; “His gifts and calling are without recalling,” not to be repented of, Romans 11:29. Now, what say our Arminians to this? Why, a whole multitude of notions and terms have they invented to obscure the doctrine. “Election,” say they,[ccxiii] [5] “is either legal or evangelical, general or particular, complete or incomplete, revocable or irrevocable, peremptory or not peremptory,” with I know not how many more distinctions of one single eternal act of Almighty God, whereof there is neither “vola nec vestigium,” sign or token, in the whole Bible, or any approved author. And to these quavering divisions they accommodate their doctrine, or rather they purposely invented them to make their errors unintelligible. Yet something agreeably thus they dictate: [ccxiv] [6] “There is a complete election, belonging to none but those that are dying; and there is another, incomplete, common to all that believe: as the good things of salvation are incomplete which are continued whilst faith is continued, and revoked when that is denied, so election is incomplete in this life, and revocable.” Again: “There are,” they say in their Confession, [ccxv] [7] “three orders of believers and repenters in the Scripture, whereof some are beginners, others having continued for a time, and soma perseverants. The first two orders are chosen vere, truly, but not absolute prorsus, absolutely, but only for a time,—so long as they will remain as they are; the third are chosen finally and peremptorily: for this act of God is either continued or interrupted, according as we fulfill the condition.” But whence learned the Arminians this doctrine? Not one word of it from the word of truth; no mention there of any such desultory election, no speech of faith, but such as is consequent to one eternal irrevocable decree of predestination: They “believed” who were “ordained to eternal life,” Acts 13:48. No distinction of men half and wholly elected, where it is affirmed that it is impossible the elect should be seduced, Matthew 24:24,—that none should Christ’s sheep out of his Father’s hand, John 10:28,29. What would they have more? God’s purpose of election is sealed up, 2 Timothy 2:19, and therefore cannot be revoked; it must stand firm, Romans 9:11, in spite of all opposition. Neither will reason allow us to think any immanent act of God to be incomplete or revocable, because of the mere alliance it hath with his very nature. But reason, Scripture, God himself, all must give place to any absurdities, if they stand in the Arminian way, bringing in their idol with shouts, and preparing his throne, by claiming the cause of their predestination to be in themselves.

Thirdly, The article is clear that the object of this predestination is some particular men chosen out of mankind; that is, it is such an act of God as concerneth some men in particular, taking them, as it were, aside from the midst of their brethren, and designing them for some special end and purpose. The Scripture also aboundeth in asserting this verity, calling them that are so chosen a “few,” Matthew 20:16, which must needs denote some certain persons; and the “remnant according to election,” Romans 11:5; those whom “the Lord knoweth to be his,” 2 Timothy 2:19; men “ordained to eternal life,” Acts 13:48; “us,” Romans 8:39; those that are “written in the Lamb’s book of life,” Revelation 21:27;—all which, and divers others, clearly prove that the number of the elect is certain, not only materially, as they say,[ccxvi] [8] that there are so many, but formally also, that these particular persons, and no other, are they, which cannot be altered. Nay, the very nature of the thing itself doth so demonstratively evince it, that I wonder it can possibly be conceived under any other notion. To apprehend an election of men not circumscribed with the circumstance of particular persons is such a conceited, Platonical abstraction, as it seems strange that any one dares profess to understand that there should be a predestination, and none predestinated; an election, and none elected; a choice amongst many, yet none left or taken; a decree to save men, and yet thereby salvation destinated to no one man, either “re aut spe,” in deed or in expectation. In a word, that there should be a purpose of God to bring men unto glory, standing inviolable, though never any one attained the purposed end, is such a riddle as no (Edipus can unfold. Now, such an election, such a predestination, have the Arminians substituted in the place of God’s everlasting decree. “We deny,”[ccxvii] [9] say they, “that God’s election extendeth itself to any singular persons as singular persons;” that is, that any particular persons, as Peter, Paul, John, are by it elected. No; how, then? Why, [ccxviii] [10] “God hath appointed, without difference, to dispense the means of faith; and as he seeth these persons to believe or not to believe by the use of those means, so at length he determineth of them,” as saith Corvinus. Well, then, God chooseth no particular man to salvation, but whom he seeth believing by his own power, with the help only of such means as are afforded unto others who never believe; and as he maketh himself thus differ from them by a good use of his own abilities, so also he may be reduced again unto the same predicament, and then his election, which respecteth not him in his person, but only his qualification, quite vanisheth. But is this God’s decree of election? “Yes,” say they; and make a doleful complaint that any other doctrine should be taught in the church. [ccxix] [11] “It is obtruded,” say the true-born sons of Arminius, “on the church as a most holy doctrine, that God, by an absolute, immutable decree, from all eternity, out of his own good pleasure, hath chosen certain persons, and those but few in comparison, without any respect had to their faith and obedience, and predestinated them to everlasting life.” But what so great exception is this doctrine liable unto, what wickedness doth it include, that it should not be accounted most holy? Nay, is not only the matter but the very terms of it contained in the Scripture? Doth it not say the elect are few, and they chosen before the foundation of the world, without any respect to their obedience or any thing that they had done, out of God’s mere gracious good pleasure, that his free purpose according to election might stand, even because so it pleased him; and this that they might be holy, believe, and be sanctified, that they might come unto Christ, and by him be preserved unto everlasting life? Yea, this is that which galls them: [ccxx] [12] “No such will can be ascribed unto God, whereby he so willeth any one to be saved as that thence their salvation should be sure and infallible,” saith the father of those children.

