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Revealed Religion
979. Revealed Religion. The wisest of heathens confessed that
the very first and most necessary thing of all, the nature and
attributes of God himself, were, notwithstanding all the general helps
of reason, very difficult to them to find out in particular and still
more difficult to explain, it being much more easy to say what God was
not, than what he was (as Plato and Cicero confess). And finally, that
method of instructing men effectually and making them truly wise and
good was a thing very obscure and dark and difficult to be found out (as
Plato says). In a word, Socrates himself always openly professed that he
pretended to be wiser than other men only in this one thing: that he was
sensible of his own ignorance. And particularly, they were entirely
ignorant of the manner in which God ought to be worshipped. Accordingly,
the very best of them complied with the outward religion of their
country and advised other to do the same. Plato, after having delivered
very noble and almost divine truths concerning the nature and attributes
of the Supreme God, weakly advises men to worship likewise inferior
gods, demons and spirits, and he dared not to condemn the worshipping
even of statues and images dedicated according to the laws of their
country….
From a general notion that prevailed in the first ages among all nations
that religion was to be taught by a revelation from the gods, all such
as gave institutions and rules for religion, pretended to have received
them from the gods by divine revelation, as Romulus, Numa, Lycurgus, and
Syphis, king of Egypt. If reason only had been the first guide in
matters of religion, rulers would neither have thought of, nor have
wanted the pretense of, revelation to give credit to their institutions.
Whereas on the other hand, revelation being generally esteemed in all
nations to be the only true foundation of religion, kings and rulers,
when they thought fit to add inventions of their own to the religion of
their ancestors, were obliged to make use of that disposition which they
knew their people to have, to receive what came recommended to them
under the name of revelation. (This from Shuckford’s history.)
986. Revealed Religion. The only way, says Mr. Locke (as
quoted by Mr. Shuckford in the Present State of the Republick of
Letters, vol.5, p. 114), that reason can teach men to know God must
be from considering his works, and if so, his works must be first known
and considered before they can teach men to know the author of them. It
seems to be but a wild fancy that man was at first raised up in this
world and left entirely to himself, to find out by his own natural
powers and faculties what was to be his duty and his business in it. If
we could imagine the first men brought into the world in this manner, we
must, with Diodorus Siculus, conceive them for many ages to be but very
poor, sorry creatures. The invisible things of God are indeed to be
understood by the things that are made. But men, in this state, would be
for many generations considering the things of the world in lower views,
in order to provide themselves the conveniences of life from them,
before they would reflect upon them in such a manner as should awaken up
in their minds any thoughts of a God. And when they should come to
consider things in such a light as to discover by them that there was a
God, yet how long must it be before they can be imagined to have arrived
to such a thorough knowledge of the things of the world as to have just
and true notions of him? We see, in fact, that when men first began to
speculate and reason about the things of the world, they reasoned and
speculated very wrong. In Egypt, in Chaldea, in Persia, and in all other
countries, false and ill-grounded notions of the things which God had
made induced them to worship the creatures instead of the Creator, and
that at times when other persons who had less philosophy were professors
of a truer theology. The descendants of Abraham were worshipers of the
God of Heaven when other nations, whose great and wise men pretended to
reason about the works of the creation, did in no wise rightly apprehend
or acknowledge the workmaster, but deemed either fire or the wind, or
the swift air, or the circle of the stars, or the violent water, or the
lights of heaven, to be the gods which govern the world. Being delighted
with their beauty or astonished at their power, they took them for gods.
In a word, if we look over all the accounts we have of the several
nations of the earth, and consider everything that has been advanced by
any or all the philosophers, we can meet with nothing to induce us to
think that the first religion of the world was introduced by the use and
direction of mere natural reason. But on the other hand, all history,
both sacred and profane, offers us various arguments to prove that God
revealed to men in the first ages how he would be worshipped, but that
when men, instead of adhering to what had been revealed, came to have
their own understandings and to set up what they thought to be right in
the room of what God himself had directed, they lost and bewildered
themselves in endless errors. This, I am sensible, is a subject that
should be examined to the bottom, and I am persuaded, if it were, the
result of the inquiry would be this: that he that thinks to prove that
the world ever did, in fact, by wisdom know God, that any nation upon
earth or any set of men ever did, from the principles of reason only
without any assistance from revelation, find out the true nature and the
true worship of the deity, must find out some history of the world
entirely different from all the accounts which the present sacred and
profane writers do give us, or his opinion must appear to be a mere
guess and conjecture of what is barely possible, but what all history
assures us never was really done in the world.
