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The Great Christian Doctrine
Of
Original Sin Defended (PART 4)
by Jonathan Edwards
PART IV
CONTAINING ANSWERS TO OBJECTIONS
CHAPTER I
CONCERNING THE OBJECTION, THAT TO SUPPOSE MEN BORN IN SIN, WITHOUT THEIR
CHOICE, OR ANY PREVIOUS ACT OF THEIR OWN, IS TO SUPPOSE WHAT IS
INCONSISTENT WITH THE NATURE OF SIN
SOME of the objections made against the doctrine of original sin, which
have reference to particular arguments used in defense of it, have been
already considered in the handling of those arguments. What I shall
therefore now consider, are such objections as I have not yet had
occasion to notice.
There is no argument Dr. T. insists more upon, than that which is taken
from the Arminian and Pelagian notion of freedom of will, consisting in
the will’s self-determination, as necessary to the being of moral
good or evil. He often urges, that if we come into the world infected
with sinful and depraved dispositions, then sin must be
natural to us; and if natural, then necessary; and if
necessary, then no sin, nor anything we are blamable for, or that
can in any respect be our fault, being what we cannot help: and he
urges, that sin must proceed from our own choice, etc.
Here I would observe in general, that the forementioned notion of
freedom of will, as essential to moral agency, and necessary to the very
existence of virtue and sin, seems to be a grand favorite point with
Pelagians and Arminians, and all divines of such characters,
in their controversies with the orthodox. There is no one thing more
fundamental in their schemes of religion: on the determination of this
one leading point depends the issue of almost all controversies we have
with such divines. Nevertheless, it seems a needless task for me
particularly to consider that matter in this place; having already
largely discussed it, with all the main grounds of this notion, and the
arguments used to defend it, in a late book on this subject, to which I
ask leave to refer the reader. It is very necessary, that the modern
prevailing doctrine concerning this point, should be well understood,
and therefore thoroughly considered and examined: for without it there
is no hope of putting an end to the controversy about original sin, and
innumerable other controversies that subsist, about many of the main
points of religion. I stand ready to confess to the forementioned modern
divines, if they can maintain their peculiar notion of freedom,
consisting in the self-determining power of the will, as
necessary to moral agency, and can thoroughly establish it in
opposition to the arguments lying against it, then they have an
impregnable castle, to which they may repair, and remain invincible, in
all the controversies they have with the reformed divines, concerning
original sin, the sovereignty of grace, election,
redemption, conversion, the efficacious operation of the Holy
Spirit, the nature of saving faith, perseverance of the saints,
and other principles of the like kind. However, at the same time, I
think this will be as strong a fortress for the Deists, in common
with them; as the great doctrines, subverted by their notion of
freedom, are so plainly and abundantly taught in the Scripture. But
I am under no apprehensions of any danger, which the cause of
Christianity, or the religion of the reformed, is in, from any
possibility of that notion being ever established, or of its
being ever evinced that there is not proper, perfect, and manifold
demonstration lying against it. But as I said, it would be needless
for me to enter into a particular disquisition of this point here; from
which I shall easily be excused by any reader who is willing to give
himself the trouble of consulting what I have already written. And as to
others, probably they will scarce be at the pains of reading the present
discourse; or at least would not, if it should be enlarged by a full
consideration of that controversy.
I
shall at this time therefore only take notice of some gross
inconsistencies that Dr. T. has been guilty of, in his handling this
objection against the doctrine of original sin. In places which have
been cited, he says, that sin must proceed from our own choice:
and that if it does not, it being necessary to us, it cannot be sin,
it cannot be our fault, or what we are to blame for: and therefore all
our sin must be chargeable on our choice, which is the cause
of sin: for he says, the cause of every effect is alone chargeable
with the effect it produceth, and which proceedeth from it (Page
128). Now here are implied several gross contradictions. He greatly
insists, that nothing can be sinful, or have the nature of sin,
but what proceeds from our choice. Nevertheless he says, “Not the
effect, but the cause alone is chargeable with blame.”
Therefore the choice, which is the cause, is alone
blamable, or has the nature of sin; and not the effect of that
choice. Thus nothing can be sinful, but the effect of choice; and yet
the effect of choice never can be sinful, but only the cause,
which alone is chargeable with all the blame.
Again, the choice, from which sin proceeds, is itself
sinful. Not only is this implied in his saying, “The cause alone
is chargeable with all the blame;” but he expressly speaks of the
choice as faulty (Page 190), and calls that choice wicked,
from which depravity and corruption proceeds (Page 200. See also
p. 216). Now if the choice itself be sin, and there be no sin but
what proceeds from a sinful choice, then the sinful choice must proceed
from another antecedent choice; it must be chosen by a foregoing
act of will, determining itself to that sinful choice, that so it may
have that which he speaks of as absolutely essential to the nature of
sin, namely, that it proceeds from our choice, and does not
happen to us necessarily. But if the sinful choice itself proceeds from
a foregoing choice, then also that foregoing choice must be sinful; it
being the cause of sin, and so alone chargeable with the blame.
Yet if that foregoing choice be sinful, then neither must that
happen to us necessarily, but must likewise proceed from choice, another
act of choice preceding that: for we must remember, that “Nothing is
sinful but what proceeds from our choice.” And then, for the same
reason, even this prior choice, last mentioned, must also be sinful,
being chargeable with all the blame of that consequent evil choice,
which was its effect. And so we must go back till we come to the very
first volition, the prime or original act of choice in the whole
chain. And this to be sure must be a sinful choice,
because this is the origin or primitive cause of all the
train of evils which follow; and according to our author, must therefore
be “alone chargeable with all the blame.” And yet so it is, according to
him, this “cannot be sinful,” because it does not “proceed from
our own choice,” or any foregoing act of our will; it being, by the
supposition, the very first act of will in the case. And
therefore it must be necessary, as to us, having no choice of
ours to be the cause of it.
In
p. 232 he says, “Adam’s sin was from his own disobedient will;
and so must every man’s sin, and all the sin in the world be, as
well as his.” By this, it seems, he must have a disobedient will”
before he sins; for the cause must be before the effect: and yet
that disobedient will itself is sinful; otherwise it could not be
called disobedient. But the question is, How do men come by the
disobedient will, this cause of all the sin in the world? It must
not come necessarily, without men’s choice; for if so, it is
not sin, nor is there any disobedience in it. Therefore that
disobedient will must also come from a disobedient will; and so
on, in infinitum. Otherwise it must be supposed, that there is
some sin in the world, which does not come from a disobedient
will: contrary to our author’s dogmatical assertions.
In
p. 166. S. he says, “Adam could not sin without a sinful inclination.”
Here he calls that inclination itself sinful, which is the
principle from whence sinful acts proceed; as elsewhere he speaks of the
disobedient will from whence all sin comes: and he allows
[Contents of Rom. chap. 7 in Notes on the epistle.], that “the law
reaches to all the latent principles of sin;” meaning
plainly, that it forbids, and threatens punishment for,
those latent principles. Now these latent principles of sin, these
sinful inclinations, without which, according to our author, there can
be no sinful act, cannot all proceed from a sinful choice;
because that would imply great contradiction. For, by the supposition,
they are the principles from whence a sinful choice comes, and whence
all sinful acts of will proceed; and there can be no sinful act without
them. So that the first latent principles and inclinations, from
whence all sinful acts proceed, are sinful; and yet they are
not sinful, because they do not proceed from a wicked choice,
without which, according to him, “nothing can be sinful.”
Dr.
T. speaking of that proposition of the Assembly of Divines,
wherein they assert, that man is by nature utterly corrupt, etc.
(Page 125) thinks himself well warranted, by the supposed great evidence
of these his contradictory notions, to say, “Therefore sin is not
natural to us; and therefore I shall not scruple to say, this
proposition in the Assembly of Divines is FALSE.” But it may be
worthy of consideration, whether it would not have greatly become him,
before he had clothed himself with so much assurance, and proceeded, on
the foundation of these his notions, so magisterially to charge the
Assembly’s proposition with falsehood, to have taken care
that his own propositions, which he has set in opposition to them,
should be a little more consistent; that he might not have
contradicted himself, while contradicting them; lest some
impartial judges, observing his inconsistency, should think they had
warrant to declare with equal assurance, that “they should not scruple
to say, Dr. T.’s doctrine is FALSE.”
PART IV
CHAPTER II
CONCERNING THE OBJECTION, AGAINST THE DOCTRINE OF NATIVE CORRUPTION,
THAT TO SUPPOSE MEN RECEIVE THEIR FIRST EXISTENCE IN SIN, IS TO MAKE HIM
WHO IS THE AUTHOR OF THEIR BEING, THE AUTHOR OF THEIR DEPRAVITY
ONE
argument against a supposed native, sinful depravity, which Dr. T.
greatly insists upon, is, “that this does in effect charge him, who is
the author of our nature, who formed us in the womb, with being the
author of a sinful corruption of nature; and that it is highly
injurious to the God of our nature, whose hands have formed and
fashioned us, to believe our nature to be originally
corrupted, and that in the worst sense of corruption [p. 137,
187-189, 256, 258, 260. 143. S. and other places.].