Well, then, let St Austin’s definition be quite rejected, [ccxxi] [13] “That predestination is a preparation of such benefits whereby some are most certainly freed and delivered from sin and brought to glory;” and that also of St Paul, “That (by reason of this) nothing can separate us from the love of God, which is in Christ.” What is this election in your judgment? [ccxxii] [14] “Nothing but a decree whereby God hath appointed to save them that believe in Christ,” saith Corvinus, be they who they will; or a general purpose of God, whereby he hath ordained faith in Christ to be the means of salvation. Yea, but this belongs to Judas as well as to Peter. This decree carrieth as equal an aspect to those that are damned as to those that are saved. Salvation, under the condition of faith in Christ, was also proposed to them; but was Judas and all his company elected? How came they, then, to be seduced and perish? That any of God’s elect go to hell is as yet a strange assertion in Christianity. Notwithstanding this decree, none may believe, or all that do may fall away, and so none at all be saved; which is a strange kind of predestination: or all may believe, continue in faith, and be saved; which were a more strange kind of election.

We, poor souls, thought hitherto that we might have believed, according unto Scripture, that some by this purpose were in a peculiar manner made the Father’s (“Thine they were”), and by him given unto Christ, that he might bring them unto glory; and that these men were so certain and unchangeable a number, that not only God “knoweth them” as being “his,” but also that Christ” calleth them by name,” John 10:3, and looketh that none taketh them out of his hand. We never imagined before that Christ hath been the mediator of an uncertain covenant, because there are no certain persons covenanted withal but such as may or may not fulfill the condition. We always thought that some had been separated before by God’s purpose from the rest of the perishing world, that Christ might lay down his life for his “friends,” for his “sheep,” for them that were “given him” of his Father. But now it should seem he was ordained to be a king when it was altogether uncertain whether he should ever have any subjects, to be a head without a body, or to such a church whose collection and continuance depend wholly and solely on the will of men.

These are doctrines that I believe searchers of the Scripture had scarce ever been acquainted withal, had they not lighted on such expositors as teach, [ccxxiii] [15] “That the only cause why God loveth” (or chooseth) “any person is, because the honesty, faith, and piety wherewith, according to God’s command and his own duty, he is endued, are acceptable to God;” which, though we grant it true of God’s consequent or approving love, yet surely there is a divine love wherewith he looks upon us otherwise, when he gives us unto Christ, else either our giving unto Christ is not out of love, or we are pious, just, and faithful before we come unto him,—that is, we have no need of him at all. Against either way, though we may blot these testimonies out of our hearts, yet they will stand still recorded in holy Scripture,—namely, that God so loved us when we were his “enemies,” Romans 5:10, “sinners,” verse 8, of no “strength,” verse 6; that “he gave his only-begotten Son” to die, “that we should not perish, but have everlasting life,” John 3:16. But of this enough.

