The Moral Theology of William Ames
A look at the structure and thought
behind William Ames' theology. (I could not find the actual place where
this articles was taken. If I do I will post that information as well.)
The
Moral Theology of William Ames:
From Thomas to Westminster
by J. van Vliet, Ph.D.
A.
Introduction
This morning I want to explore
the casuistry or practical theology of William Ames (1576-1633) and
trace its evolution from the earliest Puritan casuistry to the system of
moral theology of the Reformed tradition. Along the way I provide some
reasons for the development of Puritan casuistry, observe Ames’ use of
French Huguenot Peter Ramus (1515-72), note Ames’ improvement over his
predecessors, point out his focus on the will as the center of the act
of faith and obedience, and finally conduct a close comparison of the
case divinity of William Perkins (1558-1602) and William Ames. I show
how it is that Ames’ casuistry represents the informed piety of the
Reformed tradition.
B.
Reasons for Puritan Casuistry
Through the course of evolving
Reformed system and tradition, as the Reformation matured into what
became the post-Reformation period, it became very apparent that there
did not exist a moral compass for the conduct of the daily life of the
faithful. Living to God was often easier said then done. What was to be
the guide for an obedient, Christian faith-walk? How could Calvin’s
exhortation to godliness be followed without direction? No doubt the
concern at the newly-formed Academy at Franeker was how the
recently-acquired Professor Amesius would teach his uniquely-defined
theology without a pedagogical plan for the teaching of piety. Thus the
venerated Englishman wrote his own treatise, to “excite to this kind
of study.”[i][1]
The need for casuistry in
England was most apparent with the abolition of the medieval church’s
confessional system at the Reformation.[ii][2]
Although teaching on casuistry existed in the Roman Catholic Church
since the Middle Ages,[iii][3]
the Protestant church was at its early stage of development in this
area. Much of what did exist had to do more with one’s relationship to
God, chiefly insecurity regarding grace and assurance. Recall that for
William Perkins, so significant was the question of the greatest case of
conscience there ever was – how a man may know whether he be the child
of God or no – that he wrote an entire volume on just this case.[iv][4]
Although ministers in post-Reformation England dispensed sound advice
verbally, and casuistry was considered an essential task of a minister
of the gospel, a written literature had not developed and was in great
demand.[v][5]
To fill this lacuna, William
Perkins, the father of Puritanism, penned the first Protestant casuistic
exercise and, with this work, Puritan casuistry was born, an effort
that, under the more Reformed reconstruction by architect William Ames
became the first manual for the practice of informed Reformed pietism.[vi][6]
And although Ames, somewhat more judiciously than his teacher Perkins,
made liberal use of thinkers and theologians of the church of Rome, it
remained his preference that “the children of Israel should not need
to goe downe to the Philistims (that is, our Students to Popish Authors)
to sharpen every man his share, his Mattocke, or his Axe, or his weeding
Hooke, as it fell out in the Extreame necessity of Gods people.”[vii][7]
After lecturing on casuistry since 1622, Ames crowned his teaching in
1630 with the publication of Cases of Conscience, a seminal work
on moral theology that filled an “unwarranted gap in the contemporary
study of theology.”[viii][8]
Some cultural reasons as well
encouraged Ames to focus on casuistry: for example – the dead
orthodoxy he found prevalent in the Netherlands (in the academy, the
church, and the culture generally). He was also greatly concerned with
what he perceived to be the moral slide as evidenced by Sabbath-breaking
and by tendencies towards gambling. He had, as sympathizers, Dutch
Pietists and church leaders Willem Teelinck (1579-1629) and Gisbertus
Voet (1589-1676), the two foremost figures in the post-Reformation
Netherlands both vastly interested in societal and church reform. They
also desired further reformation in the direction of a more pious system
of faith and life, a healthy Christian balance in which orthodoxy would
intersect with orthopraxy. For ultimately, when all is said and done,
“Such as the life is, such is the end.”[ix][9]
C.
The Influence of Peter Ramus: Style and Substance
1)
Ramism
While at Cambridge before his
self-imposed exile to the Netherlands, Ames was exposed to and
influenced by a new philosophy developed by Peter Ramus (1515-72), a
sixteenth century Reformed French philosopher.[x][10]
Ramus developed a new approach to knowledge to displace what he
considered to be the artificial system of Aristotle and the speculation
of the schoolmen.[xi][11]
Ramus scorned Aristotle’s rejection of the distinction between
theoretical and practical disciplines in theological science. In
agreement, Ames held that “science was to turn toward reality, was
always to be directed toward experience, and was to keep practical use
in view.”[xii][12]
Ramus’ new system of
philosophy was triple-focussed: his concerns were those of pedagogy,
accessibility and practicality. First, in developing his system for
study of the arts, Ramus developed a new framework for logic, grammar,
rhetoric and religion along lines more akin to natural reasoning yet
along the deductive method of Aristotle, whereby the movement in logic
is from general to specific, a passing from universals to particulars.[xiii][13]
The program he taught was primarily a method of organization discernible
by dichotomy and it was used, especially by Ames, not as a substitute
for but as a modification of scholastic system.[xiv][14]
Second, Ramus was also a French Protestant, concerned with making the
faith accessible to the common man and woman. This concern led to an
interest in making theology precise, methodical and teachable, one
cleansed from the scholastic influence. Third, it was not only the
Aristotelian philosophy and method against which Ramus reacted. Close to
Ramus’ heart was a concern for ethics. Biblical ethics knew nothing of
the ethics of Aristotle, said Ramus.[xv][15]
Such a practical system, with its emphasis on method to make theology
more usable and understandable, found a devoted disciple in William
Ames.[xvi][16]
For Ames, faith and works are seamlessly unified, indistinguishable in
the life of the believer. In Technometry he demonstrates his
disdain for those who treat theology and ethics separately.[xvii][17]
This
three-pronged interrelated emphasis of form and substance in the Ramist
system had a tremendous impact on Ames’ thought and work. It provided
the philosophical and pedagogical legitimization for Ames’ definition
of theology by joining ethics with theology and, through the use of the
(scholastic) hypothetical syllogism, it forced the Christian pilgrim to
make a decision based on comparing God’s law with his or her faith and
morals.
2) Calvin, Ramus,
Perkins and Ames on Theology
Peter Ramus held that
“theology is the doctrine of living well.”[xviii][18]
Perkins, coming after Ramus maintained that theology is “the science
of living blessedly forever.”[xix][19]
But for Ames, coming a generation later, it had to be even more precise:
theology is the “doctrine of living to God.”[xx][20]
What are we to make of this progression?[xxi][21]
Perkins found the source and
fountain of living blessedly forever in the knowledge of God. True
knowledge of God was secured by way of cognitive dialectic that involved
knowledge of self. Perkins then goes on to elaborate on just who and
what God is and his work. Perkins could have been transcribing straight
from John Calvin’s Institutes when he penned this first chapter
of Chaine. For Calvin, the knowledge of God the Creator was
obtained in a similar way: “Without knowledge of self there is no
knowledge of God” and “Without knowledge of God, there is no
knowledge of self.”[xxii][22]
And although Calvin does not explicitly offer a definition of theology
in the precise format of Ramus, Perkins, and Ames, he does ask: To what
purpose does the knowledge of God tend? He answers that “our knowledge
should serve first to teach us fear and reverence; secondly, with it as
our guide and teacher, we should learn to seek every good from him, and,
having received it, to credit it to his account.”[xxiii][23]
Or, as he put it elsewhere, only there is God known where there is
religion or piety.[xxiv][24]
Does Perkins make this
Calvinian connecting link between knowledge of God and “willing
reverence and worship?” Although it is not explicit, we did note his
assertions that “theology is the science of living blessedly
forever” and “the body of scripture is a doctrine sufficient to live
well.”[xxv][25]
It is thus fair to say that Perkins derives his understanding of
theology and its nature from Calvin – knowledge of God and knowledge
of self with a view to living blessedly forever.[xxvi][26]
Ian Breward was correct when he said that “[Perkins’] definition of
theology was a combination of Peter Ramus and John Calvin, and the
arrangement of the whole work, prefaced as it was by a formidable
looking diagram, owed a good deal to Ramist categories of arrangement
and Aristotelian logic.”[xxvii][27]
William Ames diverges
considerably from this Calvinian/Perkinsian emphasis in his stress on doing.