With respect to this, I would observe, in the first place, that this
writer, in handling this grand objection, supposes something to
belong to the doctrine objected against, as maintained by the
divines whom he is opposing, which does not belong to it, nor
follow from it. As particularly, he supposes the doctrine of original
sin to imply, that nature must be corrupted by some positive
influence; “something , by some means or other, infused into
the human minds, but like a taint, tincture, or infection,
altering the natural constitution, faculties, and dispositions of our
souls (Page 187). That sin and evil dispositions are IMPLANTED in the
fetus in the womb” [Page 146, 148, 149. S. and the like in many other
places.]. Whereas truly our doctrine neither implies nor infers any such
thing. In order to account for a sinful corruption of nature, yea, a
total native depravity of the heart of man, there is not the least need
of supposing any evil quality, infused, implanted, or wrought
into the nature of man, by any positive cause, or influence
whatsoever, either from God, or the creature; or of supposing, that man
is conceived and born with a fountain of evil in his heart, such
as is anything properly positive. I think, a little attention to
the nature of things will be sufficient to satisfy any impartial
considerate inquirer, that the absence of positive good principles, and
so the withholding of a special divine influence to impart and maintain
those good principles — leaving the common natural principles of
self-love, natural appetite, etc. to themselves, without the government
of superior divine principles — will certainly be followed with the
corruption; yea, the total corruption of the heart, without occasion for
any positive influence at all: and that it was thus in fact that
corruption of nature came on Adam, immediately on his fall, and comes on
all his posterity, as sinning in him, and falling with him.
The
case with man was plainly this: when God made man at first, he implanted
in him two kinds of principles. There was an inferior kind, which
may be called NATURAL, being the principles of mere human nature; such
as self-love, with those natural appetites and passions, which belong to
the nature of man, in which his love to his own liberty, honor,
and pleasure, were exercised: these, when alone, and left to themselves,
are what the Scriptures sometimes call FLESH. Besides these, there were
superior principles, that were spiritual, holy, and divine,
summarily comprehended in divine love; wherein consisted the spiritual
image of God, and man’s righteousness and true holiness; which are
called in Scripture the divine nature. These principles may, in
some sense, be called SUPERNATURAL, being (however concreated or
connate, yet) such as are above those principles that are
essentially implied in, or necessarily resulting from and inseparably
connected with, mere human nature; and being such as immediately
depend on man’s union and communion with God, or divine communications
and influences of God’s Spirit: which though withdrawn, and man’s nature
forsaken of these principles, human nature would be human nature still;
man’s nature, as such, being entire without these divine principles,
which the Scripture sometimes calls SPIRIT, in contradistinction to
flesh. These superior principles were given to possess the
throne, and maintain an absolute dominion in the heart; the other to be
wholly subordinate and subservient. And while things continued thus, all
was in excellent order, peace, and beautiful harmony, and in a proper
and perfect state. These divine principles thus reigning, were the
dignity, life, happiness, and glory of man’s nature. When man sinned and
broke God’s covenant, and fell under his curse, these superior
principles left his heart: for indeed God then left him; that communion
with God on which these principles depended, entirely ceased; the Holy
Spirit, that divine inhabitant, forsook the house. Because it would have
been utterly improper in itself, and inconsistent with the constitution
God had established, that he should still maintain communion with man,
and continue by his friendly, gracious, vital influences, to dwell with
him and in him, after he was become a rebel, and had incurred God’s
wrath and curse. Therefore immediately the superior divine principles
wholly ceased; so light ceases in a room when the candle is withdrawn;
and thus man was left in a state of darkness, woeful corruption, and
ruin; nothing but flesh without spirit. The inferior
principles of self-love, and natural appetite, which were given only to
serve, being alone, and left to themselves, of course became
reigning principles; having no superior principles to regulate or
control them, they became absolute masters of the heart. The immediate
consequence of which was a fatal catastrophe, a turning of all
things upside down, and the succession of a state of the most odious and
dreadful confusion. Man immediately set up himself, and the
objects of his private affections and appetites, as supreme; and so they
took the place of God. These inferior principles are like fire in
a house; which, we say, is a good servant, but a bad master; very useful
while kept in its place, but if left to take possession of the whole
house, soon brings all to destruction. Man’s love to his own honor,
separate interest, and private pleasure, which before was wholly
subordinate unto love to God, and regard to his authority and glory,
now disposes and impels him to pursue those objects, without regard to
God’s honor, or law; because there is no true regard to these divine
things left in him. In consequence of which, he seeks those objects as
much when against God’s honor and law, as when agreeable
to them. God still continuing strictly to require supreme regard
to himself, and forbidding all undue gratifications of these inferior
passions — but only in perfect subordination to the ends, and
agreeableness to the rules and limits, which his holiness, honor, and
law prescribe — hence immediately arises enmity in the heart, now
wholly under the power of self-love; and nothing but war ensues,
in a constant course, against God, As, when a subject has once renounced
his lawful sovereign, and set up a pretender in his stead, a state of
enmity and war against his rightful king necessarily ensues. It were
easy to show, how every lust, and depraved disposition of man’s heart,
would naturally arise from this private original, if here were
room for it. Thus it is easy to give an account, how total corruption of
heart should follow on man’s eating the forbidden fruit, though that was
but one act of sin, without God putting any evil into his heart,
or implanting any bad principle, or infusing any corrupt
taint, and so becoming the author of depravity. Only God’s
withdrawing, as it was highly proper and necessary that he should,
from rebel-man, and his natural principles being left to
themselves, is sufficient to account for his becoming entirely
corrupt, and bent on sinning against God.
And
as Adam’s nature became corrupt, without God’s implanting or infusing of
any evil thing into it; so does the nature of his posterity. God
dealing with Adam as the head of his posterity (as has been shown), and
treating them as one, he deals with his posterity as having all
sinned in him. And therefore, as God withdrew spiritual communion,
and his vital gracious influence, from the common head, so he withholds
the same from all the members, as they come into existence; whereby they
come into the world mere flesh, and entirely under the government
of natural and inferior principles; and so become wholly corrupt, as
Adam did.
Now, for God so far to have the disposal of this affair, as to
withhold those influences, without which, nature will be
corrupt, is not to be the author of sin. But, concerning
this, I must refer the reader to what I have said of it in my discourse
on the Freedom of the Will [Part IV § 9.]. Though, besides what I
have there said, I may here observe, that if for God so far to order and
dispose the being of sin, as to permit it, by withholding the
gracious influences necessary to prevent it, is for him to be the author
of sin, then some things which Dr. T. himself lays down, will equally be
attended with this very consequence. For, from time to time he speaks of
God giving men up to the vilest lusts and affections, by permitting,
or leaving them [Key, § 388, note: and Par. on Rom. 1:24.].
Now, if the continuance of sin, and its increase and prevalence,
may be in consequence of God’s disposal, in withholding needful grace,
without God being the author of that continuance and prevalence
of sin; then, by parity of reason, may the being of sin, in the
race of Adam, be in consequence of God’s disposal, by his withholding
that grace which is needful to prevent it, without his being the author
of sin.
If
here it should be said, that God is not the author of sin, in giving up
to sin those who have already made themselves sinful, because when men
have once made themselves sinful, their continuing so, and sin
prevailing in them, and becoming more and more habitual, will follow
in a course of nature: I answer, let that be remembered which this
writer so greatly urges, in opposition to them who suppose original
corruption comes in a course of nature, viz. That the course of
nature is nothing without God. He utterly rejects the notion of the
“course of nature’s being a proper active cause, which will work,
and go on by itself, without God, if he lets or permits it.”
[Page 134. S. See also with what vehemence this is urged in p. 137. S.]
But affirms, “That the course of nature, separate from the agency of
God, is no cause or nothing; and that the course of nature
should continue itself, or go on to operate by itself, any more than at
first produce itself, is absolutely impossible.” These strong
expressions are his. Therefore, to explain the continuance of the habits
of sin in the same person, when once introduced, yea, to explain the
very being of any such habits, in consequence of repeated acts, our
author must have recourse to those same principles, which he rejects as
absurd to the utmost degree, when alleged to explain the corruption of
nature in the posterity of Adam. For, that habits, either good or
bad, should continue, after being once established, or that
habits should be settled and have existence in consequence of repeated
acts, can be owing only to a course of nature, and those laws
of nature which God has established.
That the posterity of Adam should be born without holiness, and so with
a depraved nature, comes to pass as much by the established course of
nature, as the continuance of a corrupt disposition in a particular
person, after he once has it; or as much as Adam’s continuing unholy and
corrupt, after he had once lost his holiness. For Adam’s posterity are
from him, and as it were in him, and belonging to him, according to an
established course of nature, as much as the branches of a tree
are, according to a course of nature, from the tree, in the tree,
and belonging to the tree; or (to make use of the comparison which Dr.
T. himself chooses from time to time, as proper to illustrate the
matter, page 146, 187) just as the acorn is derived from the oak.
And I think, the acorn is as much derived from the oak, according to the
course of nature, as the buds and branches. It is true, that God,
by his own almighty power, creates the soul of the infant; and it
is also true, as Dr. T. often insists, that God, by his immediate power,
forms and fashions the body of the infant in the womb; yet he
does both according to that course of nature, which he has been
pleased to establish. The course of nature is demonstrated, by late
improvements in philosophy, to be indeed what our author himself says it
is, viz. Nothing but the established order of the agency and
operation of the author of nature. And though there be the immediate
agency of God in bringing the soul into existence in generation, yet it
is done according to the method and order established by the author of
nature, as much as his producing the bud, or the acorn of the oak; and
as much as his continuing a particular person in being, after he once
has existence. God’s immediate agency in bringing the soul of a child
into being, is as much according to an established order, as his
immediate agency in any of the works of nature whatsoever. It is
agreeable to the established order of nature, that the good qualities
wanting in the tree, should also be wanting in the branches
and fruit. It is agreeable to the order of nature, that when
a particular person is without good moral qualities in his heart, he
should continue without them, till some new cause or efficiency produces
them. And it is as much agreeable to an established course and order of
nature, that since Adam, the head of mankind, the root of that great
tree with many branches springing from it, was deprived of original
righteousness, the branches should come forth without it. Or, if any
dislike the word nature, as used in this last case, and instead
of it choose to call it a constitution, or established order
of successive events, the alteration of the name will not in the
least alter the state of the present argument. Where the name, nature,
is allowed without dispute, no more is meant than an established method
and order of events, settled and limited by divine wisdom.