Fourthly, Another thing that the article asserteth according to the Scripture is, that there is no other cause of our election but God’s own counsel. It recounteth no motives in us, nothing impelling the will of God to choose some out of mankind, rejecting others, but his own decree,—that is, his absolute will and good pleasure; so that as there is no cause, in any thing without himself, why he would create the world or elect any at all,—for he doth all these things for himself, for the praise of his own glory,—so there is no cause in singular elected persons why God should choose them rather than others. He looked upon all mankind in the same condition, vested with the same qualifications, or rather without any at all; for it is the children not yet born, before they do either good or evil, that are chosen or rejected, his free grace embracing the one and passing over the other. Yet here we must observe, that although God freely, without any desert of theirs, chooseth some men to be partakers both of the end and the means, yet he bestoweth faith, or the means, on none but for the merit of Christ; neither do any attain the end or salvation but by their own faith, through that righteousness of his. The free grace of God notwithstanding, choosing Jacob when Esau is rejected, the only antecedent cause of any difference between the elect and reprobates, remaineth firm and unshaken; and surely, unless men were resolved to trust wholly to their own bottoms, to take nothing gratis at the hands of God, they would not endeavor to rob him of his glory, of having mercy on whom he will have mercy, of loving us without our desert before the world began. If we must claim an interest in obtaining the temporal acts of his favor by our own endeavors, yet, oh, let us grant him the glory of being good unto us, only for his own sake, when we were in his hand as the clay in the hand of the potter. What made this piece of clay fit for comely service, and not a vessel wherein there is no pleasure, but the power and will of the Framer? It is enough, yea, too much, for them to repine and say, “Why hast thou made us thus?” who are vessels fitted for wrath. Let not them who are prepared for honor exalt themselves against him, and sacrifice to their own nets, as the sole providers of their glory. But so it is: human vileness will still be declaring itself, by claiming a worth no way due unto it; of a furtherance of which claim if the Arminians be not guilty, let the following declaration of their opinions in this particular determine:—

“We confess,” say they,[ccxxiv] [16] “roundly, that faith, in the consideration of God choosing us unto salvation, doth precede, and not follow as a fruit of election.” So that whereas Christians have hitherto believed that God bestoweth faith on them that are chosen, it seems now it is no such matter, but that those whom God findeth to believe, upon the stock of their own abilities, he afterward chooseth. Neither is faith, in their judgment, only required as a necessary condition in him that is to be chosen, but as a cause moving the will of God to elect him that hath it, [ccxxv] [17] “as the will of the judge is moved to bestow a reward on him who according to the law hath deserved it,” as Grevinchovius speaks: which words of his, indeed, Corvinus strives to temper, but all in vain, though he wrest them contrary to the intention of the author; for with him agree all his fellows. [ccxxvi] [18] “The one only absolute cause of election is, not the will of God, but the respect of our obedience,” saith Episcopius. At first they required nothing but faith, and that as a condition, not as a cause;[ccxxvii] [19] then perseverance in faith, which at length they began to call obedience, comprehending all our duty to the precepts of Christ: for the cause, say they, of this love to any person, is the righteousness, faith, and piety wherewith he is endued; which being all the good works of a Christian, they, in effect, affirm a man to be chosen for them,—that our good works are the cause of election; which whether it were ever so grossly taught, either by Pelagians or Papists, I something doubt.

And here observe, that this doth not thwart my former assertion, where I showed that they deny the election of any particular persons, which here they seem to grant upon a foresight of their faith and good works; for there is not any one person, as such a person, notwithstanding all this, that in their judgment is in this life elected, but only as he is considered with those qualifications of which he may at any time divest himself, and so become again to be no more elected than Judas.

The sum of their doctrine in this particular is laid down by one of ours in a tract entitled “God’s Love to Mankind,” etc.; a book full of palpable ignorance, gross sophistry, and abominable blasphemy, whose author seems to have proposed nothing unto himself but to rake all the dunghills of a few of the most invective Arminians, and to collect the most filthy scum and pollution of their railings to cast upon the truth of God; and, under I know not what self-coined pretences, belch out odious blasphemies against his holy name.