Knowledge, intellectual apprehension, qualified as this might be with
statements of “living blessedly” was not sufficient for Ames. He was
seeking something much more activistic; after all, “theology is the
doctrine of living to God.” It is called doctrine because it is
divinely revealed. But more than that, humanity, made in the image of
God, must emulate him and “since the highest kind of life for a human
being is that which approaches most closely the living and life-giving
God, the nature of theological life is living to God.”[xxviii][28]
This is accomplished by living in accord with God’s will and to his
glory.[xxix][29]
And then, as if consciously wishing to refine Perkins’ definition,
Ames asserts that “although it is within the compass of life to live
both happily and well, living well is more excellent than living
happily.”[xxx][30]
Here Ames re-emphasizes Ramus’ definition of theology – living well.
Lest Perkins’ definition of theology might lead one to believe that
living blessedly could be self-serving, Ames makes the following
clarification: “What chiefly and finally ought to be striven for is
not happiness which has to do with our own pleasure, but goodness which
looks to God’s glory. For this reason, theology is better defined as
that good life whereby we live to God than as that happy life whereby we
live to ourselves.”[xxxi][31]
In this fashion Ames provides
a corrective to Perkins’ more open-ended definition, and a solution to
what Peter Ramus considered to be a chief problem in theology: the
relation between living blessedly and living rightly.[xxxii][32]
Ramus concluded that the latter was to be preferred over the former,
that “the righteous life was to be set over the blessed life; a life
rightly lived is a life of response to God, the source of all
righteousness.”[xxxiii][33]
John Eusden is to the point as well when he asserts that “for Ames the
end of theology was never to produce blessedness, which he felt related
chiefly to man’s ultimate aspiration and desire. In a search for his
own blessedness, man could miss God, the very object of his living
rightly.”[xxxiv][34]
To complement this unique (activistic)
understanding of theology, it is not surprising that William Ames
teaches the priority of the volitional faculty, the will. If theology is
the doctrine of living to God, what is the subject of theology? Perkins
and Calvin before him would have to say the intellect. For knowledge
begins there and, as Perkins said, the intellect is to the soul “as
the wagginer to the waggin.” But this is precisely where Ames differs
radically from his professor:
Furthermore,
since this life is the spiritual work of the whole man, in which he is
brought to enjoy God and to act according to his will, and since it
certainly has to do with man’s will, it follows that the first and
proper subject of theology is the will. Prov. 4:23, From the heart
come the acts of life; and 23:26, Give me your heart.[xxxv][35]
The proper subject of faith is the will as well.[xxxvi][36]
As if attempting to refine both Calvin and Perkins (and others who place
faith in the understanding and the will, Ames closes this chapter
with a lengthy and cogent justification for his placement of faith
exclusively in the will on the grounds that faith is a single virtue and
therefore indivisible.[xxxvii][37]
Thus, although their
respective theological systems both made use of Ramist methodological
and logical categories, Perkins was less a disciple of the French
philosopher than was Ames whose commitment to Ramism, as we’ve shown,
dominated his entire system. Their theological emphases were clearly
distinctive. William Perkins was heavily indebted to John Calvin and to
the legacy of Thomas before him; William Ames cleared a new theological
path because of his commitment to the view that theology could only be
understood first and foremost as a practical doctrine – the doctrine
of living to God. Here Peter Ramus can be said to have had a stronger
influence on Ames than did Calvin.
There is an identifiable
advance here.[xxxviii][38]
We move from Thomas Aquinas, through John Calvin and Peter Ramus, to the
Puritans William Perkins and William Ames. Calvin’s approach is very
scholastic; even his categories and organization, to a greater or lesser
degree, borrow from Thomas, but he decidedly separates himself from the
medieval Doctor where it matters most: by firmly anchoring his theology
in revelation, not reason. Nowhere do revelation and reason appear on
equal terms in Calvin, although he accords reason and the intellect
pride of place in the subjective appropriation of objective revelation,
and this through general and special revelation. By contrast, for Ames
God is the object, not of scholastic knowledge, but of an active faith.
It is not until Chapter 34 of Book 1 of Marrow that Ames
introduces his views of the doctrine of scripture; Calvin begins this
study as early as Chapter 6 of Institutes.
Now we come to Ramus who seeks
to toss out both Aristotelian philosophy and method with his own
replacements. As Perkins and Ames appear on the horizon, the former
recasts Calvin and Beza in Ramist categories while the latter’s
commitment to Ramist logic, method and philosophy has resulted in
significant modifications to some Calvinian priorities. We have seen
that the chief of these had to do with the subject and object of
theology – for Ames the faculty of the will, and God, respectively.
Calvin was more Thomistic in his presentation in his emphasis on
intellect in the knowledge of God, while Perkins began moving in a
direction finessed by Ames. Perkins, finally, owed much more to Calvin
than did Ames, who blazed his own theological trail through the Thomist,
Calvinian, Ramist and Perkinsian paths before him.
D.
The Casuistry of William Ames: Taking William Perkins out of the
Medieval Tradition
1)
The Essence of Early Puritan Casuistry: Ames’ Theory of Conscience
For Perkins, conscience is of divine quality, placed by God
between himself and humanity, combining two parties in the knowledge of
a secret. Deriving the meaning from the etymology of the word, Perkins
reasons that this combination (scire, to know, and conscire,
to know together “some one secret thing”) can only be between man
and God.[xxxix][39]
Further, it belongs to the duties of this conscience to give testimony
and to give judgment. Conscience is the arbitrator, working on behalf of
the Creator to pronounce either for or against the creature in passing
sentence on all of man’s thoughts, words and deeds. The proper subject
of conscience so defined, Perkins repeats, are “reasonable
creatures” – men and angels.[xl][40]
William Ames’ casuistry,
although penned to address the same concern as that of Perkins, is a
much more integral part of Ames’ works. It flows directly from his
definition of theology and his practical concern for godly living.[xli][41]
In Book 1 of his 5-book
collection on casuistry, Ames discusses the nature of conscience. He
defines it as follows, somewhat more carefully than did Perkins: “The
conscience of man (for I doe not intend to treat of the conscience of
angels) is a mans judgement of himself, according to the judgement of
God of him.”[xlii][42]
With Perkins he explains that conscience results from exercising the
intellect, not the will, because it utilizes judgment which belongs to
the faculty of reason. But this intellectual exercise is more than just
bare assent to facts or “apprehension of the truth;” rather, this
judgment presupposes an already “firm and settled” truth.
Consequently, it is not a “contemplative judgement, whereby
truth is simply discerned from falsehood: but a practicall judgement,
by which, that which a man knoweth is particularly applyed to that which
is either good or evill to him, to the end that it may be a rule within
him to direct his will.”[xliii][43]
Both Puritans hold that
“conscience gives judgement in or by a kind of reasoning or disputing,
called a practicall syllogisme. Rom. 2.15. Their reasoning accusing or
excusing each other.”[xliv][44]
This adjudication works in the court of one’s conscience by way of
syllogism. This three-statement construct is the field of operation of
the mind and the memory. It comprises the proposition, the assumption
and the conclusion and by deduction makes a judgment. Ames illustrates:
the first statement – the proposition – is the law,
the objective biblical teaching with respect to a particular subject,
propositional truth, as it were, e.g., “He that lives in sinne, shall
dye.” The second statement – the assumption – Ames calls an
index or a book, i.e., an observation on the state of
things relative to the proposition, e.g., “I live in sinne.” And
finally, the third statement – the conclusion – is designated
the judge, e.g., “Therefore, I shall dye.”[xlv][45]
Ames concludes:
In
that Syllogisme alone is contained the whole nature of Conscience. The
Proposition treateth of the Law; the Assumption of the fact or state,
and the Conclusion of the relation arising from the fact or state, in
regard of that Law; The Conclusion either pronounceth one guilty, or
giveth spirituall peace and security.[xlvi][46]
Ames observes that it
is the “synteresis” which provides the proposition; this synteresis
is none other than biblical law.[xlvii][47]
I want to point out one final
but central Amesian emphasis before moving on to a comparison of Ames’
case divinity with that of William Perkins. This is his deliberate
attribution of conscience as “act.” Perkins held that conscience was
“faculty” – an inherent power or capability that can effect
change. Scotus and other Schoolmen opted for conscience as “habit”
– a characteristic predisposed to and enabling change (presumably from
disobedience to obedience). But neither faculty, nor habit are enough.
