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Mysteries in Christianity
83. Theology: Abstractions and Apparent Contradictions. The
things of Christianity are so spiritual, so refined, so high and
abstracted, so much above the things we ordinarily converse with and our
common affairs for which we adapt our words, and language not supplying
of us with words completely adapted to these high and abstracted ideas,
we are forced to use words which do no otherwise exhibit what we would
than analogically — which words in their ordinary use do not in
everything, but only in some part, exhibit what we intend they should
when used in divinity. And therefore religion raises so many shadows and
seeming contradictions. And it is for want of distinguishing that in the
meaning of words in divinity from what is intended by them in their
ordinary use that arise most of the jangles about religion in the world.
And to one who is not much for elevated thought, many things that are in
themselves as easy and natural as the things we every day converse with,
seem like impossibility and confusion. It is so in every case — the more
abstracted the science is, and by how much the higher the nature of
those things are of which that science treats, and by so much the more
our way of thinking and speaking of the things of that science be beside
our way of thinking and speaking of ordinary things, by so much the more
will that science abound in paradoxes and seeming contradictions.
184. Spiritual Union. What insight I have of the nature of
minds, I am convinced that there is no guessing what kind of unions and
mixions by consciousness or otherwise there may be between them. So that
all difficulty is removed in believing what the Scripture declares about
spiritual unions of the persons of the Trinity, of the two natures of
Christ, of Christ and the minds of saints.
583. Mysteries in Christianity. It is very unreasonable to
make it an objection against the Christian revelation, that it contains
some things that are very mysterious and difficult to our
understandings, and that seem to us impossible. If God will give us a
revelation from heaven of the very truth concerning his own nature,
acts, counsels, and ways, and of the spiritual and invisible world, it
is unreasonable to expect any other than that there should be many
things in such a revelation that should be utterly beyond our
understanding and seem impossible. For when was there ever a time when,
if there had been a revelation from heaven of the very truth in
philosophical matters and concerning the nature of created things (which
are of a vastly lower nature and must be supposed to be more
proportioned to our understandings), there would not have been many
things which would have appeared, not only to the vulgar but to the
learned of that age, absurd and impossible? If those positions in
philosophy, which are now received by the learned world as indubitable
truths, had been revealed from heaven to be truths in past ages, they
would be looked upon as great mysteries and difficult, and would have
seemed as impossible as the most mysterious Christian doctrines do now.
I believe that even now, if there should come a revelation from heaven
of what is the very truth in these matters, without deviating at all to
accommodate it to our received notions and principles, there would be
many things in it that would seem to be absurd and contradictions. I do
now receive principles as certain, which once, if they had been told me,
I should have looked upon as difficult as any mystery in the Bible.
Without doubt, much of the difficulty we have about the doctrines of
Christianity arises from wrong principles that we receive. We find that
those things that are received as principles in one age, and are never
once questioned, concerning which it comes into nobody’s thought that
they possibly may not be true, are yet exploded in another age as light
increases. If God makes a revelation to us, he must reveal to us the
truth as it is, without accommodating himself to our notions and
principles, which would be indeed impossible. For those things which are
our received notions in one age are contrary to what are so in another,
and the Word of God was not given for any particular age but for all
ages. It surely becomes us to receive what God reveals to be truth, and
to look upon his Word as proof sufficient, whether what he reveals
squares with our notions or not.
I
rather wonder that the Word of God contains no more mysteries in it. And
I believe it is because God is tender of us and considers the weakness
of our sight, and reveals only such things as he sees that man (though
so weak a creature), if of an humble and honest mind, can well enough
bear. Such a kind of tenderness we see in Christ towards his disciples,
who had many things to say, but forebore because they could not bear
them yet. God does not depart from truth to accommodate his revelation
to our manner of thinking. Yet I believe he accommodates himself to our
understanding in this manner of expressing and representing things, as
we are wont to do when we are teaching little children.