The sum, saith he, of all these speeches (he cited to his purpose) is, [ccxxviii] [20] “That there is no decree of saving men but what is built on God’s foreknowledge of the good actions of men.” No decree? No, not that whereby God determineth to give some unto Christ, to ingraft them in him by faith, and bring them by him unto glory; which giveth light to that place of Arminius, where he affirmeth, [ccxxix] [21] “That God loveth none precisely to eternal life but considered as just, either with legal or evangelical righteousness.” Now, to love one to eternal life is to destinate one to obtain eternal life by Christ, and so it is coincident with the former assertion, that our election, or choosing unto grace and glory, is upon the foresight of our good works; which contains a doctrine so contradictory to the words and meaning of the apostle, Romans 9:11, condemned in so many councils, suppressed by so many edicts and decrees of emperors and governors, opposed as a pestilent heresy, ever since it was first hatched, by so many orthodox fathers and learned schoolmen, so directly contrary to the doctrine of this church, so injurious to the grace and supreme power of Almighty God, that I much wonder any one, in this light of the gospel and flourishing time of learning, should be so boldly ignorant or impudent as to broach it amongst Christians. To prove this to be a heresy exploded by all orthodox and catholic antiquity were to light a candle in the sun; for it cannot but be known to all and every one who ever heard or read any thing of the state of Christ’s church after the rising of the Pelagian tumults.[ccxxx] [22]

To accumulate testimonies of the ancients is quite beside my purpose. I will only add the confession of Bellarmine,[ccxxxi] [23] a man otherwise not over-well affected to truth. “Predestination,” saith he, “from the foresight of works, cannot be maintained unless we should suppose something in the righteous man, which should make him differ from the wicked, that he doth not receive from God; which truly all the fathers with unanimous consent do reject.” But we have a more sure testimony, to which we will take heed, even the holy Scripture, pleading strongly for God’s free and undeserved grace.

First, our Savior Christ, Matthew 11:26, declaring how God revealeth the gospel unto some, which is hidden from others (a special fruit of election), resteth in his will and good pleasure as the only cause thereof: “Even so, Father; for so it seemed good in thy sight.” So, comforting his “little flock,” Luke 12:32, he bids them fear not, “for it is your Father’s good pleasure to give you the kingdom;”—“His good pleasure is the only cause why his kingdom is prepared for you rather than others.” But is there no other reason of this discrimination? No; he doth it all “that his purpose according to election might stand” firm, Romans 9:11; for we Are “predestinated according to the purpose of him who worketh all things after the counsel of his own will,” Ephesians 1:11. But did not this counsel of God direct him to choose us rather than others because we had something to commend us more than they? No; “The LORD did not set his love upon you, nor choose you, because ye were more in number than any people; but because the LORD loved you,” Deuteronomy 7:7,8. “He hath mercy on whom he will have mercy;” yea, “the children being not yet born, neither having done any good or evil, that the purpose of God according to election might stand, not of works, but of him that calleth, it was said unto her, The elder shall serve the younger: as it is written, Jacob have I loved, but Esau have I hated,” Romans 9:11-13. In brief, wherever there is any mention of election or predestination, it is still accompanied with the purpose, love, or will of God; his foreknowledge, whereby he knoweth them that are his; his free power and supreme dominion over all things. Of our faith, obedience, or any thing importing so much, not one syllable, no mention, unless it be as the fruit and effect thereof. It is the sole act of his free grace and good pleasure, that “he might make known the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy,” Romans 9:23. For this only end hath he “saved us, and called us with an holy calling, not according to our works, but according to his own purpose and grace, which was given us in Christ Jesus before the world began,” 2 Timothy 1:9. Even our calling is free and undeserved, because flowing from that most free grace of election, whereof we are partakers before we are [i.e., exist]. It were needless to heap up more testimonies in a thing so clear and evident. When God and man stand in competition who shall be accounted the cause of an eternal good, we may be sure the Scripture will pass the verdict on the part of the Most High. And the sentence, in this case, may be derived from thence by these following reasons:—

First, If final perseverance in faith and obedience be the cause of, or a condition required unto, election, then none can be said in this life to be elected; for no man is a final perseverer until he be dead, until he hath finished his course and consummated the faith. But certain it is that it is spoken of some in the Scripture that they are even in this life elected: “Few are chosen,” Matthew 20:16; “For the elect’s sake those days shall be shortened,” chapter 24:22; “And shall, if it were possible, deceive the very elect,” verse 24,—where it is evident that election is required to make one persevere in the faith, but nowhere is perseverance in the faith required to election; yea, and Peter gives us all a command that we should give all diligence to get an assurance of our “election,” even in this life, 2 Peter 1:10: and, therefore, surely it cannot be a decree presupposing consummated faith and obedience.