1239. Revealed Religion. One thing wherein the deficiency of
natural light appears is this: that men without revelation should
suppose that they should be forgiven on repentance and reformation, and
also that there is a future state. Yet the light of nature alone never
could be sufficient to ascertain the limits of their day of probation,
and satisfy them on sure grounds that repentance shall never be accepted
in some future state, or whether ever the time would come when the case
of sinners would be hopeless or past remedy by repentance.
1304. Revealed Religion and Relationship. Satisfaction for Sin.
The religion that is required of us, consists in the disposition and
affections of mind which we ought to have towards God, and our behavior
with respect to him. Therefore, in order to know what is that religion
that becomes us, we must know that God is, and what manner of Being he
is; what perfections he has, and what concern we have with him; or what
notice he takes of us; what relation we stand in to him; and what
dependence we have upon him. Not only is it necessary that we should
know that God is, and what he is, in order to know what that religion
is, which is our duty, but also it is requisite that we should know
those other things mentioned, viz. what concern we have with him,
etc. If we have no concern with him, nor he with us, if he has not
relation to us, and we have no dependence upon him, and he takes no
notice of us, then, surely, all will allow that the foundation of
religion, consisting in the regard of our minds and exercise of our
hearts, and in acts of respect or service towards him, does, at least in
a very great measure, cease….
As
it is of so great importance that we should exercise that religion that
is our duty, so we must suppose that our Creator looks upon it as such,
and that it is proportionably agreeable to his will, or in other words,
it is a thing proportionably fit and amiable in his eye, that we should
do so. That God has regard to men’s doing their duty, and is not
careless about it, is evident from these considerations: It is evident
that God is not negligent of the world he has made. He has made it for
his use, and therefore, doubtless, he uses it, which implies that he
takes care of it, and orders and governs it that it may be directed to
the ends for which he has made it. If God regards the state of the
world, he will especially regard the state of the intelligent part of
the world, which is transcendently the most important, and that for
which all the rest is evidently made, and without which all the rest is
nothing.
God
regards the moral state of the intelligent world, as the well-being and
preservation of the world depends upon its moral state. Wickedness
tends, above all things, to ruin it. If let alone, it tends to its
greatest confusion, disorder and utter destruction, as a fire that will
wholly consume it. And its beauty and excellency, above all things, and
indeed summarily, consists in virtue. We see that God takes care of the
well-being, good state, regularity and beauty of those parts of the
world that are infinitely of less importance. Therefore, surely he is
not careless about these things in the intelligent world, the highest
part of creation, the head of all, that is next to himself…. It is
evident that as God has made man an intelligent creature, capable of
knowing his Creator, and discerning God’s aims in creation, and
particularly in creating himself, by seeing the nature and tendency of
things. He has made him a volitive and active creature, capable of
willing and actively falling in with his aims, and promoting them. So it
must be that he has made him so serve him, and consequently, to have
respect to him, and love him.
From these things, it must needs happen, according to what was before
laid down, that God looks upon it of great importance, that men have and
exercise that religion that becomes them, and that he greatly insists
upon it…. Seeing God insists that we should have and exercise that
religion towards him, we may well conclude that he will not deny mankind
the means necessary to render them capable of this, and therefore will
not deny them the necessary means of some clear, evident, and distinct
knowledge, not only of his existence and perfections, but also of the
relations he stands in to us, and of the things wherein we are dependent
on him…. As for instance, we may conclude that he will not deny mankind
sufficiently clear and evident knowledge of his concern with them as
their Creator and Preserver, and the Author of all their outward good
things, and as their Judge to recompense their behavior. Or if there be
any other relations that God stands in to them of like importance, then,
doubtless, it is the will of God to give like clear and full evidence of
them also. But now from these things I infer, that if there be any such
thing as forgiveness of sin, and salvation from sin and its evil
consequences, then God has certainly given a revelation to mankind, to
make this clearly and distinctly known, together with the terms, method,
and means of it. Because if so, these things will follow:
1.