If
any should object to this, that if the want of original righteousness be
thus according to an established course of nature, then why are
not principles of holiness, when restored by divine grace, also
communicated to posterity; I answer, The divine law and
establishments of the author of nature, are precisely settled by
him as he pleaseth, and limited by his wisdom. Grace is
introduced among the race of man by a new establishment; not on
the ground of God’s original establishment, as the head of the natural
world, and author of the first creation; but by a constitution of a
vastly higher kind; wherein Christ is made the root of the
tree, whose branches are his spiritual seed, and he is the
head of the new creation; of which I need not stand now to
speak particularly.
But
here I desire it may be noted, that I do not suppose the natural
depravity of the posterity of Adam is owing to the course of nature
only; it is also owing to the just judgment of God. But yet I
think, it is as truly and in the same manner owing to the course of
nature, that Adam’s posterity come into the world without original
righteousness, as that Adam himself continued without it, after he had
once lost it. That Adam continued destitute after he had once lost it.
That Adam continued destitute of holiness, when he had lost it, and
would always have so continued, had it not been restored by a Redeemer,
was not only a natural consequence, according to the course of
things established by God, as the author of nature; but it was also a
penal consequence, or a punishment of his sin. God, in righteous
judgment, continued to absent himself from Adam after he became a
rebel; and withheld from him now those influences of the Holy Spirit,
which he before had. And just thus I suppose it to be with every natural
branch of mankind: all are looked upon as sinning in and with
their common root; and God righteously withholds special influences and
spiritual communications from all, for this sin. But of the manner and
order of these things, more may be said in the next chapter.
On
the whole, this grand objection against the doctrine of men being born
corrupt, that it makes him who gave us our being, to be the cause
of the being of corruption, can have no more force in it, than a
like argument has to prove, that if men by a course of nature
continue wicked, or remain without goodness, after they have by
vicious acts contracted vicious habits, and so made themselves wicked,
it makes him, who is the cause of their CONTINUANCE in being, and
the cause of the CONTINUANCE of the course of nature, to be
the cause of their CONTINUED wickedness. Dr. T. says (Page 136. S),
“God would not make any thing that is hateful to him;
because, by the very terms, he would hate to make such a thing.”
But if this be good arguing in the case to which it is applied, may I
not as well say, God would not CONTINUE a thing in being that is
HATEFUL to him; because, by the very terms, he would HATE TO CONTINUE
such a thing in being? I think, the very terms do as much (and no
more) infer one of these propositions, as the other. In like manner, the
rest that he says on that head may be shown to be unreasonable, by only
substituting the word continue, in the place of make and
propagate. I may fairly imitate his way of reasoning thus: to
say, God continues us according to his own original decree, or
law of continuation, which obliges him to continue us in a
manner he abhors, is really to make bad worse: for it is supposing him
to be defective in wisdom, or by his own decree or law to lay such a
constraint upon his own actions, that he cannot do what he would, but is
continually doing what he would not, what he hates to do, and what he
condemns in us; viz. continuing us sinful when he condemns
us from continuing ourselves sinful.” If the reasoning be weak
in the one case, it is no less so in the other.
If
any shall still insist, that there is a difference between God so
disposing things, as that depravity of heart shall be continued,
according to the settled course of nature, in the same person, who has
by his own fault introduced it; and his so disposing as that men,
according to a course of nature, should be born with depravity,
in consequence of Adam’s introducing of sin, by his act which we had no
concern in, and cannot be justly charged with: on this I would observe,
that it is quite going off the objection, which we have been upon, from
God’s agency, and flying to another. It is then no longer insisted on,
that simply for him, from whose agency the course of nature and
our existence derive, so to dispose things as that we should have
existence in a corrupt state, is for him to be the author of sin: but
the plea now advanced is, that it is not proper and just for such an
agent so to dispose, in this case, and only in consequence of
Adam’s sin; it not being just to charge Adam’s sin to his posterity. And
this matter shall be particularly considered, in answer to the next
objection; to which I now proceed.
PART IV
CHAPTER III
THAT GREAT OBJECTION AGAINST THE IMPUTATION OF ADAM’S SIN TO HIS
POSTERITY, CONSIDERED, THAT SUCH IMPUTATION IS UNJUST AND UNREASONABLE,
INASMUCH AS ADAM AND HIS POSTERITY ARE NOT ONE AND THE SAME. WITH A
BRIEF REFLECTION SUBJOINED OF WHAT SOME HAVE SUPPOSED, OF GOD IMPUTING
THE GUILT OF ADAM’S SIN TO HIS POSTERITY, BUT IN AN INFINITELY LESS
DEGREE THAN TO ADAM HIMSELF.
THAT we may proceed with the greater clearness in considering the main
objections against supposing the guilt of Adam’s sin to be imputed to
his posterity; I would premise some observations with a view to the
right stating of the doctrine; and then show its
reasonableness, in opposition to the great clamor raised against it
on this head.
I
think, it would go far towards directing us to the more clear conception
and right statement of this affair, were we steadily to bear this in
mind: that God, in every step of his proceeding with Adam, in relation
to the covenant or constitution established with him, looked on his
posterity as being one with him. And though he dealt more
immediately with Adam, it yet was as the head of the whole body,
and the root of the whole tree; and in his proceedings with him,
he dealt with all the branches, as if they had been then existing in
their root.
From which it will follow, that both guilt, or exposedness to
punishment, and also depravity of heart, came upon Adam’s posterity just
as they came upon him, as much as if he and they had all coexisted, like
a tree with many branches; allowing only for the difference necessarily
resulting from the place Adam stood in, as head or root of the whole.
Otherwise, it is as if, in every step of proceeding every alteration in
the root had been attended, at the same instant, with the same
alterations throughout the whole tree, in each individual branch. I
think, this will naturally follow on the supposition of there being a
constituted oneness or identity of Adam and his posterity in
this affair.
Therefore I am humbly of opinion, that if any have supposed the children
of Adam to come into the world with a double guilt, one the guilt
of Adam’s sin, another the guilt arising from their having a corrupt
heart, they have not so well conceived of the matter. The guilt a
man has upon his soul at first existence, is one and simple, viz.
the guilt of the original apostasy, the guilt of the sin by which the
species first rebelled against God. This, and the guilt arising from the
depraved disposition of the heart, are not to be looked upon as two
things, distinctly imputed and charged upon men in the sight
of God. Indeed the guilt that arises from the corruption of the heart,
as it remains a confirmed principle, and appears in its consequent
operations, is a distinct and additional guilt: but the guilt
arising from the first existing of a depraved disposition in Adam’s
posterity, I apprehend, is not distinct from their guilt of
Adam’s first sin. For so it was not in Adam himself. The first evil
disposition or inclination of Adam to sin, was not properly distinct
from his first act of sin, but was included in it. The external act he
committed was no otherwise his, than as his heart was in it, or as that
action proceeded from the wicked inclination of his heart. Nor was the
guilt he had double, as for two distinct sins: one, the
wickedness of his will in that affair; another, the wickedness of the
external act, caused by it. His guilt was all truly from the act of his
inward man; exclusive of which the motions of his body were no more than
the motions of any lifeless instrument. His sin consisted in wickedness
of heart, fully sufficient for, and entirely amounting to,
all that appeared in the act he committed.
The
depraved disposition of Adam’s heart is to be considered two ways. (1.)
As the first rising of an evil inclination in his heart, exerted
in his first act of sin, and the ground of the complete transgression.
(2.) An evil disposition of heart continuing afterwards, as a
confirmed principle that came by God’s forsaking of him; which was a
punishment of his first transgression. This confirmed corruption, by
its remaining and continued operation, brought additional guilt on his
soul.
In
like manner, depravity of heart is to be considered two ways in Adam’s
posterity. The first existing of a corrupt disposition, is not to
be looked upon as sin distinct from their participation of Adam’s
first sin. It is as it were the extended pollution of that sin,
through the whole tree, by virtue of the constituted union of the
branches with the root; or the inherence of the sin of that head
of the species in the members, in their consent and concurrence with the
head in that first act. But the depravity of nature remaining as an
established principle in a child of Adam, and as exhibited in
after-operations, is a consequence and punishment of the
first apostasy thus participated, and brings new guilt. The first
being of an evil disposition in a child of Adam, whereby he is
disposed to approve the sin of his first father, so far as to
imply a full and perfect consent of heart to it, I think, is not
to be looked upon as a consequence of the imputation of that first sin,
any more than the full consent of Adam’s own heart in the act of
sinning; which was not consequent on the imputation, but rather prior
to it in the order of nature. Indeed the derivation of the evil
disposition to Adam’s posterity, or rather, the coexistence of
the evil disposition, implied in Adam’s first rebellion, in the root
and branches, is a consequence of the union that the
wise Author of the world has established between Adam and his posterity;
but not properly a consequence of the imputation of his
sin; nay, is rather antecedent to it, as it was in Adam himself.
The first depravity of heart, and the imputation of that sin, are both
the consequences of that established union; but yet in such order, that
the evil disposition is first, and the charge of guilt
consequent, as it was in the case of Adam himself.
The
first existence of an evil disposition, amounting to a full consent to
Adam’s sin, no more infers God being the author of that evil disposition
in the child, than in the father. The first arising or
existing of that evil disposition in the heart of Adam, was by God’s
permission; who could have prevented it, if he had pleased, by
giving such influences of his Spirit, as would have been absolutely
effectual to hinder it; which, it is plain in fact, he did withhold:
and whatever mystery may be supposed in the affair, yet no Christian
will presume to say, it was not in perfect consistence with God’s
holiness and righteousness, notwithstanding Adam had been
guilty of no offense before. So root and branches being one, according
to God’s wise constitution, the case in fact is, that by virtue of this
oneness answerable changes or effects through all the branches
coexist with the changes in the root: consequently an evil
disposition exists in the hearts of Adam’s posterity, equivalent to that
which was exerted in his own heart, when he eat the forbidden fruit.