Only with conscience as act can Ames’ consistently argue that
Christian experimentalism (Christian activism) is pure active obedience
and involves more than an inherent aptitude to change behavior. Act
is change. With conscience as act, the judgment of the
intellect, stirs the habit (an enabling predisposition), and
motivates the faculty (an inherent capability) to change.
Hand-in-hand with the hypothetical or practical syllogism, conscience as
act must produce an effect in keeping with the judgment arising
from a comparison of behavior to its standard (the Ten Commandments).
Ames is in pursuit of pure act, not just a propensity to
act, because only pure act is a mark of obedience to the grace given in
the covenant relationship. Nothing less than act will do for William
Ames, and this understanding of conscience is key in the construction of
the theoretical foundations for the case divinity that follows. And it
is through use of the hypothetical syllogism that one is confronted with
the truth of the law, the truth of one’s behavior, and the truth of
the subsequent judgment, a judgment rendered when one’s behavior is
measured against the plumb line of the authority (or the proposition as
it is called in the practical syllogism).
a)
2) The Medieval Character of Perkins’ Case Divinity
In this section we examine the development and structure of the
case divinity of William Perkins and William Ames. This will help us
determine the degree to which they both utilize existing philosophical
thinking and advance case divinity in a biblical direction. We have
mentioned that both Perkins and Ames develop their case-divinity after
they have established their theoretical principles of conscience.
Perkins, whose case-divinity appears in a volume separate altogether
from his theoretical treatment in The Whole Treatise of the Cases of
Conscience, constructs his practical theology under three main
headings (three books), each subdivided into any number of Ramist
dichotomies.
Book 1 has as theme “man
simply considered in himselfe without relation to another” and is
essentially a treatise on human nature, spiritually conceived. It covers
such topics as confession, sin, salvation (a large part devoted to
preparationism), assurance and five “distresses of mind” and the
comfort afforded these.[xlviii][48]
All remedies begin with repentance and faith. “In case of
affliction,” he says, “we must not live by feeling but by faith.”[xlix][49]
If there is an undercurrent throughout, it would focus on the theme of
the assurance of faith and salvation. Now remember that, for Perkins,
this represented the greatest of all cases of conscience.[l][50]
Yet there are surprises for the reader as, for example, Perkins’
apparent approval of the scholastic distinction between mortal and
venial sins.[li][51]
In Book 2, Perkins examines
case-divinity “concerning Man as he stands in relation to God.” The
focus is fourfold: theology proper, scriptures, worship, and the
Sabbath. Of interest in this book is Perkins’ exhaustive coverage of
the arguments for the existence of God.[lii][52]
These proofs, he claims, are useful in apologetics and are preparatory
to faith.[liii][53]
The remainder of Book 2 is devoted to material having to do with
christology, the scriptures, religion and worship.[liv][54]
In Book 3 Perkins discusses
case-divinity “concerning Man as he stands in relation to Man.” This
book, both its organizing principles and its content will surprise the
reader. The book begins with an excursus of virtue, which he defines as
“a gift of the Spirit of God, and a part of regeneration, whereby a
man is made apt to live well.”[lv][55]
His case-divinity focuses on the virtues of prudence, clemency,
temperance, liberality and justice, under which heads Perkins addresses
moral dilemmas arising in the course of human relations against the
backdrop of the social issues of the day. Such issues as forgiveness,
self-defense, use of money, proper dress, recreation and reputation are
discussed and resolved. This ends Perkins’ case divinity.
3) The Biblical
Character of Ames’ Case Divinity
When compared against the
case-divinity of William Perkins, our study of William Ames’ massive
one volume, five-book work on conscience already mentioned uncovers some
significant differences.
We have discussed already the
topic of Book 1 – the theory of conscience and Ames’ reliance and
use of scholastic categories. The remainder of this first book follows
Perkins’ format and represents further elaboration of the conscience
and its workings.[lvi][56]
The book closes with a brief summary including four corollaries that
were publicly debated “to encourage and stirre up to the study of
Practicall Divinity.”[lvii][57]
It is not surprising that Ames’ pedagogical technique is almost
entirely Ramist.
The second book flows
naturally from the first. Having elucidated the nature of conscience,
Ames logically moves on to the definition of “cases” of conscience.
“A Case of Conscience is a practical question, concerning which, the
Conscience may make a doubt.”[lviii][58]
This section is devoted to sin, entry into the state of grace,
salvation, the ongoing flesh/spirit battle and conduct in the Christian
life.[lix][59]
This book could easily pass for a compendium of reformed theology and
compares most uniformly with Perkins’ Book 1. The Reformed ordo
salutis is one of its organizing principles.[lx][60]
The book is an exploration and inquiry into “those things that belong
to the state of man.”[lxi][61]
On the other hand, Book 3 –
“Of Man’s Duty in Generall” – is an inquiry into “the actions,
and conversation of [man’s] life.”[lxii][62]
This is meant to address the whole question of obedience to God, a
distinctively Amesian priority. Ames asserts that the signs of true
obedience are submissively placing God’s will ahead of the will of the
creature, even when that will does not appear to work towards one’s
advantage. How is this to be accomplished? By exercising those
characteristics that conduce to an obedient life, viz., the cardinal
virtues of prudence, courage, temperance and justice,[lxiii][63]
and by avoiding those tendencies that thwart an obedient walk (such as
drunkenness, sins of the heart, sins of the mouth, etc.).[lxiv][64]
Thus, whereas Perkins saw these virtues as organizing principles for
instruction in man’s social intercourse, Ames emphasized more their
nature as characteristic of the obedience that demonstrated
theology, the doctrine of living unto God.
At this point it is
instructive to notice the priority Ames gives the concept of virtue and
the honored place assigned the cardinal virtues as hallmarks of the life
of obedience. Perkins did this as well but to a greater extent since he
used them as his organizing structure. On the other hand and equally
obvious is the absence, from Ames, of any arguments for God’s
existence. That “Ames is wary of natural theology”[lxv][65]
is clearly borne out here.
These three books comprise
just over a third of Conscience. Having taken care of these
“preliminary matters,”[lxvi][66]
Ames can now concentrate on his real concern: How are cases of
conscience to be adjudicated? The simple answer is: By a proper
understanding and application of the moral law.
This is Ames’ organizing
framework – the decalogue. It is precisely because the law does not
explicitly cover all possible eventualities that teaching on cases of
conscience is needed. This demonstrates just how wide a net the
decalogue does cast. Thus, Books 4 and 5 concentrate on the elucidation
of the moral law, respectively, man’s duty toward God and man’s duty
toward neighbor.[lxvii][67]
The biblical Ten Commandments, not the medieval cardinal virtues,
constitute Ames’ synteresis. It is here, in its very organizing
structure, that we see in Ames’ casuistry, the very fountainhead of
Reformed moral theology and informed piety. Although William Perkins can
be properly designated as the first Puritan moral theologian, his
casuistry was dominated by medieval constructs and very much driven by
Thomistic categories, as we have seen.