765. Illumination of Mysteries. When we seek for anything in
the dark by so low a faculty of discerning as the sense of feeling, or
by the sense of seeing with a dim light, sometimes we cannot find it:
though it be there, it seems to us to be impossible that it should be.
But yet, when a clear light comes to shine into the place, and we
discern by a better faculty, or the same faculty in a clearer manner,
the thing appears very plain to us. So doubtless, many truths will
hereafter appear plain, when we come to look on them by the bright light
of heaven, that now are involved in mystery and darkness.
770. Understanding Mysteries. How are we ready to trust to
the determinations of one, universally reputed a man of great genius, of
vast penetration and insight into things, if he be positive in anything
that appears to us very mysterious, and is quite contrary to what we
thought ourselves clear and certain in before! How are we ready in such
a case to suspect ourselves, especially if it be a matter wherein he has
been very much versed, has had much more occasion to look into it than
we, and has been under greater advantages to know the truth! How much
more still, if one should be positive in it, as a thing he had clearly
and undoubtedly seen to be true, if he were still of ten times greater
genius, and of a more penetrating insight into things, than any that
ever have appeared? And, in matters of fact, if some person whom we had
long known, one of great judgment and discretion, justice, integrity,
and fidelity, and had always been universally so reputed by others,
should declare to us that he had seen and known that to be true which
appeared to us very strange and mysterious, and concerning which we
could not see how it was possible. How, in such a case, should we be
ready almost to suspect our own faculties and to give credit to such a
testimony, in that which, if he had not positively asserted it and
persisted in it, we should have looked upon as perfectly incredible, and
absurd to be supposed!
839. Scripture Mysteries. From that text, John 3:12. “If I
have told you earthly things, and ye believe not, how shall ye believe
if I tell you of heavenly things?” — several things are manifest
concerning mysteries in religion. (1.) That there are things contained
in those doctrines which Christ came into the world to teach, which are
not only so far above human comprehension, that men cannot easily
apprehend all that is to be understood concerning them, but which are
difficult to be received by the judgment or belief: “How shall ye
believe if I tell you of heavenly things?” They are difficult, upon the
same account that the doctrine of the new birth was difficult to
Nicodemus, because it was so strange, and seemingly impossible. (2.) We
may from the words infer that the more persons are in themselves and in
their own nature above us, the more the doctrines or truths concerning
them are mysterious to us, above our comprehension, and difficult to our
belief, and the more do those things that are really true concerning
them contain seeming inconsistencies and impossibilities. For Christ, in
the preceding verses, had been speaking of something that is true
concerning man, being of the same nature, an inhabitant of the
same world with ourselves, which therefore, Christ calls an earthly
thing. And this seemed very mysterious and impossible, and to contain
great seeming inconsistencies. “How can a man be born when he is old?”
This seemed to be a contradiction. And after Christ had somewhat
explained himself, still the doctrine seemed strange and impossible,
John 3:9, “How can these things be?” Nicodemus still looked upon it as
incredible, and on that account, did not believe it at that time, as is
implied in these words of Christ; “If I have told you earthly things,
and ye believe not.” But Christ here plainly signifies that he had other
truths to teach that were not about man, an earthly inhabitant, but
about a person vastly above men, even about himself who is from heaven
and in heaven, as in the next verse: “And no man hath ascended up to
heaven, but he that came down from heaven; even the Son of man which is
in heaven.” Which, therefore, it would be much more difficult to men’s
understanding and judgment, seeming to contain greater impossibilities
and inconsistencies, as he then proceeds immediately to declare him a
heavenly thing, as he calls it, viz., that Christ, a heavenly and
divine person should die, John 3:14-15. Such a mysterious doctrine, so
strange and seemingly inconsistent and impossible, that a divine person
should die, is more strange than that men should be born again. Hence,
when divines argue from the mysterious nature of many things here below
with which we are daily conversant: that it would be very unreasonable
to suppose but that there should be things concerning God which are much
more mysterious, and that, therefore, it is unreasonable to object
against the truth of the doctrines of the Trinity, Incarnation, etc.,
they argue justly, because they argue as Christ argued.