Which God has no hand in, any otherwise, than in not exerting such an
influence, as might be effectual to prevent it; as appears by what was
observed in the former chapter [See also p. 39, note, § 8, etc. 48 § 12,
etc. 80 § 9, etc. 82 § 17, etc. 121 § 7, etc.].
But
now the grand objection is against the reasonableness of such a
constitution, by which Adam and his posterity should be looked
upon as one, and dealt with accordingly, in an affair of such
infinite consequence; so that if Adam sinned, they must necessarily be
made sinners by his disobedience, and come into existence with
the same depravity of disposition, and be looked upon and treated
as though they were partakers with him in his act of sin. I have not
room here to rehearse all Dr. T.’s vehement exclamations against the
reasonableness and justice of this. The reader may at his leisure
consult his book, and see them in the places referred to below [Page 13.
150, 151, 156, 261. 108, 109, 111. S.]. Whatever black colors and
frightful representations are employed on this occasion, all may be
summed up in this, That Adam and his posterity are not one, but
entirely distinct agents. But with respect to this mighty outcry
made against the reasonableness of any such constitution,
by which God is supposed to treat Adam and his posterity as one,
I would make the following observations.
I.
It signifies nothing to exclaim against plain fact. Such is the
fact, the most evident and acknowledged fact, with respect
to the state of all mankind, without exception of one individual among
all the natural descendants of Adam, as makes it apparent, that God
actually deals with Adam and his posterity as one, in reference
to his apostasy, and its infinitely terrible consequences. It has been
demonstrated, and shown to be in effect plainly acknowledged, that every
individual of mankind comes into the world in such circumstances, as
that there is no hope or possibility of any other than their violating
God’s holy law (if they ever live to act at all as moral agents), and
being thereby justly exposed to eternal ruin [Part I Chap. I, the three
first sections.]. And God either thus deals with mankind, because he
looks upon them as one with their first father, and so treats
them as sinful and guilty by his apostasy; or (which will
not mend the matter) he, without viewing them as at all concerned
in that affair, but as in every respect perfectly innocent,
subjects them nevertheless to this infinitely dreadful calamity. Adam by
his sin was exposed to the calamities and sorrows of this life,
to temporal death and eternal ruin; as is confessed. And it is
also in effect confessed, that all his posterity come into the world in
such a state, as that the certain consequence is their being exposed,
and justly so, to the sorrows of this life, to temporal
death, and eternal ruin, unless saved by grace. So that we see, God
in fact deals with them together, or as one. If God orders
the consequences of Adam’s sin, with regard to his posterity’s welfare —
even in those things which are most important, and which in the highest
degree concern their eternal interest — to be the same with the
consequences to Adam himself, then he treats Adam and his posterity as
one in that affair. Hence, however the matter be attended with
difficulty, fact obliges us to get over it, either by
finding out some solution, or by shutting our mouths, and acknowledging
the weakness and scantiness of our understandings; as we must in other
innumerable cases, where apparent and undeniable fact, in God’s
works of creation and providence, is attended with events and
circumstances, the manner and reason of which are
difficult to our understandings. — But to proceed.
PART IV
CHAPTER III
THAT GREAT OBJECTION AGAINST THE IMPUTATION OF ADAM’S SIN TO HIS
POSTERITY, CONSIDERED, THAT SUCH IMPUTATION IS UNJUST AND UNREASONABLE,
INASMUCH AS ADAM AND HIS POSTERITY ARE NOT ONE AND THE SAME. WITH A
BRIEF REFLECTION SUBJOINED OF WHAT SOME HAVE SUPPOSED, OF GOD IMPUTING
THE GUILT OF ADAM’S SIN TO HIS POSTERITY, BUT IN AN INFINITELY LESS
DEGREE THAN TO ADAM HIMSELF.
THAT we may proceed with the greater clearness in considering the main
objections against supposing the guilt of Adam’s sin to be imputed to
his posterity; I would premise some observations with a view to the
right stating of the doctrine; and then show its
reasonableness, in opposition to the great clamor raised against it
on this head.
I
think, it would go far towards directing us to the more clear conception
and right statement of this affair, were we steadily to bear this in
mind: that God, in every step of his proceeding with Adam, in relation
to the covenant or constitution established with him, looked on his
posterity as being one with him. And though he dealt more
immediately with Adam, it yet was as the head of the whole body,
and the root of the whole tree; and in his proceedings with him,
he dealt with all the branches, as if they had been then existing in
their root.
From which it will follow, that both guilt, or exposedness to
punishment, and also depravity of heart, came upon Adam’s posterity just
as they came upon him, as much as if he and they had all coexisted, like
a tree with many branches; allowing only for the difference necessarily
resulting from the place Adam stood in, as head or root of the whole.
Otherwise, it is as if, in every step of proceeding every alteration in
the root had been attended, at the same instant, with the same
alterations throughout the whole tree, in each individual branch. I
think, this will naturally follow on the supposition of there being a
constituted oneness or identity of Adam and his posterity in
this affair.
Therefore I am humbly of opinion, that if any have supposed the children
of Adam to come into the world with a double guilt, one the guilt
of Adam’s sin, another the guilt arising from their having a corrupt
heart, they have not so well conceived of the matter. The guilt a
man has upon his soul at first existence, is one and simple, viz.
the guilt of the original apostasy, the guilt of the sin by which the
species first rebelled against God. This, and the guilt arising from the
depraved disposition of the heart, are not to be looked upon as two
things, distinctly imputed and charged upon men in the sight
of God. Indeed the guilt that arises from the corruption of the heart,
as it remains a confirmed principle, and appears in its consequent
operations, is a distinct and additional guilt: but the guilt
arising from the first existing of a depraved disposition in Adam’s
posterity, I apprehend, is not distinct from their guilt of
Adam’s first sin. For so it was not in Adam himself. The first evil
disposition or inclination of Adam to sin, was not properly distinct
from his first act of sin, but was included in it. The external act he
committed was no otherwise his, than as his heart was in it, or as that
action proceeded from the wicked inclination of his heart. Nor was the
guilt he had double, as for two distinct sins: one, the
wickedness of his will in that affair; another, the wickedness of the
external act, caused by it. His guilt was all truly from the act of his
inward man; exclusive of which the motions of his body were no more than
the motions of any lifeless instrument. His sin consisted in wickedness
of heart, fully sufficient for, and entirely amounting to,
all that appeared in the act he committed.
The
depraved disposition of Adam’s heart is to be considered two ways. (1.)
As the first rising of an evil inclination in his heart, exerted
in his first act of sin, and the ground of the complete transgression.
(2.) An evil disposition of heart continuing afterwards, as a
confirmed principle that came by God’s forsaking of him; which was a
punishment of his first transgression. This confirmed corruption, by
its remaining and continued operation, brought additional guilt on his
soul.
In
like manner, depravity of heart is to be considered two ways in Adam’s
posterity. The first existing of a corrupt disposition, is not to
be looked upon as sin distinct from their participation of Adam’s
first sin. It is as it were the extended pollution of that sin,
through the whole tree, by virtue of the constituted union of the
branches with the root; or the inherence of the sin of that head
of the species in the members, in their consent and concurrence with the
head in that first act. But the depravity of nature remaining as an
established principle in a child of Adam, and as exhibited in
after-operations, is a consequence and punishment of the
first apostasy thus participated, and brings new guilt. The first
being of an evil disposition in a child of Adam, whereby he is
disposed to approve the sin of his first father, so far as to
imply a full and perfect consent of heart to it, I think, is not
to be looked upon as a consequence of the imputation of that first sin,
any more than the full consent of Adam’s own heart in the act of
sinning; which was not consequent on the imputation, but rather prior
to it in the order of nature. Indeed the derivation of the evil
disposition to Adam’s posterity, or rather, the coexistence of
the evil disposition, implied in Adam’s first rebellion, in the root
and branches, is a consequence of the union that the
wise Author of the world has established between Adam and his posterity;
but not properly a consequence of the imputation of his
sin; nay, is rather antecedent to it, as it was in Adam himself.
The first depravity of heart, and the imputation of that sin, are both
the consequences of that established union; but yet in such order, that
the evil disposition is first, and the charge of guilt
consequent, as it was in the case of Adam himself.
The
first existence of an evil disposition, amounting to a full consent to
Adam’s sin, no more infers God being the author of that evil disposition
in the child, than in the father. The first arising or
existing of that evil disposition in the heart of Adam, was by God’s
permission; who could have prevented it, if he had pleased, by
giving such influences of his Spirit, as would have been absolutely
effectual to hinder it; which, it is plain in fact, he did withhold:
and whatever mystery may be supposed in the affair, yet no Christian
will presume to say, it was not in perfect consistence with God’s
holiness and righteousness, notwithstanding Adam had been
guilty of no offense before. So root and branches being one, according
to God’s wise constitution, the case in fact is, that by virtue of this
oneness answerable changes or effects through all the branches
coexist with the changes in the root: consequently an evil
disposition exists in the hearts of Adam’s posterity, equivalent to that
which was exerted in his own heart, when he eat the forbidden fruit.
Which God has no hand in, any otherwise, than in not exerting such an
influence, as might be effectual to prevent it; as appears by what was
observed in the former chapter [See also p. 39, note, § 8, etc. 48 § 12,
etc. 80 § 9, etc. 82 § 17, etc. 121 § 7, etc.].