In Books 4 and 5 Ames teaches
the extended meaning of the Ten Commandments and how these are to apply
to the daily walk of the pilgrim. The duty of man toward God (Book 4)
covers the entire spectrum of the obedient Christian walk. Commandments
one through four are addressed under the heading of “Religion” and
cover the theological virtues of faith, hope and love. Commandment two
is covered by chapters on “pride against God,” “Consulting with
the Devill,” and, alternatively, give positive instruction on prayer,
confession and singing. Under commandment three Ames teaches on the
biblical use of the oath, the lot, and the sacraments in the context of
worship to God. The book closes with a chapter on commandment four, the
Lord’s Day.[lxviii][68]
Throughout this book – Book
4 – Ames discusses general topics such as the church and very specific
topics such as the gesture of prayer and singing. In this fashion he
prepares the reader for Book 5 – interpersonal relations – by first
settling any uncertainty the believer may have about his relationship to
God. About one-quarter of the book is devoted to addressing cases of
conscience arising out of the theological virtues, faith, hope and love.[lxix][69]
This book, as would be expected, covers much the same ground as
Perkins’ Book 2 and borrows from this volume. But it is explicitly
cast within the framework of the Ten Commandments.
In Book 5, his elaboration of
the second tablet of the decalogue, it would appear that the concern
Ames has regarding “the duty of man towards his neighbour” is the
primary practical concern of the day which has given rise to cases of
conscience. This book stretches 57 chapters and is twice as long as his
elaboration on the first table of the law. Under commandment five are
covered such topics as justice, revenge, restitution, favoritism, love
for neighbor, intercessory prayer, schism, humility, pride, and the
mutual obligation between opposite classes of people for which the
commandment on honoring of parents is the springboard. Here the
hallmarks are respect for others and others’ reputation and obedience
of one class of citizen over against another. Then follows commandment
six, or, as he labels it, “Precept 6,” and the associated teaching
on meekness, patience, long-suffering, slowness to wrath, goodwill,
equanimity, manslaughter, duels, and war. The seventh commandment,
proscribing adultery, addresses the “solemnities of matrimony,” the
“mutual duties of man and wife” and divorce and polygamy. Basic
issues of fairness in economic enterprise are addressed by chapters on
“contracts,” profits, lending of money (“usury”), poverty,
wealth, saving and spending, and theft, all with respect to commandment
eight and the proscription against theft. Under commandment nine one
finds teaching not only on a “lye” but also on “public judgments,
the judge, accusers, witnesses, advocates and defenders.” Apparently
“revealing a secret” gave rise to a case of conscience. Finally,
Book 5 closes with Ames’ exposition on “contentment” which guards
against covetousness.[lxx][70]
This book compares with Book 3
of Perkins, but only marginally so, since the taxonomy framing and
conceptually organizing Perkins’ casuistry on interpersonal
relationships – the cardinal virtues – is entirely different from
that of Ames – the second table of the Law. As mentioned, herein lies
the major difference between the casuistry of the two Puritans: Perkins
has followed the system of Thomas very closely, Ames less so. Most
significantly, Ames has taken Perkins’ teachings out of the medieval
tradition, placed them into the organizational framework of the moral
law, and greatly embellished them with biblical content. Scripture, not
the medieval Thomas-inspired tradition of the Church of Rome, was to be
the Christian rule for practice, asserted Ames. The Ten Commandments,
not the cardinal virtues, were to be the organizing principles for the
parishioner needing direction for day to day life. Thus Ames
demonstrably improved over Perkins, whose casuistry was still very much
that of Thomas, and constitutes the origins of the informed pietism of
the Reformed tradition.[lxxi][71]
It is clear that Ames
judiciously and unapologetically used the Schoolmen as handmaidens,
certainly with more frequency and depth than did Perkins.[lxxii][72]
At the same time, the Aristotelian bifurcation of ethics and theology
Ames assailed ad infinitum; he meets this dualism head on with
Titus 2:12, that theology is all about righteous and honorable living.[lxxiii][73]
Indeed, the theme dominating Technometry was that “knowledge is
judged by its performance, not its theory.”[lxxiv][74]
Thus, although the philosophical categories and theories of the medieval
theologians and casuists were reviled, some of their practical teaching
found reception in Ames who acknowledged that “the Papists have
laboured much this way, to instruct their Confessors: and in a great
deale of earth and dirt of Superstitions, they have some veines of
Silver: out of which, I suppose, I have drawne some things that are not
to be despised.”[lxxv][75]
E:
Summary
I repeat, the most significant discovery to remember is the
advance that William Ames’ casuistry made over the earlier moral
theology of William Perkins. The rationale for, and the use of, the
cardinal virtues as the organizational framework of Perkins’ third
book of case-divinity clearly mark him as a man just emerging out of the
medieval tradition as he cut a new path for the theory and practice of
moral theology.[lxxvi][76]
Ames sweeps this new path with a Reformed brush, even changing direction
from time to time when it appeared Perkins was dawdling too long along
the medieval trail. Ames covers the cardinal virtues in his explication
of humanity’s obedience to God and thus subsumes them within the
framework of the decalogue.[lxxvii][77]
For Ames, only the form and substance of the biblical moral law
are to be used in the adjudication of cases of conscience. In this way
did Ames place a biblical gloss on early Puritan piety and moral
theology, a gloss that converted this piety from one structured around
medieval principles and categories to one whose framework represented a
paradigm shift from the medieval understanding to the Reformed view of
the organizing principles of the moral law. This was the provenance of
the informed piety of the Reformed tradition. This “torch of piety”
was passed on from William Ames to Richard Baxter while it reached its
most mature creedal expression in the exposition of the decalogue found
in the Westminster Larger and Shorter catechisms.[lxxviii][78]
Endnotes
[i][1]
Ames, Conscience with the Power and Cases Thereof: Devided into
V. Bookes (N. p., 1639), “To the Illustrious and Mightie
Lords, the Staes of Zeland,” Dedicatory Epistle.
[ii][2]
Keith Thomas, “Cases of Conscience in Seventeenth-Century England,”
Public Duty and Private Conscience in Seventeenth-Century England,
eds. John Morrill, Paul Slack and Daniel Woolf (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1993), 32. Excellent introductions to Puritan
casuistry appear in Keith L. Sprunger, The Learned Doctor William
Ames: Dutch Backgrounds of English and American Puritanism
[Chicago: University of Illinois, Press, 1972], 153-66; Thomas F.
Merrill, ed. and intro., William Perkins. 1558-1602. English
Puritanist. His Pioneer Works on Casuistry: “A Discourse of
Conscience” and “The Whole Treatise of Cases of Conscience.”
(Nieuwkoop: B. De Graaf, 1966), x-xx; and H. R. McAdoo, The
Structure of Caroline Moral Theology (London: Longman’s, Green
and Co., 1949).
[iii][3]
Hugo Visscher, Guilielmus Amesius: Zijn Leven en Werken (Haarlem:
J. M. Stap, 1894), trans. Tjaard Georg Hommes and Douglas Horton as William
Ames: His Life and Works; hereafter Horton, Ames by Visscher,
120. For a summary of the method and practice of medieval casuistry,
particularly that of the Jesuits, and a broader application of the
casuistry of early English Puritanism, see Jan van Vliet,
“Gambling on Faith: A Holistic Examination of Blaise Pascal’s Wager,”
Westminster Theological Journal 62 (2000): 33-63.
[iv][4]
William Perkins, The Workes of that Famous and Worthy Minister of
Christ in the Universitie of Cambridge, Mr. William Perkins, 3
vols. (London: John Legatt, 1612-1613), 1.421-1.438.
[v][5]
Thomas, “Conscience,” 36-37.