964. Heathen Mysteries. The wiser heathens were sensible that
the things of the gods are so high above us, that what appertains to
them should appear exceedingly mysterious and wonderful to us, and that
it is therefore unreasonable to disbelieve what we are taught concerning
them on that account. This is fully expressed by Pythagoras, viz.,
“Concerning the gods, disbelieve nothing wonderful, nor yet concerning
divine things. This, says Jamblicus, declareth the superlative
excellency of God instructing us, and puts us in mind, that we ought not
to estimate the divine power by our own judgment. The Pythagoreans
stretched this rule beyond the line of divine revelation, to the belief
of every oriental tradition.” Gale’s Court of the Gentiles, p. 2.
b. 2. c. 8. 190.
1100. Understanding Mysterious Truths. It is not necessary
that persons should have clear ideas of the subject of a proposition, in
order to be rationally convinced of the truth of the proposition. There
are many truths, of which mathematicians are convinced by strict
demonstration, concerning many kinds of quantities, as surd quantities
and fluxions, but concerning which they have no clear ideas.
1169. Limitations of Man’s Understanding. Supposing that
mankind in general were a species of far less capacity than they are: so
much less that when men are come to full ripeness of judgment and
capacity, they arrived no higher than that degree to which children
generally arrive at seven years of age; and supposing a revelation to be
made to mankind, in such a state and degree of capacity, of many such
propositions in philosophy as are now looked upon as undoubted truths;
and let us suppose, at the same time, the same degree of pride and
self-confidence as there is now, — what cavilling and objecting would
there be! Or supposing a revelation of these philosophical truths had
been made to mankind, with their present degree of natural capacity, in
some ancient generation — suppose that which was in Joshua’s time — in
that degree of acquired knowledge and learning which the world had
arrived at then, how incredible would those truths have seemed!
1171. Mysteries. If things, which fact and experience make
certain, such as the miseries infants are sometimes the subjects of in
this world, had been exhibited only in a revelation of things in an
unseen state, they would be as much disputed as the Trinity and other
mysteries revealed in the Bible.
1233. Christ’s Incarnation: Its Plausibility. There is
nothing impossible or absurd in the doctrine of the Incarnation of
Christ. If God can join a body and a rational soul together, which are
of natures so heterogeneous and opposite, that they cannot, of
themselves, act one upon another; may he not be able to join two spirits
together, which are of natures more similar? And, if so, he may, for
ought we know to the contrary, join the soul or spirit of a man to
himself. Had reason been so clear in it, that God cannot be incarnate,
as many pretend, it could never have such a notion to gain ground and
possess the minds of so many nations. Nay, and of Julian himself, who
says, that “Jupiter begat Esculapius out of his own proper substance,
and sent him down to Epidaurus, to heal the distempers of mankind.”
Reason did not hinder Spinosa, Blount, and many other modern
philosophers, from asserting that God may have a body, or rather that
the universe, or the matter of the universe, is God. Many nations
believed the incarnation of Jupiter himself. Reason, instead of being
utterly averse to the notion of a divine incarnation, has easily enough
admitted that notion and suffered it to pass, almost without
contradiction, among the most philosophical nations of the world.
1234. Mysteries Concerning God’s Nature. “In thinking of
God’s raising so many myriads of spirits, and such prodigious masses of
matter, out of nothing, we are lost and astonished, as much as in the
contemplation of the Trinity. We can follow God but one or two steps in
his lowest and plainest works, till all becomes mystery and matter of
amazement to us. How, then, shall we comprehend himself? How shall we
understand
his nature, or account for his actions? In that he contains what is
infinitely more inconceivable than all the wonders of his creation put
together.” Deism Revealed, edit. 2. vol. 2. p. 93, 94.