But
now the grand objection is against the reasonableness of such a
constitution, by which Adam and his posterity should be looked
upon as one, and dealt with accordingly, in an affair of such
infinite consequence; so that if Adam sinned, they must necessarily be
made sinners by his disobedience, and come into existence with
the same depravity of disposition, and be looked upon and treated
as though they were partakers with him in his act of sin. I have not
room here to rehearse all Dr. T.’s vehement exclamations against the
reasonableness and justice of this. The reader may at his leisure
consult his book, and see them in the places referred to below [Page 13.
150, 151, 156, 261. 108, 109, 111. S.]. Whatever black colors and
frightful representations are employed on this occasion, all may be
summed up in this, That Adam and his posterity are not one, but
entirely distinct agents. But with respect to this mighty outcry
made against the reasonableness of any such constitution,
by which God is supposed to treat Adam and his posterity as one,
I would make the following observations.
I.
It signifies nothing to exclaim against plain fact. Such is the
fact, the most evident and acknowledged fact, with respect
to the state of all mankind, without exception of one individual among
all the natural descendants of Adam, as makes it apparent, that God
actually deals with Adam and his posterity as one, in reference
to his apostasy, and its infinitely terrible consequences. It has been
demonstrated, and shown to be in effect plainly acknowledged, that every
individual of mankind comes into the world in such circumstances, as
that there is no hope or possibility of any other than their violating
God’s holy law (if they ever live to act at all as moral agents), and
being thereby justly exposed to eternal ruin [Part I Chap. I, the three
first sections.]. And God either thus deals with mankind, because he
looks upon them as one with their first father, and so treats
them as sinful and guilty by his apostasy; or (which will
not mend the matter) he, without viewing them as at all concerned
in that affair, but as in every respect perfectly innocent,
subjects them nevertheless to this infinitely dreadful calamity. Adam by
his sin was exposed to the calamities and sorrows of this life,
to temporal death and eternal ruin; as is confessed. And it is
also in effect confessed, that all his posterity come into the world in
such a state, as that the certain consequence is their being exposed,
and justly so, to the sorrows of this life, to temporal
death, and eternal ruin, unless saved by grace. So that we see, God
in fact deals with them together, or as one. If God orders
the consequences of Adam’s sin, with regard to his posterity’s welfare —
even in those things which are most important, and which in the highest
degree concern their eternal interest — to be the same with the
consequences to Adam himself, then he treats Adam and his posterity as
one in that affair. Hence, however the matter be attended with
difficulty, fact obliges us to get over it, either by
finding out some solution, or by shutting our mouths, and acknowledging
the weakness and scantiness of our understandings; as we must in other
innumerable cases, where apparent and undeniable fact, in God’s
works of creation and providence, is attended with events and
circumstances, the manner and reason of which are
difficult to our understandings. — But to proceed.
II.
We will consider the difficulties themselves, insisted on in the
objections of our opposers. They may be reduced to these two: First,
that such a constitution is injurious to Adam’s posterity.
Secondly, that it is altogether improper, as it implies
falsehood, viewing and treating those as one, which indeed are not
one, but entirely distinct.
FIRST difficulty. That appointing Adam to stand, in this
great affair, as the moral head of his posterity, and so treating
them as one with him, as standing or falling with him, is
injurious to them. To which I answer, it is demonstrably
otherwise; that such a constitution was so far from being
injurious to Adam’s posterity, any more than if everyone had been
appointed to stand for himself personally, that it was, in itself
considered, attended with a more eligible probability of a
happy issue than the latter would have been: and so a constitution
that truly expresses the goodness of its Author. For,
1.
It is reasonable to suppose, that Adam was as likely, on
account of his capacity and natural talents, to persevere in
obedience, as his posterity (taking one with another), if they had all
been put on the trial singly for themselves. And supposing that there
was a constituted union or oneness of him and his posterity, and that he
stood as a public person, or common head, all by this constitution would
have been as sure to partake of the benefit of his obedience, as of the
ill consequence of his disobedience, in case of his fall.
2.
There was a greater tendency to a happy issue, in such an
appointment, than if everyone had been appointed to stand for himself;
especially on two accounts. (1.) That Adam had stronger
motives to watchfulness than his posterity would have had; in that
not only his own eternal welfare lay at stake, but also that of all his
posterity: (2.) Adam was in a state of complete manhood,
when his trial began. It was a constitution very agreeable to the
goodness of God, considering the state of mankind, which was to be
propagated in the way of generation, that their first father
should be appointed to stand for all. For by reason of the manner of
their coming into existence in a state of infancy, and their
coming so gradually to mature state, and so remaining for a great
while in a state of childhood and comparative imperfection, after they
were become moral agents, they would be less fit to stand for
themselves, than their first father to stand for them.
If
any man, notwithstanding these things, shall say, that for his own part,
if the affair had been proposed to him, he should have chosen
to have had his eternal interest trusted in his own hands: it
is sufficient to answer, that no man’s vain opinion of himself, as
more fit to be trusted than others, alters the true nature and
tendency of things, as they demonstrably are in themselves. Nor is it a
just objection, that this constitution has in event proved for
the hurt of mankind. For it does not follow, that no advantage
was given for a happy event, in such an establishment, because it
was not such as to make it utterly impossible there should be any other
event.
3.
The goodness of God in such a constitution with Adam
appears in this: that if there had been no sovereign gracious
establishment at all, but God had proceeded only on the basis of mere
justice, and had gone no further than this required, he might have
demanded of Adam and all this posterity, that they should perform
perfect perpetual obedience, without ever failing in the least
instance, on pain of eternal death; and might have made this
demand without the promise of any positive reward
for their obedience. For perfect obedience is a debt, that
everyone owes to his Creator; and therefore is what his Creator was not
obliged to pay him for. None is obliged to pay his debtor for
discharging his just debt. — But such was evidently the constitution
with Adam, that an eternal happy life was to be the consequence of his
persevering fidelity, to all such as were included within that
constitution (of which the tree of life was a sign), as well as
eternal death to be the consequence of his disobedience. — I come now to
consider the
SECOND difficulty. — It being thus manifest, that this
constitution, by which Adam and his posterity are dealt with as
one, is not unreasonable on account of its being injurious
and hurtful to the interest of mankind, the only thing remaining
in the objection, against such a constitution, is the impropriety
of it, as implying falsehood, and contradiction to the true
nature of things; as hereby they are viewed and treated as one,
who are not one, but wholly distinct; and no arbitrary
constitution can ever make that to be true, which in itself considered
is not true.
This objection, however specious, is really founded on a false
hypothesis, and wrong notion of what we call sameness or
oneness, among created things; and the seeming force of the
objection arises from ignorance or inconsideration of the degree,
in which created identity or oneness with past existence, in general,
depends on the sovereign constitution and law of the supreme Author and
Disposer of the universe.
Some things are entirely distinct, and very diverse, which
yet are so united by the established law of the Creator, that by virtue
of that establishment, they are in a sense one. Thus a tree,
grown great, and a hundred years old, is one plant with the
little sprout, that first came out of the ground from whence it
grew, and has been continued in constant succession; though it is now so
exceeding diverse, many thousand times bigger, and of a very
different form, and perhaps not one atom the very same: yet God,
according to an established law of nature, has in a constant succession
communicated to it many of the same qualities, and most important
properties, as if it were one. It has been his pleasure, to
constitute an union in these respects, and for these purposes, naturally
leading us to look upon all as one. — So the body of
man at forty years of age, is one with the infant body
which first came into the world, from whence it grew; though now
constituted of different substance, and the greater part of the
substance probably changed scores (if not hundreds) of times: and though
it be now in so many respects exceeding diverse, yet God, according to
the course of nature, which he has been pleased to establish, has
caused, that in a certain method it should communicate with that
infantile body, in the same life, the same senses, the same
features, and many the same qualities, and in union with the same soul;
and so, with regard to these purposes, it is dealt with by him as one
body. Again, the body and soul of a man are one,
in a very different manner, and for different purposes. Considered in
themselves, they are exceeding different beings, of a nature as diverse
as can be conceived; and yet, by a very peculiar divine constitution, or
law of nature, which God has been pleased to establish, they are
strongly united, and become one, in most important respects; a
wonderful mutual communication is established; so that both become
different parts of the same man. But the union and mutual
communication they have, has existence, and is entirely regulated and
limited, according to the sovereign pleasure of God, and the
constitution he has been pleased to establish.
And
if we come even to the personal identity of created intelligent
beings, though this be not allowed to consist wholly in what Mr.
Locke supposes, i.e. Same consciousness; yet I think it cannot be
denied, that this is one thing essential to it. But it is evident, that
the communication or continuance of the same consciousness and memory to
any subject, through successive parts of duration, depends wholly on a
divine establishment. There would be no necessity, that the remembrance
and ideas of what is past should continue to exist, but by an arbitrary
constitution of the Creator. — If any should here insist, that there is
no need of having recourse to any such constitution, in order to
account for the continuance of the same consciousness; and should
say, that the very nature of the soul is such as will
sufficiently account for it, its ideas and consciousness being retained,
according to the course of nature: then let it be remembered, who
it is that gives the soul this nature; and let that be remembered, which
Dr. T. says of the course of nature, before observed; denying, that
the course of nature is a proper active cause, which will work and go on
by itself without God, if he lets and permits it; saying, that
the course of nature, separate from the agency of God, is no cause, or
nothing; and affirming, that it is absolutely impossible, the
course of nature should continue itself, or go on to operate by itself,
any more than produce itself (Page 134. S); and that God, the
original of all being, is the ONLY CAUSE of all natural effects
(Page 140. S). Here it is worthy also to be observed, what Dr. Turnbull
says of the laws of nature, as cited from Sir Isaac Newton (Mor.