Secondly, Consider two things of our estate, before the first temporal act of God’s free grace (for grace is no grace if it be not free), which is the first effect of our predestination, comprehendeth us:—First, “Were we better than others.” No, in no wise: both Jews and Gentiles were all under sin,” Romans 3:9. “There is no difference; for all have sinned, and come short of the glory of God,” verse 23;—being all “dead in trespasses and sins,” Ephesians 2:1; being “by nature the children of wrath, even as others,” verse 3; “far off,” until we are “made nigh by the blood of Christ,” verse 13. We were “enemies” against God, Romans 5:10; Titus 3:3. And look what desert there is in us with these qualifications, when our vocation, the first effect of our predestination, as St Paul showeth, Romans 8:30, and as I shall prove hereafter, separateth us from the world of unbelievers. So much there is in respect of predestination itself; so that if we have any way deserved it, it is by being sinners, enemies, children of wrath, and dead in trespasses. These are our deserts; this is the glory, whereof we ought to be ashamed. But, secondly, When they are in the same state of actual alienation from God, yet then, in respect of his purpose to save them by Christ, some are said to be his: “Thine they were, and thou gavest them me,” John 17:6;—they were his before they came unto Christ by faith; the sheep of Christ before they are called, for he “calleth his sheep by name,” chapter 10:3; before they come into the flock or congregation, for “other sheep,” saith he, “I have, which are not of this fold, them also must I bring,” chapter 10:16;—to be beloved of God before they love him: “Herein is love, not that we loved God, but that he loved us,” 1 John 4:10. Now, all this must be with reference to God’s purpose of bringing them unto Christ, and by him unto glory; which we see goeth before all their faith and obedience.

Thirdly, Election is an eternal act of God’s will: “He hath chosen us before the foundation of the world,” Ephesians 1:4; consummated antecedently to all duty of ours, Romans 9:11. Now, every cause must, in order of nature, precede its effect; nothing hath an activity in causing before it hath a being. Operation in every kind is a second act, flowing from the essence of a thing which is the first. But all our graces and works, our faith, obedience, piety, and charity, are all temporal, of yesterday, the same standing with ourselves, and no longer; and therefore cannot be the cause of, no, nor so much as a condition necessarily required for, the accomplishment of an eternal act of God, irrevocably established before we are.

Fourthly, If predestination be for faith foreseen, these three things, with divers such absurdities, will necessarily follow:—First, That election is not of “him that calleth,” as the apostle speaks, Romans 9:11,—that is, of the good pleasure of God, who calleth us with a holy calling,—but of him that is called; for, depending on faith, it must be his whose faith is, that doth believe. Secondly, God cannot have mercy on whom he win have mercy, for the very purpose of it is thus tied to the qualities of faith and obedience, so that he must have mercy only on believers antecedently to his decree. Which, thirdly, hinders him from being an absolute free agent, and doing of what he will with his own,—of having such a power over us as the potter hath over his clay; for he finds us of different matter, one clay, another gold, when he comes to appoint us to different uses and ends.

Fifthly, God sees no faith, no obedience, perseverance, nothing but sin and wickedness, in any man, but what himself intendeth graciously and freely to bestow upon him; for “faith is not of ourselves, it is the gift of God;” it is “the work of God, that we believe,” John 6:29; he “blesseth us with all spiritual blessings in Christ,” Ephesians 1:3. Now, all these gifts and graces God bestoweth only upon those whom he hath antecedently ordained to everlasting life: for “the election obtained it, and the rest were blinded,” Romans 11:7; “The Lord added to the church daily such as should be saved”’ Acts 2:47. Therefore, surely, God chooseth us not because he foreseeth those things in us, seeing he bestoweth those graces because he hath chosen us. “Wherefore,”[ccxxxii] [24] saith Austin, “doth Christ say, ‘Ye have not chosen me, but I have chosen you,’ but because they did not choose him that he should choose them; but he chose them that they might choose him.” We choose Christ by faith; God chooseth us by his decree of election. The question is, Whether we choose him because he hath chosen us, or he chooseth us because we have chosen him, and so indeed choose ourselves? We affirm the former, and that because our choice of him is a gift he himself bestoweth only on them whom he hath chosen.