That then God sustains a relation entirely new and distinct from the
natural relation of a Creator, Preserver, etc. viz. that of a
Savior. And we have a new concern with God, and a new dependence on
him, entirely distinct from that which is by nature, but no less
important, which renders a new kind of regard to God, and so a new sort
of religion, proper and becoming in man, corresponding with this new
relation, and these his new concerns with God.
2.
That we cannot have any clear, certain, and distinct knowledge of this
new relation, etc. any other way than by divine revelation. I shall show
each of these in their order.
First. If there be any forgiveness of the sins we are guilty of, and
deliverance from sin and its consequences, then God stands in a new
relation to us, even that of Savior, and we have new concerns with him
founded upon it. [This] new relation is no less important than that of
the Author and Preserver of our nature, and the Bestower of natural
enjoyments. And consequently, new regards to God, and new duties founded
on this new relation, become us, which are not less important than the
duties of natural religion. That the relation of a Savior from our sin
and its consequences, is no less important than the other, will appear
from the following considerations. It is evident that mankind in general
has forsaken and renounced the Author and Preserver of their beings, and
the Fountain of all that pertains to their well-being, i.e. their
hearts have forsaken him, in that they do not love God so much as they
do other things. Therefore, they have taken away their hearts from God,
have set up other things in the throne of God. They have subjected God
in their hearts to things that are infinitely mean, and worthless and
vile, in comparison of God. This is attended unavoidably with enmity to
God. As rebelling against a lawful prince, and setting up another in his
stead, is turning enemy to the lawful prince, so men naturally disregard
God’s glory and supreme dominion. They have truly no sincere consent of
heart to that glory, or delight in any such thing, but rather are
against it, and have naturally no relish for the infinite supreme beauty
of the divine nature, nor any proper gratitude to him, as the Fountain
of all good that belongs to our being. And this certainly is rebellion
and revolt, and a renouncing and casting off the Supreme Being, as to
his infinite excellency and dignity, and as to that supreme dominion of
his, founded on that dignity, and the relation of a Creator, Preserver,
and Fountain of all good. Now it is pretty manifest that by forsaking
and renouncing the Author of our being, and of all good, and thus
turning enemy to him, we must forfeit his favor and friendship, and the
benefits we derive from this Fountain of good. And that implies that our
conduct deserves that we should be totally undone. A casting off the
Author of our being, deserves plainly that he should cast us off, and
that he should cause that our being should not be for our good. Our
becoming his enemies deserves that he should be and act as our enemy,
and that he should cause our being to be the means of our misery. And if
we have deserved these things, then unless we are forgiven, at least in
part, these things will certainly come upon us.
From these things it appears that if we are ever forgiven and restored
from this utterly ruined and undone state, it will be as great a thing
as our creation, and equivalent to a new creation from nothing, in order
to a new preservation, and new enjoyment of the benefits of being. So
that hereby God stands in a new relation to us, even that of a Savior,
and we have a new concern with him, and dependence upon him, of equal
importance with that of our Creator, Preserver, etc. And if the misery
that we deserve, be worse than a state of non-existence, as it would be
easy to prove that it must be infinitely worse, then this new relation
of a Savior is infinitely more important that the other.
From whence it follows that new duties arise, new regards towards God,
and a new religion becomes us, which is no less important than natural
religion. And it will further follow from things before shown that it
must be agreeable to the Word of God that we should have means of clear,
full and distinct notice of this new relation that God stands in to us
as our Savior, and his concern with us, and the manner of our dependence
on him in that matter, and consequently that we have sufficient means
for a certain knowledge that God is willing to forgive us, and of the
nature of salvation, and the terms on which it may be obtained…. And
therefore, from what has been before observed, it is doubtless agreeable
to the will of God that we should have a revelation, i.e. if
there be any such thing as forgiveness and salvation for us. And this is
what I would now proceed to show,
Second. That we cannot have any certain and distinct knowledge of
these things concerning our restoration and salvation with a revelation.
It is said by some that the light of nature and reason is sufficient to
teach us that a good God stands ready to forgive sinners on their hearty
repentance.