Phil. p. 7). “It is the will of the mind that is the first cause,
that gives subsistence and efficacy to all those laws, who is the
efficient cause that produces the phænomena, which appear
in analogy, harmony, and agreement, according to these laws.”
And, “the same principles must take place in things pertaining to
moral as well as natural philosophy” (Mor. Phil. p. 9).
From these things it will clearly follow, that identity of
consciousness depends wholly on a law of nature; and so, on
the sovereign will and agency of God. And therefore, that
personal identity, and so the derivation of the pollution and guilt of
past sins in the same person, depends on an arbitrary divine
constitution; and this, even though we should allow the same
consciousness not to be the only thing which constitutes oneness of
person, but should, besides that, suppose sameness of substance
requisite. Or, if same consciousness be one thing necessary to
personal identity, and this depends on God’s sovereign constitution,
it will still follow that person identity depends on God’s sovereign
constitution.
And
with respect to the identity of created substance itself, in the
different moments of its duration, I think we shall greatly mistake, if
we imagine it to be like that absolute, independent identity of the
FIRST BEING, whereby he is the same yesterday, today, and forever.
Nay, on the contrary, it may be demonstrated, that even this oneness
of created substance, existing at different times, is a merely
dependent identity; dependent on the pleasure and sovereign
constitution of him who worketh all in all. This will follow from
what is generally allowed, and is certainly true, that God not only
created all things, and gave them being at first, but continually
preserves them, and upholds them in being. This being a matter of
considerable importance, it may be worthy here to be considered with a
little attention. Let us inquire therefore, in the first place, whether
it be not evident, that God does continually, by his immediate power,
uphold every created substance in being; and then let us see the
consequence.
That God does, by his immediate power, uphold every created
substance in being, will be manifest, if we consider that their present
existence is a dependent existence, and therefore is an effect
and must have some cause; and the cause must be one of these two;
either the antecedent existence of the same substance, or else
the power of the Creator. But it cannot be the
antecedent existence of the same substance. For instance, the
existence of the body of the moon, at this present moment, cannot
be the effect of its existence at the last foregoing moment. For
not only was what existed the last moment, no active cause, but wholly a
passive thing; but this also is to be considered, that no cause can
produce effects in a time and place in which itself is not.
It is plain, nothing can exert itself, or operate, when and
where it is not existing. But the moon’s past existence was neither
where nor when its present existence is. In point of
time, what is past entirely ceases, when present
existence begins; otherwise it would not be past. The past moment
has ceased, and is gone, when the present moment takes place; and no
more coexists with it, than any other moment that had ceased,
twenty years ago. Nor could the past existence of the particles of this
moving body produce effects in any other place, than where
it then was. But its existence at the present moment, in every point of
it, is in a different place, from where its existence was at the
last preceding moment. From these things, I suppose, it will certainly
follow, that the present existence, either of this, or any other created
substance, cannot be an effect of its past existence. The existences (so
to speak) of an effect, or thing dependent, in different parts of space
or duration, though ever so near one to another, do not at all
coexist one with the other; and therefore are as truly different
effects, as if those parts of space and duration were ever so far
asunder. And the prior existence can no more be the proper cause of the
new existence, in the next moment, or next part of space, than if it had
been in an age before, or at a thousand miles’ distance, without any
existence to fill up the intermediate time or space. Therefore the
existence of created substances, in each successive moment, must be the
effect of the immediate agency, will, and power of God.
If
any shall insist upon it, that their present existence is the effect or
consequence of past existence, according to the nature of things;
that the established course of nature is sufficient to
continue existence once given; I allow it. But then it should be
remembered, what nature is in created things; and what the
established course of nature is; that, as has been observed
already, it is nothing, separate from the agency of God; and
that, as Dr. T. says, God, the original of all being, is the ONLY
cause of all natural effects. A father, according to the course of
nature, begets a child; an oak, according to the course of nature,
produces an acorn, or a bud; so according to the course of nature, the
former existence of the trunk of the tree is followed by its new or
present existence. In one case, and the other, the new effect is
consequent on the former, only by the established laws and
settled course of nature; which is allowed to be nothing but the
continued immediate efficiency of God, according to a constitution
that he has been pleased to establish. Therefore, according to what
our author urges, as the child and the acorn which come into existence
according to the course of nature, in consequence of the prior
existence and state of the parent and the oak, are truly immediately
created by God; so must the existence of each created person and
thing, at each moment, be from the immediate continued creation
of God. It will certainly follow from these things, that God’s
preserving of created things in being, is perfectly equivalent to a
continued creation, or to his creating those things out of
nothing at each moment of their existence. If the continued
existence of created things be wholly dependent on God’s preservation,
then those things would drop into nothing upon the ceasing of the
present moment, without a new exertion of the divine power to cause them
to exist in the following moment. If there be any who own, that God
preserves things in being, and yet hold that they would continue in
being without any further help from him, after they once have existence;
I think, it is hard to know what they mean. To what purpose can it be,
to talk of God preserving things in being, when there is no
need of his preserving them? Or to talk of their being dependent
on God for continued existence, when they would of themselves
continue to exist, without his help; nay, though he should wholly
withdraw his sustaining power and influence?
It
will follow from what has been observed, that God’s upholding of created
substance, or causing of its existence in each successive moment, is
altogether equivalent to an immediate production out of nothing,
at each moment. Because its existence at this moment is not merely in
part from God, but wholly from him; and not in any part, or
degree, from its antecedent existence. For, to suppose that its
antecedent existence concurs with God in efficiency, to
produce some part of the effect, is attended with all the very
same absurdities, which have been shown to attend the supposition of its
producing it wholly. Therefore the antecedent existence is
nothing, as to any proper influence or assistance in the affair: and
consequently God produces the effect as much from nothing,
as if there had been nothing before. So that this effect differs
not at all from the first creation, but only circumstantially;
as, in the first creation there had been no such act and effect
of God’s power before: whereas, his giving existence afterwards,
follows preceding acts and effects of the same kind, in an
established order.
Now, in the next place, let us see how the consequence of these
things is to my present purpose. If the existence of created
substance, in each successive moment, be wholly the effect of God’s
immediate power, in that moment, without any dependence on prior
existence, as much as the first creation out of nothing, then
what exists at this moment, by this power, is a new effect; and
simply and absolutely considered, not the same with any past existence,
though it be like it, and follows it according to a certain established
method. And there is no identity or oneness in the case, but what
depends on the arbitrary establishment so unites these successive
new effects, that he treats them as one, by communicating to them
like properties, relations, and circumstances; and so, leads us
to regard and treat them as one. When I call this an arbitrary
constitution, I mean, that it is a constitution which depends on
nothing but the divine will; which divine will depends on nothing
but the divine wisdom. In this sense, the whole course of
nature, with all that belongs to it, all its laws and methods,
constancy and regularity, continuance and proceeding, is an arbitrary
constitution. In this sense, the continuance of the very being of
the world and all its parts, as well as the manner of continued being,
depends entirely on an arbitrary constitution. For it does not at
all necessarily follow, that because there was sound, or light,
or color, or resistance, or gravity, or thought, or consciousness, or
any other dependent thing the last moment, that therefore there shall be
the like at the next. All dependent existence whatsoever is in a
constant flux, ever passing and returning; renewed every moment ,as the
colors of bodies are every moment renewed by the light that shines upon
them; and all is constantly proceeding from God, as light from the sun.
In him we live, and move, and have our being.
Thus it appears, if we consider matters strictly, there is no such thing
as any identity or oneness in created objects, existing at different
times, but what depends on God’s sovereign constitution. And so
it appears, that the objection we are upon, made against a
supposed divine constitution, whereby Adam and his posterity are viewed
and treated as one, in the manner and for the purposes supposed —
as if it were not consistent with truth, because no constitution
can make those to be one, which are not one — is built on
a false hypothesis: for it appears, that a divine constitution is
what makes truth, in affairs of this nature. The objection
supposes, there is a oneness in created beings, whence qualities and
relations are derived down from past existence, distinct from,
and prior to, any oneness that can be supposed to be founded on
divine constitution. Which is demonstrably false; and
sufficiently appears so from things conceded by the adversaries
themselves: and therefore the objection wholly falls to the ground.
There are various kinds of identity and oneness, found among
created things, by which they become one in different manners,
respects, and degrees, and to various purposes;
several of which differences have been observed; and every kind is
ordered, regulated, and limited, in every respect, by divine
constitution. Some things, existing in different times and places,
are treated by their Creator as one in one respect, and others in
another; some are united for this communication, and
others for that; but all according to the sovereign pleasure
of the fountain of all being and operation.
It
appears, particularly, from what has been said, that all oneness, by
virtue whereof pollution and guilt from past
wickedness are derived, depends entirely on a divine establishment.
It is this, and this only, that must account for guilt and an evil taint
on any individual soul, in consequence of a crime committed twenty or
forty years ago, remaining still, and even to the end of the world, and
forever. It is this that must account for the continuance of any such
thing, and where, as consciousness of acts that are past; and for
the continuance of all habits, either good or bad: and on this
depends everything that can belong to personal identity. And all
communications, derivations, or continuation of qualities, properties,
or relations, natural or moral, from what is past, as if the
subject were one depends on no other foundation.
And
I am persuaded, that no solid reason can be given, why God — who
constitutes all other created union or oneness according to his
pleasure, and for what purposes, communications, and effects he pleases
— may not establish a constitution whereby the natural posterity
of Adam, proceeding from him, much as the buds and branches from
the stock or root of a tree, should be treated as one with him,
for the derivation, either of righteousness, and communion in rewards,
or of the loss of righteousness, and consequent corruption and guilt.