Sixthly, and principally, The effects of election, infallibly following it, cannot be the causes of election, certainly preceding it. This is evident, for nothing can be the cause and the effect of the same thing, before and after itself. But all our faith, our obedience, repentance, good works, are the effects of election, flowing from it as their proper fountain, erected on it as the foundation of this spiritual building; and for this the article of our church is evident and clear. “Those,” saith it, “that are endued with this excellent benefit of God are called according to God’s purpose, are justified freely, are made the sons of God by adoption; they be made like the image of Christ; they walk religiously in good works,” etc. Where, first, they are said to be partakers of this benefit of election, and then by virtue thereof to be entitled to the fruition of all those graces. Secondly, it saith, “Those who are endued with this benefit enjoy those blessings;” intimating that election is the rule whereby God proceedeth in bestowing those graces, restraining the objects of the temporal acts of God’s special favor to them only whom his eternal decree doth embrace. Both these, indeed, are denied by the Arminians; which maketh a farther discovery of their heterodoxies in this particular. [ccxxxiii] [25] “You say,” saith Arminius to Perkins, “that election is the rule of giving or not giving of faith; and, therefore, election is not of the faithful, but faith of the elect: but by your leave this I must deny.” But yet, whatever it is the sophistical heretic here denies, either antecedent or conclusion, he falls foul on the word of God. “They ‘believed,”’ saith the Holy Ghost, “who were ‘ordained to eternal life,’” Acts 13:48; and, “The Lord added to the church daily such as should be saved,” chapter 2:47. From both which places it is evident that God bestoweth faith only on them whom he hath pre-ordained to eternal life; but most clearly, Romans 8:29,30, “For whom he did foreknow, he also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of his Son. Moreover whom he did predestinate, them he also called: and whom he called, them he also justified: and whom he justified, them he also glorified.” St Austin interpreted this place by adding in every link of the chain, “Only those.” However, the words directly import a precedency of predestination before the bestowing of other graces, and also a restraint of those graces to them only that are so predestinated. Now, the inference from this is not only for the form logical, but for the matter also; it containeth the very words of Scripture, “Faith is of God’s elect,” Titus 1:1.

For the other part of the proposition, that faith and obedience are the fruits of our election, they cannot be more peremptory in its denial than the Scripture is plentiful in its confirmation: “He hath chosen us in Christ, that we should be holy,” Ephesians 1:4; not because we were holy, but that we should be so. Holiness, whereof faith is the root and obedience the body, is that whereunto, and not for which, we are elected. The end and the meritorious cause of any one act cannot be the same; they have divers respects, and require repugnant conditions. Again; we are “predestinated unto the adoption of children by Jesus Christ,” verse 5. Adoption is that whereby we are assumed into the family of God, when before we are “foreigners, aliens, strangers, afar off;” which we see is a fruit of our predestination, though it be the very entrance into that estate wherein we begin first to please God in the least measure. Of the same nature are all those places of holy writ which speak of God’s giving some unto Christ, of Christ’s sheep hearing his voice, and others not hearing, because they are not of his sheep; all which, and divers other invincible reasons, I willingly omit, with sundry other false assertions and heretical positions of the Arminians about this fundamental article of our religion, concluding this chapter with the following scheme:—

ENDNOTES:

[ccxxxiv]  [1] “Electio non est ab aeterno.”—Rem. Apol.

[ccxxxv]  [2] “Electio alia completa est, quae neminem spectat nisi immorientem. Electio peremptoria totum salutis complementum et consummationem decernit, ideoque in objecto requirit totam consummatam fidei obedientiam.”—Grevinch, ad Ames. p. 136, passim. dis.

[ccxxxvi]  [3] “Non agnoscimus aliam praedestinationem in evangelio patefactam, quam qua Deus decrevit credentes et qui in eadem fide perseverarent, salvos facere.”—Rem. Coll. Hag., p. 34.

[ccxxxvii]  [4] “Electionis fructum aut sensum in hac vita nullum agnosco.”—Grevinch.