But
I think it plain that our reason alone never could give a clear and
evident notice of this. A wise governor, in governing, will not be
influenced wholly and only by goodness and pity. Wisdom, on many
accounts, and in many cases, may prevent his forgiving offenders. And
who could tell in what manner of wisdom might influence and determine
the Supreme Ruler of the world in this matter…. It is natural to suppose
that other things become the Supreme Governor of the world, besides pity
and goodness, and particularly, that justice and hatred of sin becomes
him. It is not natural to suppose that he cannot be provoked or offended
by injuriousness and an unreasonable spirit and treatment, and
particularly, by and injurious disposition and behavior towards Himself,
in ingratitude, enmity, and contempt. At least, we cannot be certain
from the light of nature, that he may not be provoked by these things.
If we may judge by what seems to be dictated by the hearts of the
generality of mankind through the face of the earth, and in all ages, it
is natural for the mind of man to suppose that the Deity is greatly
provoked by such things. And if he is provoked by sin, and does greatly
abhor and resent it, it is natural to suppose that he is disposed to
punish it, and that with severity. This also agrees with the notions of
mankind in all ages and nations.
And
if other perfections besides goodness, such as justice, holiness, hatred
of sin, and wisdom as it regards the most perfect state of the universal
system in the whole series of events, I say, if such other perfections
must have their ends regarded, and so have a hand in determining, with
respect to offenders, rebels and enemies, whether they shall be forgiven
and received into favor…. How shall it be determined, without a
revelation, how great a hand those other perfections, besides goodness,
may have in this affair, and how great a regard will be paid to other
ends besides the ends of mere pity and goodness….Will not reason say
that if God be perfectly wise, he will order the methods of his
proceeding in the moral government of the world, so as to make provision
for the obtaining of the best ends in the best manner (meaning by
best, that which is so on an universal and perfect view of all
things), in their utmost extent, and utmost duration? And how can reason
alone fully and clearly determine and satisfy those, who are so
infinitely far from being capable of such a view, what is best in this
sense?
So
if we suppose that it were known and determined that it is God’s will
that there should be some way of salvation, reason will determine that
the method and means, terms and degrees, etc. shall be such as are
wisest and best in the foregoing sense, viz. with regard to the
influence of each part of the scheme or method of salvation, on the
whole extent and duration of existences, comprehending that infinite
variety of particular beings, circumstances and events. But who will say
that men’s reason alone is sufficient to determine what method of
salvation is wisest in this sense? What degree of mercy, what
deliverance and happiness, what means of salvation, what terms of
enjoying the benefits of it, will have the best and most perfect
influence in such a sense? Will any say that men’s understanding and
reason alone make it certain that the infinitely wise, holy and
righteous Governor of the world, stands ready to forgive all offenders,
how great soever their offense, and how far soever they proceed in
acting upon their enmity and contempt? If not, then who shall set the
bounds? Can man’s reason fix the limits, and say that men may go so far
in offending, and yet find mercy, and no farther?
Reason alone cannot certainly determine that God will not insist on some
satisfaction for injuries he receives. If we consider what have in fact
been the general notions of mankind, we shall see cause to think that
the dictates of men’s minds, who have been without revelation, have been
contrariwise, viz. that the Deity will insist on some
satisfaction. Repentance makes some satisfaction for many injuries that
men are guilty of one towards another, because it bears some proportion
to the degree of injury. But reason will not certainly determine that it
is proper for God to accept of repentance as some satisfaction for an
offense, when that repentance is infinitely disproportionate to the
heinousness of the offense, or the degree of injuriousness that is
offered. And reason will not certainly determine that the offense of
forsaking and renouncing God in heart, and treating him with such
indignity and contempt, as to set him below the meanest and vilest
things, is not immensely greater, and more heinous, than any injury
offered to men, and that therefore all our repentance and sorrow fall
infinitely short of proportion in measure and degree. If it be said that
we may reasonably conclude, and be fully satisfied in it, that a good
God will forgive our sin on repentance, then I ask, what can be meant by
repentance in the case of them that have no love nor true gratitude to
God in their hearts, but who discover such an habitual disregard and
contempt of God in their conduct, as to treat created things, of the
lowest value, with greater respect than him? If it be said that thereby
is meant being sorry for the offense, then I ask, whether that sorrow is
worthy to be accepted as true repentance, that does not rise from any
change of heart, or from a better mind, a mind more disposed to love
God, and honor him, being now so changed as to have less disregard and
contempt? Whether or not the sorrow which arises only from fear and
self-love, with a heart still in rebellion against God, be such as we
can be certain will be accepted? If not, then how shall a man, who at
present has no better heart, but yet is greatly concerned for himself
through fear, know how to obtain a better heart? How does it appear that
he, if he tries only from fear and self-love, can make himself better,
and make himself love God? What proper tendency can there be in the
heart to make itself better, until it sincerely repents of its present
badness? And how can the heart have sincerity of repentance of its
present badness, until it begins to be better, and so begins to forsake
its badness, by truly disapproving it, from a good disposition, or a
better tendency arising in it? If the disposition remain just the same,
then no sincere disapprobation arises, but the reigning disposition,
instead of destroying, on the contrary approves and confirms itself. The
heart can have no tendency to make itself better, until it begins to
have a better tendency. For therein consists its badness, viz.