As
I said before, all oneness in created things, whence qualities and
relations are derived, depends on a divine constitution that is
arbitrary, in every other respect, excepting that it is regulated by
divine wisdom. The wisdom which is exercised in these constitutions,
appears in these two things. First, in a beautiful analogy
and harmony with other laws or constitutions, especially,
relating to the same subject; and secondly, in the good ends
obtained, or useful consequences of such a constitution. If
therefore there be any objection still lying against this constitution
with Adam and his posterity, it must be, that it is not sufficiently
wise in these respects. But what extreme arrogance would it
be in us, to take upon us to act as judges of the beauty and wisdom of
the laws and established constitutions of the supreme Lord and Creator
of the universe! And not only so, but if this constitution, in
particular, be well considered, its wisdom, in the two forementioned
respects, may easily be made evident. There is an apparent manifold
analogy to other constitutions and laws, established and maintained
through the whole system of vital nature in this lower world; all parts
of which, in all successions, are derived from the first of the kind,
as from their root, or fountain; each deriving from thence all
properties and qualities, that are proper to the nature and capacity of
the species: no derivative having any one perfection, unless it
be what is merely circumstantial, but what was in its primitive.
And that Adam’s posterity should be without that original
righteousness, which Adam had lost, is also analogous to
other laws and establishments, relating to the nature of mankind;
according to which, Adam’s posterity have no one perfection of nature,
in any kind, superior to what was in him, when the human race began to
be propagated from him.
And
as such a constitution was fit and wise in other respects, so it
was in this that follows. Seeing the divine constitution concerning the
manner of mankind coming into existence, was such as did so
naturally unite them, and make them in so many respects one,
naturally leading them to a close union in society, and manifold
intercourse, and mutual dependence — things were wisely so established,
that all should naturally be in one and the same moral state; and
not in such exceeding different states, as that some should be perfectly
innocent and holy, but others corrupt and wicked; some
needing a Savior, but others needing none; some in a confirmed
state of perfect happiness, but others in a state of public
condemnation to perfect and eternal misery; some justly exposed
to great calamities in this world, but others by their innocence raised
above all suffering. Such a vast diversity of state would by no means
have agreed with the natural and necessary constitution and unavoidable
situation and circumstances of the world of mankind; all made of one
blood, to dwell on all the face of the earth, to be united and
blended in society, and to partake together in the natural and common
goods and evils of this lower world.
Dr.
T. urges (Page 14), that sorrow and shame are only for
personal sin; and it has often been urged, that repentance
can be for no other sin. To which I would say, that the use of words
is very arbitrary: but that men’s hearts should be deeply
affected with grief and humiliation before God, for the pollution and
guilt which they bring into the world with them, I think, is not in the
least unreasonable. Nor is it a thing strange and unheard of,
that men should be ashamed of things done by others, in
whom they are nearly concerned. I am sure, it is not unscriptural;
especially when they are justly looked upon in the sight of God, who
sees the disposition of their hearts, as fully consenting and
concurring.
From what has been observed it may appear, there is no sure ground to
conclude, that it must be an absurd and impossible thing, for the race
of mankind truly to partake of the sin of the first apostasy, so
as that this, in reality and propriety, shall become their sin;
by virtue of a real union between the root and branches of
mankind (truly and properly availing to such a consequence), established
by the author of the whole system of the universe; to whose
establishments are owing all propriety and reality of union, in
any part of that system; and by virtue of the full consent of the
hearts of Adam’s posterity to that first apostasy. And therefore the sin
of the apostasy is not theirs, merely because God imputes it to
them; but it is truly and properly theirs, and on that
ground God imputes it to them.
By
reason of the established union between Adam and his posterity,
the case is far otherwise between him and them, than it is between
distinct parts or individuals of Adam’s race; betwixt whom is no such
constituted union: as, between children and other ancestors.
Concerning whom is apparently to be understood that place, Eze. 18:1-20
(which Dr. T. alleges, p. 10, 11. S). Where God reproves the Jews for
the use they made of that proverb, “The fathers have eaten sour grapes,
and the children’s teeth are set on edge;” and tells them, that
hereafter they shall no more have occasion to use this proverb;
and that if a son sees the wickedness of his father, and
sincerely disapproves it and avoids it, and he himself is
righteous, he shall not die for the iniquity of his father; that all
souls, both the soul of the father and the son are his, and that
therefore the son shall not bear the iniquity of his father, nor the
father bear the iniquity of the son; but the soul that sinneth, it shall
die; that the righteousness of the righteous shall be upon him, and the
wickedness of the wicked shall be upon him. The thing denied,
is communion in the guilt and punishment of the sins of others, that are
distinct parts of Adam’s race; and expressly, in that case, where there
is no consent and concurrence, but a sincere disapprobation of
the wickedness of ancestors. It is declared, that children who
are adult and come to act for themselves, who are righteous,
and do not approve of, but sincerely condemn, the wickedness of their
fathers, shall not be punished for their disapproved and avoided
iniquities. The occasion of what is here said, as well as the
design and plain sense, shows, that nothing is intended in the least
degree inconsistent with what has been supposed concerning Adam’s
posterity sinning and falling in his apostasy. The occasion
is, the people’s murmuring at God’s methods under the Mosaic
dispensation; agreeable to that in Lev. 26:39, “And they that are left
of you, shall pine away in their iniquity in their enemies’ land, and
also in the iniquities of their fathers shall they pine away with them:”
and other parallel places, respecting external judgments, which were the
punishments most plainly threatened, and chiefly insisted on, under that
dispensation (which was, as it were, an external and carnal
covenant), and particularly the people suffering such terrible judgments
in Ezekiel’s time, for the sins of Manasseh; according to what God says
by Jeremiah (Jer. 15:4) and agreeable to what is said in that
confession, Lam. 5:7, “Our fathers have sinned and are not, and we have
borne their iniquities.”
In
what is said here, there is a special respect to the
gospel-dispensation; as is greatly confirmed by comparing this place
with Jer. 31:29-31. Under which dispensation, the righteousness of God’s
dealings with mankind would be more fully manifested, in the clear
revelation then to be made of the method of God’s judgment, by
which the final state of wicked men is determined; which is not
according to the behavior of their particular ancestors; but
everyone is dealt with according to the sin of his own wicked
heart, or sinful nature and practice. The affair of derivation of
the natural corruption of mankind in general, and of their consent to,
and participation of, the primitive and common
apostasy, is not in the least intermeddled with, by anything meant in
the true scope and design of this place in Ezekiel.
On
the whole, if any do not like the philosophy or the
metaphysics (as some perhaps may choose to call it) made use of in
the foregoing reasonings; yet I cannot doubt, but that a proper
consideration of what is apparent and undeniable in fact, with
respect to the dependence of the state and course of things in
the universe on the sovereign constitutions of the supreme Author
and Lord of all — who gives account to none of any of his
matters, and whose ways are past finding out — will be
sufficient, with persons of common modesty and sobriety, to stop their
mouths from making peremptory decisions against the justice of
God, respecting what is so plainly and fully taught in his holy word,
concerning the derivation of depravity and guilt from Adam to his
posterity.
This is enough, one would think, forever to silence such bold
expressions as these — ”If this be just, — if the Scriptures
teach such doctrine, etc. then the Scriptures are of no use —
understanding is no understanding, — and, what a GOD must
he be, that can thus curse innocent creatures! — Is
this thy GOD. O Christian!” — etc., etc.
It
may not be improper here to add something (by way of supplement to this
chapter, in which we have had occasion to say so much about the
imputation of Adam’s sin) concerning the opinions of two
divines, of no inconsiderable note among the dissenters in
England, relating to a partial imputation of Adam’s first
sin.
One of them supposes, that this sin, though truly imputed to
INFANTS, so that thereby they are exposed to a proper punishment,
yet is not imputed to them in such a degree, as that upon this
account they should be liable to eternal punishment, as
Adam himself was, but only to temporal death, or annihilation;
Adam himself, the immediate actor, being made infinitely more
guilty by it, than his posterity. On which I would observe; that to
suppose, God imputes not all the guilt of Adam’s sin, but only
some little part of it, relieves nothing but one’s imagination.
To think of poor little infants bearing such torments for Adam’s
sin, as they sometimes do in this world, and these torments ending in
death and annihilation, may sit easier on the imagination, than to
conceive of their suffering eternal misery for it. But it does not at
all relieve one’s reason. There is no rule of reason, that can be
supposed to lie against imputing a sin in the whole of it, which
was committed by one, to another who did not personally commit it, but
what will also lie against its being so imputed and punished in part.
For all the reasons (if there be any) lie against the imputation;
not the quantity or degree of what is imputed. If there be
any rule of reason, that is strong and good, lying against a proper
derivation or communication of guilt, from one that acted, to another
that did not act; then it lies against all that is of this
nature. The force of the reasons brought against imputing Adam’s sin to
his posterity (if there be any force in them) lies in this, That Adam
and his posterity are not one. But this lies as properly against
charging a part of the guilt, as the whole. For Adam’s posterity,
by not being the same with him, had no more hand in a little of
what was done, than the whole. They were as absolutely free from being
concerned in that act partly, as they were wholly. And
there is no reason to be brought, why one man’s sin cannot be justly
reckoned to another’s account, who was not then in being, in the
whole of it; but what will as properly lie against its being
reckoned to him in any part, so as that he should be subject to
any condemnation or punishment on that account. If those reasons are
good, all the difference is this; that to bring a great
punishment on infants for Adam’s sin, is a great act of
injustice, and to bring a comparatively smaller punishment, is a
smaller act of injustice; but not, that this is not as truly
and demonstrably an act of injustice, as the other.
To
illustrate this by an instance something parallel. It is used as an
argument why I may not exact from one of my neighbors, what was due to
me from another, that he and my debtor are not
the same; and that their concerns, interests, and properties are
entirely distinct. Now if this argument be good, it lies as truly
against my demanding from him a part of the debt, as the whole.