[vi][6]
In his study of the development of casuistry in England, Elliot Rose
opines that “Ames has some light to cast on the spirit of the
school . . . [but] since he spent most of his active career in
Holland he cannot be expected to apply himself directly to English
problems” (Rose, Cases of Conscience [Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1975], 185). This is just another of the many
random examples that could be trotted out to demonstrate the
mischaracterization of William Ames in historiography. It would
appear from a study of the level of morality in the England of the
day that Ames directed much of his casuistry, especially in Book 5
of Conscience, not only to the problems associated with the
arid orthodoxy of contemporary continental Reformed thought and the
somewhat unregulated styles of living that characterized the
egalitarian society of his adopted country, but also, if not
especially, to those more serious problems of immorality present in
his homeland. On the state of morality in seventeenth-century
England, see Douglas Campbell, The Puritan in Holland, England,
and America: An Introduction to American History, 2 vols. (New
York: Harper and Brothers. 1892), 2.350-2.375, 2.453-2.457. He
portrays Elizabethan England as a society adrift without a moral
compass, where the religious elite enjoyed lives of
self-aggrandizement. He notes that the English were “not so
laborious as the French and Hollanders, preferring to live an
indolent life, like the Spaniards” (ibid.). In more measured
tones, Lawrence Stone observes the difference between the freer
morality of English society and the circumspection found on the
continent and notes that as early as 1499, Erasmus, on a visit to
England, reported the propensity of the English to kiss strangers on
the lips, not only in greeting but for every other occasion
(Lawrence Stone, The Family, Sex and Marriage in England [New
York: Harper & Row, 1979], 325). See also his Road to
Divorce: England, 1530-1987 (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1990), Uncertain Unions: Marriage in England, 1660-1753
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), and Broken Lives:
Separation and Divorce in England, 1660-1857 (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1993).
[vii][7]
Ames, Conscience, “To the Reader.”
[viii][8]
Karl Reuter, Wilhelm Amesius: der führende Theologe des
erwchenden refomierten Pietismus (Neukirchen, Kreis Moers:
Buchhandlung des Erziehungsvereins, 1940), trans. Douglas Horton as William
Ames: The Leading Theologian in the Awakening of Reformed Pietism;
hereafter Horton, Ames by Reuter, 166.
[ix][9]
The Puritans, especially, had a great aversion to Aristotle. In his
chapter on “virtue” William Ames approvingly quotes Peter Ramus
who opined the following:
“I had
rather that philosophy were taught to children out of the gospel by
a learned theologian of proved character than out of Aristotle by a
philosopher. A child will learn many impieties from Aristotle which,
it is to be feared, he will unlearn too late. He will learn, for
example, that the beginning of blessedness arises out of man; that
the end of blessedness lies in man; that all virtues are within
man’s power and obtainable by man’s nature, art, and industry;
that God is never present in such works, either as helper or author,
however great and divine they are; that divine providence is removed
from the theater of human life; that not a word can be spoken about
divine justice; that man’s blessedness is based on this frail
life” (William Ames, The Marrow of Theology, trans. John D.
Eusden from the third Latin edition, 1629 (United Church Press,
1968; repr., Grand Rapids: Baker, 1997), 2.2.18; according to Eusden
in a note he makes on p. 227 of Marrow, Ames is quoting Peter
Ramus in Petri Rami Veromandui pro philosophica Parisiensis
academiae disciplina oratio, ad Carolum Lotharinguum Cardinalem
(Parisiis, 1551), or An Oration by the French Belgian Peter Ramus
on Behalf of the Philosophical Training at the University of Paris,
Delivered to Charles Cardinal Lorraine, 40.
Although
William Perkins held to this assessment also, and very consistently,
it will become apparent that Aristotle was invoked by William Ames
where it furthered his theological or casuistic cause, especially as
mediated through Thomas Aquinas. Indeed, scholasticism, as method,
still prevailed, and was perpetuated in the post-Reformation
development of Protestantism, if in somewhat more Christian form
(Richard A. Muller, Post Reformation Reformed Dogmatics: Volume
1, Prolegomena to Theology (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1987), 14-52.
The direction of, in particular, Ames’ work, can be said to have
been driven, in large part, by his reaction against a scholasticism
of the sort he perceived was making shipwreck of the pious and
practical faith of the Reformed in the Netherlands.
[x][10]
Sprunger, Ames, 107; Eusden, “Introduction” in Marrow,
37. Ramus died in the St. Bartholomew’s Day massacre in Paris on
August 23/24, 1572.
[xi][11]
Horton, Ames by Reuter, 232-34; Eusden, “Introduction” in
Marrow, 39; Sprunger, Ames, 106-7.
[xii][12]
Horton, Ames by Visscher, 71; Horton, Ames by Reuter,
232.
[xiii][13]
Sprunger, Ames, 107-9. We have already mentioned that in many
respects, the scholastic emphasis on logic and reason is utilized in
Ramist logic. See Sprunger, Ames, 110, and Eusden,
“Introduction” in Marrow, 15. As Ames put it: “By this
methode we proceade from the antecedent more absolutely knowen to
prove the consequent, which is not so manifestly knowen: & this
is the only methode which Aristotle did observe” (Peter Ramus, The
Logike of the Moste Excellent Philosopher P. Ramus Martyr, ed.
Catherine M. Dunn, trans. Roland MacIlmaine, Renaissance Editions,
no. 3 [Northridge, CA: San Fernando Valley State College, 1969],
54-55).
[xiv][14]
Eusden, “Introduction” in Marrow, 37. Eusden notes that
at Christ’s College, Cambridge, a succession of Ramist teachers
beginning with Laurence Chaderton (1536?-1640) included: Gabriel
Harvey (1545?-1630), Perkins (1558-1602), George Downham (d. 1634),
Ames, William Chappell (1582-1649) and John Milton (1608-1674).
Walter J. Ong points out the inroads the Huguenot’s system made in
the intellectual circles of the Palatinate and the Netherlands and
compares this favorably to Ames’ devotion to Ramism: “English
Ramists are outdistanced by the Germans and the Dutch. The one
Englishman under Ramist influence who stands out as a possible
competitor is William Ames . . . who lived for a long time in the
Netherlands” (Walter J. Ong, S.J., Ramus, Method, and the Decay
of Dialogue [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958], 304),
cited by Eusden, “Introduction” in Marrow, 37. For an
early study on the theology of Ramus, see Paul Lobstein, Petrus
Ramus als Theologe (Strassburg: G. F. Schmidts Universitäts-Buchhandlung,
1878).
[xv][15]
Frank P. Graves, Peter Ramus and the Educational Reformation of
the Sixteenth Century (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1912,
text-fiche), 173; citing Ramus’ Oratio de Professione
liberalium artium (Paris, 1563), 104; Before his short life was
so violently brought to an end, he had written a treatise on ethics
which was one revision away from publication. Yet enough of Ramus’
thoughts on ethics survive in extant publications to provide a
reasonably complete reproduction of his system. At the basis of his
ethical system lies an entirely different conception of God which
accounts for the vehemence with which Ramus attacks Aristotle. But
as Frank P. Graves points out, Ramus was not above exclusive appeal
to reason for he “treats ethics from the standpoint of the four
cardinal virtues and almost in the terms of Plato and Cicero”
(ibid., 176-77).
[xvi][16]
He defends this system in his introduction to the Marrow by
asserting: “There will be some who condemn the precision of method
and logical form as curious and troublesome. But we wish them
sounder reason, for they separate the art of learning, judging, and
memorizing from those things which most deserved to be learned,
known, and memorized” (Ames, Marrow “A Brief Forewarning
of the Author concerning His Purpose”). Aristotelian metaphysics
and ethics were common fare in the Dutch academies and especially at
Franeker. Despite synodical admonition at Dort with especial regard
to Ames’ colleague Johannes Maccovius at Franeker, the Dutch
Aristotelians’ attack on the Ramism introduced by Ames continued
unabated (Sprunger, Ames, 111) Yet in the face of this
considerable opposition, Franeker officially adopted Ramist
philosophy and logic and became the center for Ramism in the
Netherlands (ibid., 88, 111; Horton, Ames by Visscher,
59-60). Graves observes that Ramus’ destruction of Aristotle is
based, in part, on his failure to understand the great Greek
philosopher; “as an ardent Christian he evidently holds it
incumbent upon him to combat the paganism of that philosopher.”