[ccxxxviii]  [5] Episcop. Thes., p. 35; Epist. ad Walach., p. 38; Grevinch. ad Ames., p. 133.

[ccxxxix]  [6] “Electio alia completa est, quae neminem spectat nisi morientem, alia incompleta, quae omnibus fidelibus communis est; ut salutis bona sunt incompleta quae continu-antur, fide contlnuata, et abnegate, revocantur, sic electio est incompleta in hac vita, non peremptoria, revocabilis.”—Grevinch, ad Ames.

[ccxl]  [7] “Tres sunt ordines credentium et resipiscentium in Scripturis, novitli, credentes aliquandiu, perseverantes. Duo priores ordines credentium eliguntur vere quidem, at non prorsus absolute, nec nisi ad tempus, puta quamdiu et quatenus tales sunt,” etc.—Rem. Confess., cap. 18, sect. 6,7.

[ccxli]  [8] Aquinas.

[ccxlii]  [9] “Nos negamus Dei electionem ad salutem extendere sese ad slngulares personas, qua singulares personas.”—Rem. Coll. Hag., fol. 76.

[ccxliii]  [10] “Deus statuit indiscrimlnatim media ad fidem administrare, et prout has, vel illas personas, istis mediis credituras vel non credituras videt, ita tandem de illis statuit.”—Corv. ad Tilen., 76.

[ccxliv]  [11] “Ecclesiae tanquam sacrosancta doctrina obtruditur, Deum absolutissimo et immutabili decreto ab omni retro aeternitate, pro puro suo beneplacito, singulares quosdam homines, eosque, quoad caeteros, paucissimos, citra ullius obedientiae aut fidei in Chris-tum intuitum praedestinasse ad vitam.”—Praefat. Lib. Armin. ad Perk.

[ccxlv]  [12] “Nulla Deo tribui potest voluntas, qua ita velit hominem ullum salvari, ut salus inde illis constet certo et infallibiliter.”--Armin. Antip., p. 583.

[ccxlvi]  [13] “Praedestinatio est praeparatio beneficiorum quibus certissime liberantur quicunque liberantur.”—Aug, de Bono Per. Sen., cap. 14.

[ccxlvii]  [14] “Decretum electionis nihil aliud est quam decretum quo Deus constituit credentes in Christo justificare et salvare.”—Corv, ad Tilen., p. 13.

[ccxlviii]  [15] “Ratio dilectionis personae est, quod probitas, tides, vel pietas, qua ex officio suo et prrescripto Dei ista persona praedita est, Deo grata sit.” — Rem. Apol., p. 18.

[ccxlix]  [16] “Rotunde fatemur, fidem in consideratione Dei in eligendo ad salutem antecedere, et non tauquam fracture electionis sequi.”—Rem. Hag. Coll., p. 85.

[ccl]  [17] Grevinch. ad Amea, p. 24; Corv. ad Molin., p. 260.

[ccli]  [18] “Electionis et reprobationis causa unica vera et absoluta non est Dei voluntas, seal respectus obedientise et inobedientise.”—Epis. Disput. 8.

[cclii]  [19] “Cum peccatum pono causam merltoriam reprobationls, ne existlmato e contra me ponere justitiam causam meritoriam electionis.”—Attain. Antip.; Rein. Apol., p. 73.

[ccliii]  [20] God’s Love, p. 6.

[ccliv]  [21] “Deum nullam creaturam preecise ad vitam ,eternam amare, nisi consideratam ut justam sire justitia legali sire evangelica”—Armin. Artic. Perpend., fol. 21.

[cclv]  [22] Vid. Prosp. ad Excep. Gen. ad Dub., 8,9. Vid. Car. de Ingratis., c. 2,3.

[cclvi]  [23] “Non potest defendi praedestinatlo ex operibus praevisis, nisi aliquid boni ponatur in homine justo, quo discernatur ab impio, quod non sit illi a Deo, quod sane patres omnes summa consensione rejiciunt.”— Bellar, de Grat., et Lib. Arbit., cap. 14.

[cclvii]  [24] “Non ob aliud dicit, ‘Non vos me eligistis, seal ego vos elegi,’ nisi quia non elegerunt eumut eligeret eos; sed ut eligerent eum elegit eos.”—Aug, de Bono Perse, cap. 16.

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John Owen