having no good tendency or inclination. And to begin to have a good
tendency, or which is the same thing, to begin to have a sincere
inclination to be better, is the same thing as to begin already to be
better. So that it seems that they that are now under the reigning power
of an evil heart, can have no ability to help themselves, how sensible
soever they may be of their misery, and concerned through fear and
self-love to be delivered. But they need this from God as part of their
salvation, viz. that God should give them sincere repentance, as
well as pardon and deliverance from the evil consequences of sin. And
how shall they know, without revelation, that God will give sinners a
better heart, to enable them truly to repent, or in what way they can
have any hope to obtain it of him? And if men could obtain some sincere
repentance of their being wholly without that love of God that they
ought to have, yet how can reason determine that God will forgive their
sin, until they wholly forsake it? Or until their repentance is perfect?
Until they relinquish all their sinful contempt, ingratitude, and
regardlessness of God? Or, which is the same thing, until they fully
return to their duty, i.e. to that degree of love, honor,
gratitude, and devotedness to God, that is their duty? If they have
robbed God, who can certainly say that God will forgive them, until they
restore all that they have robbed him of, and give him the whole that he
claims by the most absolute right? But where is any man that repents
with such a perfect repentance? And if there be ever any instances of it
in this world, who will say that it is in every man’s power to obtain
it? Or that there certainly are no lower terms of forgiveness? And if
there are, who can tell certainly where to set the bounds, and say
precisely to what degree a man must repent? How great must his sorrow be
in proportion to his offenses, etc.? Or who can say how long a man’s day
of probation shall last? Will reason alone certainly determine that if a
man goes on for a long time presumptuously in his contempt, rebellion,
and affronts, presuming on God’s goodness, depending that though he does
thus abuse his grace as long as he pleases, yet if he repents at any
time, God will forgive him, and receive him to favor, forgiving all his
presumptuous aggravated rebellion, ingratitude, and provocation, and
will receive him into the arms of his love? Will reason alone fully
satisfy the mind that God stands ready to pardon and receive to favor
such a sinner, after long continuance in such horrid presumption and
most vile ingratitude? Or will reason fully determine for a certainty
that God will do it, if men thus presumptuously spend their youth, the
best part of their lives, in obstinate and ungrateful wickedness,
depending that God will stand ready to pardon afterwards? And, in short,
how can reason alone be sufficient to set the bounds, and say how long
God will bear with and wait upon presumptuous sinners? How many acts of
such ingratitude and presumption he will be ready to forgive, and on
what terms, etc.? I say, how can reason fix these limits, with any clear
evidence that shall give the mind a fixed establishment and
satisfaction?
Therefore, if there be any such thing as the forgiveness and salvation
of sinful men, new relations of God to men, concerns of God with men,
and a new dependence of men on God will arise, no less, probably much
more important than those which are between God as man’s Creator, and
the Author of his natural good. And as God must manifest his perfections
in a new work of redemption or salvation, contrived and ordered by his
infinite wisdom, and executed by his power — in a perfect consistence
with his justice and holiness, and a greater manifestation of his
goodness, than is made in his works as the Author of nature — so these
things must be the foundation of new regards to God, new duties, and a
new religion, founded on those displays of his perfections in the work
of salvation, and on the new relations God sustains towards men, and the
new dependence of men on God, and new obligations laid on men in that
work, which may be called revealed religion, different from that
natural religion which is founded on the works of God, as the Creator
and the Author of nature, and our concerns with God in that work; though
not at all contrary to it.