Yet Graves also remarks about Ramus: “at times he shows that the
ancient philosopher had anticipated the true Christian doctrine and
accepts his positions, even at the expense of certain usages of the
Church” (ibid., 174, 176).
[xvii][17]
William Ames, Technometry, trans. and ed. Lee W. Gibbs, Haney
Foundation Series of the University of Pennsylvania, vol. 24
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1979), theses 63,
88-94, 118; citations from Ames’ Technometry are by thesis
number. (First published as Technometria, Omnium & singularum
Artium fines adæquatè circumscribens [London: Milo Flesher,
1633] and itself part of a six-piece work published posthumously
(1643) as one volume, Philosophemata). He maintains: if it is
true that “the commonly accepted division of art into theoretical
and practical is defective in many ways and therefore must be
rejected,” (ibid., thesis 62), how much the more must be
anathematized those who would teach a discipline or “art of
ethics” separate and distinct from the doctrines of theology?
Repudiation of this essentially Aristotelian distinction between
practical and theoretical philosophy appears at length in this work
and Ames’ attack against the ethicists or moral philosophers,
those practitioners of natural ethics, is unrelenting. God’s
revealed will in scripture teaches thorough integration of theology
and ethics; attempts to drive a wedge between the two are nothing
less than metaphysical speculation and sophistry. Ames concludes:
“Hence, being thoughtless or ungrateful and yet not impious by
law, do they listen who – educated in the bosom of the Church,
have thoroughly learned both about the obscurity of these principles
. . . and about the new revelation in the Scriptures – yet flee
from these Scriptures to search after the principles of what they
call “practical philosophy” and of law and seduce others with
themselves” (ibid., thesis 63).
[xviii][18]
Ramus, Commentariorum de Religione, cited in Sprunger, Ames,
132.
[xix][19]
Perkins, Workes, 1.11.
[xx][20]
Ames, Marrow, 1.1.1.
[xxi][21]
In quoting Peter Ramus, William Ames and Henry More in sequence in
their respective definitions of theology, Samuel T. Logan, Jr.,
cogently demonstrates that the philosophical commitment to Ramism
was a contributing factor to the vast theological change at
Christ’s College, Cambridge, in the late sixteenth and early
seventeenth centuries (“Theological Decline in Christian
Institutions and the Value of Van Til’s Epistemology,” Westminster
Theological Journal 57 (1995) 145-63). Logan’s observations
regarding the reasons for the intellectual shift in direction at the
University of Cambridge are acute. For Cambridge Platonists,
especially John Smith (1616-1652) and Benjamin Whichcote
(1609-1683), theology was “more a Divine life than a Divine
science” (Alan Gabbey, “Cambridge Platonists,” in The
Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy ed., Robert Audi [New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1995], 99-101). This echoes strongly the
emphasis on the practical, originated by Peter Ramus a century
earlier and perpetuated by William Perkins and especially William
Ames at Christ’s College, Cambridge. The influential neo-platonist
in this College was More (1614-1687) who taught that “ethicks are
defined to be the art of living well and happily” (Logan,
“Decline,” 157). The transition from Ramus through Ames to More
is unmistakable, as Logan asserts.
[xxii][22]
John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, ed. John
T. MacNeill, trans. Ford Lewis Battles, 2 vols. Library of Christian
Classics, no. 20-21 (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960),
1.1.1-1.1.3.
[xxiv][24]
Ibid., 1.2.1; “Here indeed is pure and real religion: faith so
joined with an earnest fear of God that this fear also embraces
willing reverence, and carries with it such legitimate worship as is
prescribed in the law” (ibid., 1.2.2).
[xxv][25]
Perkins, Workes, 1.11.
[xxvi][26]
The editors of Calvin’s Institutes very astutely observe
that “the word “knowledge” in the title, chosen rather than
“being” or “existence” of God, emphasizes the centrality of
revelation in both the structure and the content of Calvin’s
theology. Similarly, the term “Creator,” subsuming the doctrines
of Trinity, Creation, and Providence, stresses God’s revealing
work or acts rather than God in himself. The latter is more
prominent in Scholastic doctrines of God, both medieval and later
“Calvinist”” (Calvin, Institutes, 1.1.1, n. 1). A
glance at Thomas’ (rational) arguments for existence prove the
point.
[xxvii][27]
Ian Breward, ed., The Work of William Perkins. The Courtenay
Library of Reformation Classics, no. 3 (Appleford, Abingdon,
Berkshire, England: Sutton Courtenay Press, 1970), 85-86.
Did Thomas
Aquinas, the medieval Doctor, have any thoughts on the nature of
theology? He opens his discussion by asserting the necessity of
theology (“sacred science”) for “man’s salvation,” as
well as the philosophical sciences. This is necessary, he
maintains, because the philosophical sciences are based on reason;
for the salvation of humanity, however, revelation is needed as
well:
“The whole
salvation of man, which lies in God, depends on the knowledge of
this truth [God]. . . . There is no reason, then, why the same
things, which the philosophical sciences teach as they can be known
by the light of natural reason, should not also be taught by another
science as they are known through divine revelation” (Thomas
Aquinas, Nature and Grace, ed. and trans. A. M. Fairweather.
Library of Christian Classics, vol. 11 (Philadelphia: Westminster
Press, 1954) 1.1.1. My convention in citing from this work of
Aquinas is to cite book, chapter and section. And this sacred
science is “nobler” than the other sciences “in every way,”
transcending them because, as a speculative science, it deals with
things more certain and above reason. For it is “concerned with
divine things more fundamentally than with the actions of men”
although it has an interest in these actions insofar as they bring
men to the perfect knowledge of God (ibid., 1.1.4). From this
practical perspective, sacred doctrine is wisdom, says Thomas
(ibid., 1.1.6), and wisdom’s end is eternal happiness (ibid.,
1.1.5).
[xxxi][31]
Ames, Marrow, 1.1.8.
[xxxii][32]
Horton, Ames by Reuter, 175-76.
[xxxiii][33]
Ramus, Commentariorum, 6; cited in Horton, Ames by Reuter,
175.
[xxxiv][34]
Eusden, “Introduction” in Marrow, 47.
[xxxv][35]
Ames, Marrow, 1.1.9-1.1.11. Ames continues: “Now since this
life so willed is truly and properly our most important practice, it
is self-evident that theology is not a speculative discipline but a
practical one – not only in the common respect that all
disciplines have eupraxia, good practice, as their end, but
in a special and peculiar manner compared with all others. Nor is
there anything in theology which does not refer to the final end or
to the means related to that end – all of which refer directly to
practice.” To Ames, living blessedly would never have been a
science as it was for Perkins. It was a doctrine. It was a
covenantal responsibility. It was something centered in the will; it
engaged the volitional faculty of men and women more than the
intellectual. Having established this theological principle, how
does Ames further develop his dogmatics – a treatise which, as we
judged earlier, can be considered the first full-fledged systematic
theology of post-reformation Elizabethan England of which Perkins’
work was the harbinger? So non-negotiable was this particular view
of theology that Ames’ entire theological enterprise, Ramist of
course, was undergirded by the responsibility of the creature in
living to God: faith and observance. These comprise the division or
parts of theology – not emphasizing knowledge of God and of self
but rather observance (the doctrine of living to God), and faith
(rooted in the sound theological principles of the Reformation).
Ames’ entire theology unfolds along this dichotomy.
[xxxviii][38]
This is not entirely surprising given the philosophical/theological
commitments and presuppositions of the early
“philosophical-theologians” compared to those of the later
“theological philosophers.”