Those who deny the Trinity, because of its mysteriousness and seeming
inconsistency, yet, generally, own God’s certain prescience of men’s
free actions, which they suppose to be free in such a sense, as not to
be necessary. So that we may do, or
may not do, that which God certainly foresees. “They also hold that such
a freedom without necessity, is necessary to morality, and that virtue
and goodness consists in any one’s doing good when he might do evil. And
yet they suppose that God acts by the eternal law of nature and reason,
and that it is impossible that he should transgress that law, and do
evil; because that would be a contradiction to his own nature, which is
infinitely and unchangeably virtuous. Now this seems a flat
contradiction. To say that the infinite goodness of God’s nature makes
it utterly impossible for God to do evil, is exactly the same as to say,
he is under a natural necessity not to do evil. And to say he is
morally free, is to say he may do evil. Therefore the necessity and
freedom in this case being both moral, the contradiction is flat and
plain and amounts to this: that God, in respect to good and evil
actions, is both a necessary and free agent. Dr. Clark, in his
Treatise on the Attributes, labors to get clear of this
contradiction upon these principles of liberty, but without success, and
leaves it just where all men, who hold the same principles, must be
forced to leave it. Therefore, they hold such mysteries, in respect to
Deity, that are even harder to be conceived of, or properly expressed
and explained, than the doctrine of the Trinity.
When we talk of God, who is infinite and incomprehensible, it is natural
to run into notions and terms which it is impossible for us to
reconcile. And in lower matters, that are more within our knowledge and
comprehension, we shall not be able to keep
ourselves clear of them. To say that a curve line, setting out from a
point within a hair’s breadth of a right line, shall run towards that
right line as swift as thought, and yet never be able to touch it, seems
contrary to common sense; and were it not clearly
demonstrated in the conchoid of Nechomedes, could never be believed.
Matter is infinitely divisible, and therefore, a cubical inch of gold
may be divided into an infinity of parts, and there can be no number
greater than that which contains an infinity. Yet
another cubical inch of gold may be infinitely divided also, and
therefore, the parts of both cubes must be more numerous than the parts
of one only. Here is a palpable contrariety of ideas, and a flat
contradiction of terms. We are confounded and lost in the
consideration of infinites, and surely, most of all, in the
consideration of that Infinite of infinites. We justly admire that
saying of the philosopher, that God is a Being whose center is
everywhere, and circumference nowhere, as one of the noblest and most
exalted flights of human understanding And yet, not only the terms are
absurd and contradictory, but the very ideas that constitute it, when
considered attentively, are repugnant to one another. Space and duration
are mysterious abysses, in which our thoughts are confounded with
demonstrable propositions, to all sense and reason flatly contradictory
to one another. Any two points of time, though never so distant, are
exactly in the middle of eternity. The remotest points of space that can
be imagined or supposed, are each of them precisely in the centre of
infinite space.” Deism Revealed, vol. 2. p. 109-111.
Here might have been added the mysteries of God’s eternal duration, it
being without succession, present, before and after, all at once:
Vitae interminabilis tota simul et perfecta possessio.
1303. Planets, the Uncertainty of Their Being Inhabited. That
some of the planets are such huge things, so vastly bigger than the
globe of the earth, is no certain sign of their being inhabited. This
planet we dwell upon may nevertheless be, as it were, elected to
infinitely greater and more important purposes. Such an election there
is with regard to the seed of plants and animals: whereas one is used
for the purposes for which they are fitted — to produce a future plant
and animal — vast multitudes are lost and thrown away in divine
providence. Those seeds are as great a work of God’s, perhaps, as the
bodies of Saturn or Jupiter, notwithstanding their vast bulk — the
greatness of the bulk is but a shadow of greatness or importance.
Nevertheless they may, as it were, be rejected and neglected of God when
a far lesser body may be chosen before them, as it is with divine
election as exercised amongst mankind. A poor child may be infinitely
more made of by God than some mighty potentate that rules over a large
empire, though such a prince is like a vast huge body in comparison with
the other, but truly his greatness is but the shadow of greatness. |