The
light of nature teaches that religion which is necessary to continue in
the favor of the God that made us, but it cannot teach us that religion
which is necessary to our being restored to the favor of God, after we
have forfeited it.
1341. Distinguishing Pretenses to Revelation. “The question
is asked, ‘How shall we distinguish between the pretenses to revelation
which are so many and various, all which have an equal right to be
heard, so that it is endless to look for religion in such a crowd of
pretenders to it and difficult to determine the merit of the several
claims?’ So that the only fair way is to take up with natural religion,
which is everywhere the same, and in which there is no danger of being
deluded and misled by imposture, for natural religion admits of no
counterfeit.
Now
to form a true judgment upon this case, it will be necessary first to
state the question right, upon the foot of this objection, and then to
examine what weight of reason there is in it.
First, then the question must relate to revelation, considered only as a
rule and measure of religion. For the dispute betwixt nature and
revelation is confined to this one point: which is the best and safest
guide in religion? It is absurd, therefore, to bring instances of any
revelation in this case, which do not pretend to this property, that
were never given, or pretended to be given, as a rule of religion. For
when men talk of the various revelations that have been in the world,
and the difficulty of determining which they ought to obey, they cannot
take into their consideration the answer of the oracle to Croefus, or
the several answers on particular occasions, recorded in the Greek and
Roman histories.
These are out of the present question, and have no relation to the
inquiry concerning a rule or measure of religion.
On
this view, there are not many revelations that come into competition. In
the heathen world I know of none. For though there were sundry pretenses
to revelation, yet none was set up as a common standard for the religion
of mankind. The religion of Rome was chiefly introduced by Numa, who
pretended a revelation for the foundation of his authority. But it is
plain he aimed at nothing farther than modeling the religion of his
city, and had no thought of the rest of the world in what he did, nor
had the Romans any idea that their religion concerned any but
themselves. And, therefore, when they extended their conquests, religion
was their least concern. They left the world, in that respect, as they
found it, and men were not so much as invited to take their religion.
Now it is evident that no law, either human or divine, extends farther
than the lawgiver intends. Suppose then, if you please, Numa’s religion
to be a revelation, yet since it was given and declared only to the
people of Rome, the rest of the world can have no concern in it. That no
system of religion in the heathen world claimed regard as a general law
is evident from the answer returned from the oracle, when the inquiry
was: which religion was the best? The answer was that every man should
worship according to the custom of the country where he was. So that all
religion were esteemed equally good, and the most any religion pretended
to was a local authority, which reached no farther than the laws of the
country did. And unless men are for giving more to the pretended heathen
revelations than ever they claimed for themselves, or was claimed for
them by those who introduced them and lived under them, they cannot be
brought into this question, since they have no relation to us, any more
than the many civil law and constitutions of the same countries had. And
men may as reasonably complain of the great variety of civil and
municipal laws that distract their obedience, and then instance in the
laws of the Medes and Persians, as they now complain of the variety of
revelations, instancing in such as, even were they true, concern them as
little as the laws of Persia do.
But
perhaps it will be said that though these religions do not oblige us,
yet nevertheless, if any of them were true, they effectually overthrow
all others. For God cannot contradict himself, whether he speaks to one
nation or to all the world, and upon this foot these several pretenses
come within our inquiry. This reasoning may be good, but then not one of
all these pretended revelations in the heathen world, within the period
mentioned, pretends to the essentials necessary to constitute a law
either human or divine. Where was it published and declared? By whom,
and how qualified? Can you name the persons and produce the gospel of
such a religion? Take the instance of Rome. What was Numa? A king and
therefore submitted to in the innovations of religion, but what one mark
of a divine commission can you produce? And yet without such marks, even
a true revelation could be of no authority. Try all other instances, and
you will see how weakly the objection against revelation is supported by
any pretenses of the heathen world.” Dr. Sherlock’s Disc. Preached at
the Temple Church, p. 184, etc.
1426. Revelation in Scripture. God may reveal things in
Scripture, which way he pleases. If by what he there reveals the thing
is any way clearly discovered to the understanding or eye of the mind,
it is our duty to receive it as his revelation…. |