[xxxix][39]
“God knows perfectly all things of man though they never be so hid
and concealed: and man by a gift given him of God; knowes togither
with God, the same things of himselfe: and this gift is called
Conscience” (Perkins, Workes, 1.518).
[xli][41]
His casuistry is part of a unified system of doctrine and life,
explained in Marrow. In his introduction to Marrow,
Ames promises that “if there are some who desire to have practical
matters better explained, especially those of the latter part of
this Marrow, we shall attempt, God willing, to satisfy them
in a special treatise, which I mean to write, dealing with questions
usually called ‘cases of conscience’” (Ames, Marrow,
“Brief Forewarning”). Recall that by “latter part of this Marrow”
Ames was referring to Book 2 of this work which addresses the
“observance” category of theology, the doctrine of living to
God. The first half of this Ramist presentation of theology was
faith.
[xlii][42]
Ames, Conscience, 1.1.Preamble.
[xliv][44]
Perkins, Workes, 1.535.
[xlv][45]
Ames, Conscience, 1.1.8-1.1.10.
[xlvi][46]
Ibid., 1.1.11; Ibid. It is important to note that this method of
syllogism applied to the practical reason is purely Aristotelian. In
his discussion on the Nature of Law in Question 90 of Summa
Theologiae, Thomas asks whether law is a function of mind
(reason) or will? He answers:
“Law is a
kind of direction or measure for human activity through which a
person is led to do something or held back. . . . Now direction and
measure come to human acts from reason, from which, . . . they
start. It is the function of reason to plan for an end, and this
purpose, as Aristotle notes [Physics II, 9. 200a22. Ethics
VII, 8. 1151a16. St. Thomas, lect. 8], is the original source
of what we do. . . . We are left with the conclusion, then, that law
is something that belongs to reason.
Hence: . . .
As with outward acts a distinction can be drawn between the doing
and the deed, . . . , so also with the activities of reason the
actual thinking, namely understanding and reasoning, and what is
thought out, namely first a definition, next a proposition, and
finally a syllogism or argument, can be considered apart. And
because the practical reason makes use of a sort of syllogism in
settling on a course of action . . . in accordance with the teaching
of Aristotle [Ethics VII, 3. 1147a24], a proposition can be
discerned which is to practice what a premise is to the conclusions
the theoretic reason draws” (Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae,
vol. 28, Law and Political Theory, ed. Thomas Gilby O.P.
Blackfriars Latin text and English translation with Introduction,
Notes, Appendices and Glossaries. 60 vols. [New York: McGraw-Hill,
1963-76], 5-7).
Aquinas
upholds that such a proposition in the practical reason has the
character of law and “sometimes they are actually adverted to,
sometimes they are convictions held merely as habits of mind”
(ibid., 9).
[xlvii][47]
Ames draws a direct connection between the law of nature in
primitive humanity and the moral law. By adding the notion of
conscience into this mix, he has painted a full portrait of the
responsibilities of the creature to maintain covenant faithfulness
through obedience to all the principles that extend from the moral
law. This is where case divinity comes in. (Calvin had an inchoate
sense of this in Institutes, 2.8.1.)
Synteresis has
reference to the conscience as being the internal repository of the
laws of right and wrong. Ames refers to synteresis as the
“storehouse of principles” (Ames, Conscience, 1.2.1).
Thus it is this storehouse of principles out of which the law of God
– the biblical law – is drawn. It is a “habit of the
understanding” because it houses those principles governing moral
actions that God has implanted in the domicile of humanity’s mind
and which continue to reside there, even in the fallen state.
Broadly understood, synteresis encompasses not only “generall
conclusions touching right or Law, which are deduced by good
consequence out of naturall principles, but likewise all practicall
truths, whereunto wee give a firme assent, through the revelation we
have by faith” (ibid., 1.2.6). Thus it is, that synteresis can be
ramistically dichotomized into “natural” and “enlightened”
conscience (ibid., 1.2.7). The former embraces the principles of
nature as law; the latter recognizes the legally binding character
of scriptural principles, and it is the revealed will of God
“whereby a mans duty is both showne and commanded” which
contains both of these categories. To re-emphasize, the revealed
will of God, or the law of God, incorporates both the moral
principles within humanity and the additional laws that God “hath
injoyned.” Thus Ames can uphold that the conscience can be bound
only by the revealed will of God, the law of God, all those things
commanded in the Gospel. And it is the Law of God that binds men and
women to submit to the laws of the creature, not the latter in and
of themselves. To be bound in conscience by the laws of men (or
children by parents or a promise by an oath) is idolatry, since only
God knows the inward workings of the conscience (ibid.,
1.2.9-1.2.15). This Amesian view of the conscience follows very
closely Thomas’ understanding of synteresis as habit. Thomas
designates synteresis the “law of our understanding inasmuch as it
is the habit of keeping the precepts of natural law, which are the
first principles of human activity” (Aquinas, Law and Political
Theory, 77).
[xlviii][48]
See a discussion of Perkins’ concept of conversion in Mark R.
Shaw, “The Marrow of Practical Divinity: A Study in the Theology
of William Perkins,” (Th.D. diss., Westminster Theological
Seminary, 1981), 111-53. In this section of Book 1 Perkins also
summarizes briefly some of his earlier teaching on the nature of
conscience. Perkins’ tone can be described as gentle, highly
sympathetic, practical and extremely pastoral, especially in his
excursus on comforting the distressed.
[xlix][49]
William Perkins, The Whole Treatise of the Cases of Conscience,
Distinguished into Three Bookes (London: John Legat, Printer to
the University of Cambridge, 1606; repr. The English Experience: Its
Record in Early Printed Books Published in Facsimile, no. 482.
Amsterdam: Theatrum Orbis Terrarum Ltd., and New York: Da Capo
Press, Inc., 1972), 1.8.5.
[l][50]
Perkins first addresses assurance of faith in terms of case-divinity
in an entirely separate and small work on casuistry (already
referred to in Chapter III above) entitled A Case of Conscience,
the Greatest thatever was: how a man may know whether he be the
child of God, or no in Workes, 1.421-1.428. The
resolution to this case of conscience is anchored in Psalm 15 and
the first Epistle of John and proceeds in discourse form between the
Church and the Apostle (for 1 John) and Jehovah and David (for Psalm
15). (See Shaw, “Perkins,” 154-213, for a look at Perkins’
doctrine of assurance in connection with worship.)
Although I
would not say that the issue of assurance of faith was not important
for William Ames, we can certainly say that Ames did not afford it
the priority that Perkins did. It would be interesting to pursue the
assertion, I believe legitimate, that to center faith in the
volition (Ames) as opposed to the intellect (Perkins) preempts
overdue concern with assurance of faith/salvation. If it can be said
that there is an undercurrent in Ames’ casuistry, it is clearly
the theme of obedience, the responsibility of living a life to God.
[li][51]
Perkins, Conscience, 1.2.3-1.2.11; especially 1.2.10-1.2.11.
[lii][52]
Perkins both apologizes for and explains the usefulness of these
proofs in this manner: “I doe not meane to dispute the question,
whether there be a God or no; and thereby minister occasion of
doubting and deliberation in that which is the onely maine Ground
and pillar of Christian religion: But rather my purpose is, in
shewing that there is a God, to remoove, or at least to help an
inward corruption of the soule that is great and dangerous, whereby
the heart and conscience by nature denieth God and his providence.
The wound in the bodie that plucks out the heart, is the most
dangerous wound that can be: and that opinion that takes away the
Godhead, doth in effect rend and plucke out the very heart of the
soule (Ibid., 2.2, Introductory question).