Indeed it is a greater act of injustice for me to take from him
the whole of it, than a part; but not more truly and
certainly an act of injustice.
The
other divine thinks, there is truly an imputation of Adam’s sin,
so that infants cannot be looked upon as innocent creatures; yet
seems to think it not agreeable to the perfections of God, to
make the state of infants in another world worse than a state of
nonexistence. But this to me appears plainly a giving up of
that grand point of imputation, both in whole and in part. For it
supposes it to be no right, for God to bring any evil on a child
of Adam, which is innocent as to personal sin, without paying for it,
or balancing it with good; so that still the state of the
child shall be as good as could be demanded in justice, in
case of mere innocence. Which plainly supposes, that the child is
not exposed to any proper punishment at all, or is not at all in
debt to divine justice, on account of Adam’s sin. For if the
child were truly in debt, then surely justice might
take something from him, without paying for it, or without
giving that which makes its state as good, as mere
innocence could in justice require. If he owes the suffering of some
punishment, then there is no need that justice should requite
the infant for suffering that punishment; or make up for it,
by conferring some good, that shall countervail it, and in effect
remove and disannul it; so that, on the whole, good and evil
shall be at even balance, yea, so that the scale of good
shall preponderate. If it is unjust in a judge, to order
any quantity of money to be taken from another, without paying him
again, and fully making it up to him, it must be because he had justly
forfeited one at all.
It
seems to me pretty manifest, that none can, in good consistence with
themselves, own a real imputation of the guilt of Adam’s first
sin to his posterity, without owning that they are justly treated
as sinners, truly guilty, and children of wrath, on that
account; nor unless they allow a just imputation of the whole of
the evil of that transgression; at least, all that pertains to
the essence of that act, as a full and complete violation of the
covenant, which God had established; even as much as if each one of
mankind had the like covenant established with him singly, and had by
the like direct and full act of rebellion, violated it for himself.
PART IV
CHAPTER IV
WHEREIN SEVERAL OTHER OBJECTIONS ARE CONSIDERED
DR.
T. objects against Adam’s posterity being supposed to come into the
world under a forfeiture of God’s blessing, and subject to
his curse through his sin, — That at the RESTORATION of the world after
the flood, God pronounced equivalent or greater BLESSINGS on Noah
and his sons, than he did on Adam at his creation, when he said, be
fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and have dominion over
the fish of the sea, etc. (See page 82, etc. S) — To this I answer,
in the following remarks.
1.
As has been already shown, that in the threatening denounced for
Adam’s sin, there was nothing which appears inconsistent with the
continuance of this present life for a season, or with
propagating his kind; so for the like reason, there appears nothing
in that threatening, upon the supposition that it reached Adam’s
posterity, inconsistent with enjoying the temporal blessings
of the present life, as long as this is continued; even those
temporal blessings which God pronounced on Adam at his first creation.
For it must be observed, that the blessings which God pronounced on Adam
when he created him, and before the trial of his obedience, were
not the same with the blessings which were suspended on his obedience.
The blessings thus suspended, were the blessings of eternal life;
which, if he had maintained his integrity through his trial, would have
been pronounced upon him afterwards; when God, as his judge,
should have given him his reward. God might indeed, if he had pleased,
immediately have deprived him of life, and of all
temporal blessings, given him before. But those blessings pronounced
on him beforehand, were not the things for the obtaining of which his
trial was appointed. These were reserved till the issue
of his trial should be seen, and then to be pronounced in the
blessed sentence, which would have been passed upon him by his judge,
when God came to decree to him his reward for his approved fidelity. The
pronouncing of these latter blessings on a degenerate race, that had
fallen under the threatening denounced, would indeed (without a
redemption) have been inconsistent with the constitution which
had been established. But giving them the former kind of
blessings, which were not the things suspended on the trial, or
dependent on his fidelity (and these to be continued for a season), was
not at all inconsistent therewith.
2.
It is no more an evidence of Adam’s posterity being not included in the
threatening denounced for his eating the forbidden fruit, That they
still have the temporal blessings of fruitfulness, and a dominion
over the creatures, continued to them; than it is an evidence of
Adam being not included in that threatening himself, That he had
these blessings continued to him, was fruitful, and had dominion
over the creatures, after his fall, equally with his posterity.
3.
There is good evidence, that the benedictions God pronounced on Noah and
his posterity, were granted on a new foundation; a dispensation
diverse from any grant, promise, or revelation, which God gave to
Adam, antecedently to his fall; even on the foundation of the
covenant of grace, established in Christ Jesus; a dispensation, the
design of which is to deliver men from the curse that came upon
them by Adam’s sin, and to bring them to greater blessings than
ever he had. These blessings were pronounced on Noah and his
seed, on the same foundation whereon afterwards the blessing was
pronounced on Abraham and his seed, which included both spiritual and
temporal benefits. — Noah had his name prophetically given him by his
father Lamech, because by him and his seed deliverance should be
obtained from the curse, which came by Adam’s fall. Gen. 5:29, “And he
called his name Noah (i.e. rest), saying, This same shall comfort
us concerning our work, and toil of our hands, because of the ground
which the Lord hath cursed.” Pursuant to the scope and intent of this
prophecy (which indeed seems to respect the same thing with the
prophecy in Gen. 3:15) are the blessings pronounced on Noah after the
flood. There is this evidence of these blessings being conveyed through
the channel of the covenant of grace, and by the redemption through
Jesus Christ, that they were obtained by sacrifice; or were
bestowed as the effect of God’s favor to mankind, which was in
consequence of smelling a sweet savor in the sacrifice which Noah
offered. And it is very evident by the epistle to the Hebrews, that the
ancient sacrifices never obtained the favor of God, but only by virtue
of the relation they had to the sacrifice of Christ. — Now that
Noah and his family had been so wonderfully saved from the wrath
of God, which had destroyed the rest of the world, and the world was as
it were restored from a ruined state, there was a proper occasion to
point to the great salvation to come by Christ: as it was a
common thing for God, on occasion of some great temporal
salvation of his people, or restoration from a low and miserable state,
to renew the intimations of the great spiritual restoration of
the world by Christ’s redemption. God deals with the generality
of mankind, in their present state, far differently, on occasion of the
redemption by Jesus Christ, from what he otherwise would do; for, being
capable subjects of saving mercy, they have a day of patience and grace,
and innumerable temporal blessings bestowed on them; which, as the
apostle signifies (Acts 14:17) are testimonies of God’s reconcilableness
to sinful men, to put them upon seeking after God.
But
beside the sense in which the posterity of Noah in general
partake of these blessings of dominion over the creatures, etc.
Noah himself, and all such of his posterity as have obtained like
precious faith with that exercised by him in offering his
sacrifice, which made it a sweet savor, and by which it
procured these blessings, have dominion over the creatures,
through Christ, in a more excellent sense than Adam in innocence; as
they are made kings and priests unto God, and reign with Christ,
and all things are theirs, by a covenant of grace. They
partake with Christ in that dominion over the beasts of the earth,
the fowls of the air, and fishes of the sea, spoken of in the 8th
Psalm; which is by the apostle interpreted of Christ’s dominion
over the world (1 Cor. 15:27 and Heb. 2:7). And the time is coming, when
the greater part of the posterity of Noah, and each of his sons, shall
partake of this more honorable and excellent dominion over the
creatures, through him in whom all the families of the earth shall be
blessed. Neither is there any need of supposing that these blessings
have their most complete accomplishment, till many ages after they were
granted, any more than the blessing on Japhet, expressed in those words,
God shall enlarge Japhet, and he shall dwell in the tents of Shem.
But
that Noah’s posterity have such blessings given them through the
great Redeemer, who suspends and removes the curse which
came through Adam’s sin, surely is no argument, that they originally, as
in their natural state, are not under the curse. That men have
blessings through grace, is no evidence of their being not justly
exposed to the curse by nature; but it rather argues the
contrary. For if they did not deserve the curse, they would not
depend on grace and redemption for the removal of it, and for
bringing them into a state of favor with God.
Another objection, which our author strenuously urges against the
doctrine of original sin, is, that it disparages the divine
goodness in giving us our being; which we ought to receive
with thankfulness, as a great gift of God’s beneficence, and look
upon as the first, original, and fundamental fruit of the divine
liberality (Page 256, 357, 260. 71-74. S).
To
this I answer, in the following observations:
1.
This argument is built on the supposed truth of a thing in
dispute; and so is a begging of the question. It is built on
this supposition, that we are not properly looked upon as one
with our first father, in the state wherein God at first created
him, and in his fall from that state. If we are so, it becomes
the whole race to acknowledge God’s great goodness to them, in
the state wherein mankind was made at first; in the happy
state they were then in, and the fair opportunity they then had of
obtaining confirmed and eternal happiness; and to acknowledge it
as an aggravation of their apostasy; and to humble themselves, that they
were so ungrateful as to rebel against their good Creator. Certainly, we
may all do this with as much reason, as the people of Israel in
Daniel’s and Nehemiah’s times who did with thankfulness acknowledge
God’s great goodness to their fathers, many ages before; and in
their confessions they bewailed, and took shame to themselves, for the
sins committed by their fathers, notwithstanding such great
goodness. (See the 9th chapter of Daniel, and the 9th of Nehemiah.)
2.
If Dr. T. would imply in his objection, that it doth not consist with
the goodness of God, to give mankind being in a state of
misery, what ever was done before by Adam, whether he sinned or did
not sin. I reply, if it be justly so ordered, that there should be a
posterity of Adam, which must be looked upon as one with him;
then it is no more contrary to God’s attribute of goodness to give being
to his posterity in a state of punishment, than to continue the
being of the same wicked and guilty person, who has made himself
guilty, in a state of punishment. The giv |