[liii][53]
Ibid. Closely following Thomas, the existence of God can be seen
from nature, grace and glory, Perkins maintains (cf., Aquinas, Nature
and Grace, 1.2.3). From the realm of nature and creation,
Perkins advances “five distinct arguments . . . the consideration
whereof will not be unprofitable, even to him that is best setled in
this point” (Perkins, Conscience, 2.2.1). And with this
justification, he repeats Thomas’ arguments for the existence of
God. Perkins employs a mixture, as it were, of revelation and sense
experience, to which he applies his powers of intellect. Recall that
Thomas’ cosmological arguments relied on pure sense experience and
mentioned nothing of divine revelation (ibid.). Perkins’
“proofs” from nature can be characterized as grounded in
scriptural revelation and viewed from a cosmological and
teleological perspective; he cannot let go of Thomas completely. On
the other hand, however, Anselm’s argument from pure abstract
thought, is, as expected, absent altogether from Perkins.
[liv][54]
Perkins’ coverage of the Sabbath is the longest chapter in all of
Book 2, which length is approached only by the chapters on baptism,
the scriptures and the godhead (the latter of which is, primarily,
his teaching on the existence of God summarized above). The nature
of the work is highly practical and pastoral, with corrections to
current (typically papist) views made clear. Thus, although the
writing is robustly anti-papist, it is generally not vehement,
except where practices of the Roman Catholic Church are particularly
detestable and heretical. At times Perkins employs an Aristotelian
style of discourse, and rapidly disposes of any opposition to his
casuistic teaching with biblical texts. It could be said that this
second book follows the pattern of commands found in Table 1 of the
moral law.
[lvi][56]
Such as a conscience which is good, bad, or weak; one which errs,
doubts, surmises; its interaction with the Law; and so on (Ames, Conscience,
1.3-1.15).
[lvii][57]
Ibid., Book 1, pp. 49-55. No doubt the 38 theses and four
corollaries defended by Ames for his doctoral degree at Franeker
under Sibrandus Lubbertus on May 27, 1622. See Sprunger, Ames,
74.
[lviii][58]
Ames, Conscience, 2.1.1.
[lx][60]
And preparationism is taught as well
[lxi][61]
Ibid., 3.1, Preamble.
[lxiii][63]
Or, in expanded form, wisdom, humility, sincerity, zeal, peace,
prudence, fortitude, patience, temperance, etc.
[lxiv][64]
Ames, Conscience, 3.
[lxv][65]
Observed by Eusden, “Introduction” in Marrow, 49.
[lxvi][66]
Which were primarily detailed definitional statements and conceptual
elaboration on conscience, instruction on entry into and maintenance
of the Christian life and exhortation to obedience through the
exercise of the cardinal virtues.
[lxix][69]
This is in addition to the extensive coverage already afforded these
concepts in ibid., 2.2-2.7.
[lxxi][71]
Over a quarter of a century ago, Breward observed that “Hooker’s
thomism has long been common knowledge, but there has been little
investigation into the thomism of the puritans and second generation
protestant theologians” (Breward, Perkins, 53). Although
more is known now of the Puritan’s intellectual indebtedness, for
our purposes we have established that this debt is huge indeed,
especially to Thomas, and especially in the work of William Ames.
It appears
that William Ames was much more apt to seek the advice and input of
medieval Roman Catholic scholars than was William Perkins. We have
only scratched the surface, as it were. Roman Catholic Cardinal
Robert Bellarmine (1542-1621) and medieval theologian William of
Paris also make appearances in Ames’ work, both in polemic (in the
case of the former) and in approval (in the case of the latter).
Ames saw fit to append Book 2 of Conscience with a number of
pages of teaching on temptation penned by the thirteenth-century
Bishop of Paris. Noteworthy, too, is Ames’ ambivalence toward
Spanish Jesuit philosopher Francisco Suárez (1548-1617), a
colleague of Bellarmine at a Jesuit college in Rome. Suárez’s
dualism Ames abhorred, but his thomistic theory of law is almost
straight from this Jesuit, “the last of the Schoolmen.”
According to Eusden, the sabbatarianism of the Reformed tradition
owes much to the findings of the late scholastics, particularly Suárez
(Eusden, “Introduction” in Marrow, 19, n. 40).
An excellent
sampling of the thought of Suárez is found in Selections from
Three Works. De Legibus, AC Deo Legislatore, 1612 Defensio Fidei
Catholicae et Apostolicare Adversus Anglicanae Sectae Errores, 1613
de Triplici Virtute Theologica, Fide, Spe, et Charitate, 1621,
Vol. Two, The Translation, prepared by Gwladys L. Williams, Ammi
Brown and John Waldron with certain revisions by Henry Davis, S. J.,
and an Introduction by James Brown Scott (Oxford: Clarendon Press
and London: Humphrey Milford, 1944; repr., Buffalo: William S. Hein
& Co., Inc., 1995).
[lxxii][72]
It is worth noting that despite Perkins’ stated opposition to the
Church of Rome, he was generally gentle. It is curious that Thomas
Pickering’s highly anti-papist introduction to Perkins’ Conscience
contrasts markedly with Perkins’ own Preface, a model of
tender pastoral exposition of Christ’s burden recorded in Isa 50:4
and the need of the church of the day for just such a healer of
souls. The Catholic Church isn’t even mentioned. Although Ames
shared this opposition, his significantly more scholarly bent
resulted in a library well-stocked with medieval thinkers. For a
study of Ames’ library, see Julius H. Tuttle, “Library of Dr.
William Ames,” Publications of the Colonial Society of
Massachusetts 19 (1911): 63-66.
[lxxiii][73]
German Protestant theologian Bartholomäus Keckermann (1571-1609), a
contemporary exponent of this dualism and favorite of Maccovius, is
quoted scornfully at length in Marrow.
[lxxiv][74]
Observed by Sprunger, Ames, 168.
[lxxv][75]
Ames, Conscience, “To the Reader.” However, the sentence
immediately following reads: “But they are without the life of
this Doctrine: and death is in their pot.”
[lxxvi][76]
“Vertue” said Perkins, “is a gift of the Spirit of God, and a
part of regeneration, whereby a man is made apt to live well.” How
was this different from the schoolmen? “And this I put in the
first place, to confute the received error of the wisest Heathen
Philosophers, which call Vertue an habite of the minde, obtained and
confirmed by custom, use, and practice” (Perkins, Conscience,
3.1). Yet Ames was willing to borrow yet again from these “Heathen
Philosophers” when he defines virtue as “a condition or habit by
which the will is inclined to do well.” But he placed it in the
will because, as we have already observed, the will “is the true
subject of theology” (Ames, Marrow, 2.2.4-2.2.7). An
important distinction between Ames and the Schoolmen on this point
is that, for Ames, virtue was a result of faith; for the
scholastics, it made one acceptable to God (ibid., 2.2.8-2.2.9).
[lxxvii][77]
In fact, one searches in vain for coverage of these scholastic
categories in standard, Reformed systematic theologies; nor do they
surface in theological dictionaries. In a popular dictionary of
philosophy under the entry “theological virtues,” the reader is
directed to the entry “Aquinas” (Cambridge Dictionary of
Philosophy, 31-34, 103, 842). Emphasis on the four cardinal
virtues as principles of the virtuous life, an emphasis picked up by
both Ames and Perkins, reaches back to Cicero and to Plato before
him.
[lxxviii][78]
Richard Baxter’s work represents Puritan casuistry in its most
developed (some might say “over-developed”) form. See
particularly his A Christian Directory: or, A Summ of Practical
Theologie, and Cases of Conscience (London: By Robert White for
Nevil Simmons, 1673); see also the following: The Life of Faith,
as it is the Evidence of Things Unseen (London: Printed by R. W.
and A. M. for Francis Tyton and Jane Underhill, 1660) and The
Practical Works of Richard Baxter, Introduction and life by
William Orme, 23 vols. (London: James Duncan, 1830; reprint ed. in 4
vols., London: George Virtue, 1857 and Ligonier, PA: Soli Deo Gloria
Publications, 1990-91). See also James M. Phillips, “Between
Conscience and the Law: The Ethics of Richard Baxter (1615-1691),”
(Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1959).
Copyright
© 2002, by J. van Vliet,
Ph.D. Glenside,
Pennsylvania |
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